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  1. Political Equality and Political Sufficiency.Adrian Blau - 2023 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 10 (1):23-46.
    The distinction between equality and sufficiency, much discussed in the distributive justice literature, is here applied to democratic theory. Overlooking this distinction can have significant normative implications, undermining some defences and criticisms of political equality, as I show by discussing the work of three prominent democratic theorists: Thomas Christiano, David Estlund, and Mark Warren. Most importantly, Christiano sometimes defends egalitarian conclusions using sufficientarian premises, or worries about inequality in situations where insufficiency is also part of the problem; inequality above the (...)
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  • Should campaign finance reform aim to level the playing field?Ryan Pevnick - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (4):358-373.
    Many argue that an important goal of campaign finance reform should be to ensure that competing candidates have roughly equal financial resources with which to contest campaigns. Although there are...
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  • Democracy’s Value: A Conceptual Map.Elena Ziliotti - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):407-427.
    The justification of democracy, while widely debated, is hindered by a sub-optimal conceptual framework. For a start, there is confusion about the basic terms in the discussion. Many theorists claim to support either the ‘intrinsic’ or the ‘instrumental’ value of democracy, but it is unclear what this exactly means. Can democracy have other kinds of values? What does it mean to value democracy intrinsically? As a result, at certain points, scholars are talking past one another and their assessments of their (...)
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  • Markets in Votes and the Tyranny of Wealth.James Stacey Taylor - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (3):313-328.
    A standard objection to a market in political votes is that it will enable the rich politically to dominate the poor. If a market in votes was allowed then the poor would be the most likely sellers and the rich the most likely buyers. The rich would thus accumulate the votes of the poor, and so the candidates elected and the policies passed would represent only their interests and not those of the electorate as a whole. To ensure that the (...)
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