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  1. Not every truth could have a truthmaker.John Stigall - 2023 - Theoria 89 (1):7-13.
    Mark Jago argues for truthmaker maximalism in some recent papers based on a key premise: that every truth could have a truthmaker. Jago contends that many would pretheoretically accept this principle and that counterexamples to it would be difficult to find. In this note, I show how truthmaker non-maximalists can use a modified version of Peter Milne's argument against maximalism to provide a counterexample to this key premise.
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  • Introduction to the special issue “Logical perspectives on science and cognition”.Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Peter Brössel, Alexander Gebharter & Markus Werning - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1381-1390.
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