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Philosophy and 'super'computation

In Terrell Ward Bynum & James Moor (eds.), The Digital Phoenix: How Computers are Changing Philosophy. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 231--252 (1998)

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  1. Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test.Selmer Bringsjord, P. Bello & David A. Ferrucci - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):3-27.
    The Turing Test is claimed by many to be a way to test for the presence, in computers, of such ``deep'' phenomena as thought and consciousness. Unfortunately, attempts to build computational systems able to pass TT have devolved into shallow symbol manipulation designed to, by hook or by crook, trick. The human creators of such systems know all too well that they have merely tried to fool those people who interact with their systems into believing that these systems really have (...)
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  • Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and More.Mark Phillips, Selmer Bringsjord & M. Zenzen - 2003 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    When Ken Malone investigates a case of something causing mental static across the United States, he is teleported to a world that doesn't exist.
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  • (1 other version)Why did evolution engineer consciousness?Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel - 1998 - In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
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  • Toward a formal philosophy of hypercomputation.Selmer Bringsjord & Michael Zenzen - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (2):241-258.
    Does what guides a pastry chef stand on par, from the standpoint of contemporary computer science, with what guides a supercomputer? Did Betty Crocker, when telling us how to bake a cake, provide an effective procedure, in the sense of `effective' used in computer science? According to Cleland, the answer in both cases is ``Yes''. One consequence of Cleland's affirmative answer is supposed to be that hypercomputation is, to use her phrase, ``theoretically viable''. Unfortunately, though we applaud Cleland's ``gadfly philosophizing'' (...)
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  • A refutation of Penrose's Godelian case against artificial intelligence.Selmer Bringsjord - 2000
    Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the G\"{o}delian attack he articulated in his {\em The Emperor's New Mind}, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious G\"{o}delian case, expressed in and 3 of his {\em Shadows of the Mind}. The core argument in these chapters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is (...)
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