In this book I argue that school integration is not a proxy for educational justice. I demonstrate that the evidence consistently shows the opposite is more typically the case. I then articulate and defend the idea of voluntary separation, which describes the effort to redefine, reclaim and redirect what it means to educate under preexisting conditions of segregation. In doing so, I further demonstrate how voluntary separation is consistent with the liberal democratic requirements of equality and citizenship. The position I (...) defend is not opposed to integration but rather is a justified response to the daily experience of frustration and disappointment with a system that has failed members of marginalized groups for too long. I argue that most voluntary separation experiments in education, far from being motivated by a sense of racial, cultural or religious exclusion, are in fact driven among other things by a desire for a quality education, not to mention community membership and self respect. As such, voluntary separation represents a morally robust pragmatic strategy that is able to answer liberal challenges concerning involuntary stratification, ethnocentrism and democratic deliberation. (shrink)

In this article I argue that while an attachment to one's country is both natural and even partially justifiable, cultivating loyal patriotism in schools is untenable insofar as it conflicts with the legitimate aims of education. These aims include the epistemological competence necessary for ascertaining important truths germane to the various disciplines; the cultivation of critical thinking skills ; and developing the capacity for economic self‐reliance. I argue that loyal patriotism may result in a myopic understanding of history, an unhealthy (...) attitude of superiority relative to other cultures, and a coerced sense of attachment to one's homeland. (shrink)

In order to facilitate cooperation to solve problems within a nation-state, a new approach which conceptualizes citizenship in terms of shared fate has been promoted to potentially ameliorate the tensions identified between civic liberty and solidarity. Proponents of an emphasis on shared fate frame it not in terms of a particular shared national identity, but in terms of participation in the shared project of the nation-state. The approach of singular shared fate rightly emphasizes the urgency of finding a common ground (...) for people to cultivate obligations to others and achieve sincere cooperation in a society. Unfortunately, in some cases it leaves room for some people to undermine the common ground and its good intention, however, as the promotion of a view of singular shared fate risks producing a hegemonic singular nation building project and predesigning an agreement before a truly inclusive and just dialogue among relevant stakeholders proceeds. To make the good intentions of the notion of shared fate realizable, a modification is explored, in recasting the concept of singular “shared fate” to plural “shared fates”. Given the situation that people in societies have the plural shared fates de facto, the view of plural shared fates recognizes that people will reject any singular substantial nation building project that has a predesigned direction. In current, divided societies, acknowledging multiple fates at the beginning, rather than predesigning a singular fate, can better provide a platform for all stakeholders to discuss their obligations to others toward sincere cooperation through equal co-construction of what is shared and what is not shared. To enhance civic education in a multicultural society, we suggest that complementing the concept of singular “shared fate” with a recognition of the value of plural “shared fates” can provide a context for all people to work together towards a more inclusive and just future. (shrink)

In this paper I explore how citizenship education might position students as always/everywhere political to diminish the pervasive belief that one either is or is not a “political person.” By focusing on how liberal and radical democracy are both necessary frameworks for engaging with issues of power, I address how we might reframe citizenship education to highlight the ubiquity of politics, offering a deepened sense of democracy. This reframing of citizenship education entails highlighting how liberalism and radical democracy are mutually (...) reinforcing when it comes to illustrating political life as entangled in power relations. My argument centers on Sigal Ben-Porath’s :381–395, 2012) concept of shared fate as a frame for citizenship education. In this model, students are habituated into thinking of democracy as an “enduring pluralism” in which their fates are connected to that of their fellow citizens. In this paper I recast shared fate education in the singular to an education of shared fates in the plural. By doing so I theorize how citizenship education might construct citizenship as relational, emotional, embedded in power, and uncomfortable. (shrink)

Québec’s model of cultural diversity, Interculturalism, has been the object of considerable debate since Bouchard and Taylor released in 2008 their now famous report, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation. Among other things, the authors recommended that schools take more seriously Québec’s Intercultural model as a means of bringing diverse cultures into a single society. In this dissertation I consider the uptake and implication of Intercultural ideals in Québec’s History and Citizenship education course. This study involved three secondary school (...) history teachers in Montreal Anglophone schools. Using Thacher’s “normative case study” as the methodological framework, I combine curriculum documents, classroom observations, open-ended interviews, and photo-voice methods to illuminate the Intercultural model’s shortcomings with regard to issues of power and identity. The guiding question for this dissertation is: how do the historicized power dynamics embedded within Québec’s Intercultural policy shape history education in Québec? Two sets of tensions are found to be at the crux of the issue of history teaching in Québec: first the theoretical debates on history education do not take Québec’s specific brand of cultural negotiation into account, resulting in a lack of research on the civic implications of history education particular to the Québec context. Second, the Intercultural model itself does not adequately deal with entrenched issues of power relating to marginalized identities, which raises many questions for how civic education is being carried out in the province. (shrink)

How should patriotism be handled in schools? We argue that schools cannot afford to ignore the topic, but nor are they justified in either promoting or discouraging patriotic feeling in students. The only defensible policy is for schools to adopt a stance of neutrality and teach the topic as a controversial issue. We go on to show that there is general support among British teachers and students for school neutrality on patriotism and that the currently preferred classroom practice is to (...) address patriotic ideas in the context of open discussion. We conclude with some discussion of the extensive and often hostile coverage of our research in the British press. (shrink)

History has long been taught in Australian schools with a view to encouraging patriotic citizenship. What has been taught and what is meant by patriotic Australian citizenship has changed markedly over the years. Current national initiatives to stimulate and direct the teaching of 'what we all know' to be Australian history may not meet the requirements of acceptable educational practice. The Commonwealth government may be better advised to pursue initiatives that encourage understanding of and commitment to the common weal.

If patriotism is morally unacceptable, as some philosophers believe, then also education for patriotism cannot be tolerated, although some other non-moral reasons might be in favour of such education. However, it seems that not all types of patriotism can be convincingly rejected as morally unacceptable. Even more, if MacIntyre’s claim is correct that patriotism is not only a virtue but also the foundation of morality, then schools ought to cultivate patriotism. For, in this context, patriotism is morally required. But if (...) this claim is mistaken and some sorts of patriotism are at best only morally allowed, as Primoratz argues, then schools are not obliged to cultivate patriotism. Although they are not required to cultivate it, they may promote morally acceptable types of patriotism such as “moderate patriotism”, “constitutional patriotism”, “republican patriotism” and “cosmopolitan patriotism”. And the contrary, extreme patriotism which leads to hostility towards other countries, international tensions and conflicts should not be promoted in schools. Therefore, the answer to the question as to whether education for patriotism is morally required, permitted or unacceptable depends on which kind of patriotism is being discussed. (shrink)

History has long been taught in Australian schools with a view to encouraging patriotic citizenship. What has been taught and what is meant by patriotic Australian citizenship has changed markedly over the years. Current national initiatives to stimulate and direct the teaching of ‘what we all know’ to be Australian history may not meet the requirements of acceptable educational practice. The Commonwealth government may be better advised to pursue initiatives that encourage understanding of and commitment to the common weal.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This study surveys debates on citizenship, the state, and the bases of political stability. The survey begins by presenting the primary sense of 'citizenship' as a legal status and the question of the sorts of political communities people can belong to as citizens. (Multi)nation-states are suggested as the main site of citizenship in the contemporary world, without ignoring the existence of alternative possibilities. Turning to discussions of citizen identity, the study shows that some of the discussion is motivated by a (...) perceived need for citizens to have a sense of political belonging, on the assumption that such a sense promotes political activity and has other personal and social benefits. But there are serious problems with the strategy of understanding the relevant sense of belonging in terms of identification with the nation-state. The study explores a more promising way to generate this sense of belonging. First, societies should function, to a sufficiently high degree, in accord with political principles of justice and democratic decision making. Second, there should be a general consensus on political principles among citizens, as well as high levels of engagement in democratic deliberation. (shrink)

Concerned with interreligious conflict in Indonesia, this study seeks to describe and evaluate the current citizenship education that has been designed and implemented for a democratic multireligious Indonesia. The context for the study, outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, is contemporary Indonesian society. Three features of this society are highlighted as especially significant. First, it is characterized by a wide diversity of religious groups. Second, it is governed by the state which acknowledges religious diversity with an official stance of interreligious (...) tolerance. Third, since 1998 it has adopted a democratic political system. The study begins by outlining how the state and national education has tried to meet demands of national unity and those of religious acknowledgment. The remainder of the study combines philosophical and qualitative empirical methods. In Chapter 3, I critically examine three contemporary liberal theories of citizenship education models. I suggest that these theories contain important insights relevant to a forward looking assessment of Indonesian citizenship educational policy and practice even though Indonesia is not a secular liberal democracy in the 'Western' mould. Specifically, I argue that what is critical to cultivate in multireligious Indonesia is the core idea of political liberalism – that is, the capacity for "public reasonableness" which involves the attitude and capacity to think, to judge and to behave in a way reasonable to pluralist societies. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on two case studies of public senior high schools in Jakarta and provide examples of citizenship education taking place in the education system. Overall, I found that although educational policy and the public schools I studied did indeed focus on civic knowledge transmission, the specific practices indicated mixed results for achieving the desired aims of citizenship education for a multireligious Indonesia. On the positive side, school settings were relatively diverse and facilitated a good deal of social interaction and created the potential for shared civic knowledge across religious differences. In some cases, friendships and cooperative relationships among religiously diverse students seemed to occur. On the negative side, there were cases of interreligious discrimination, misunderstanding, tension and conflict and these seemed to originate from a lack of open communication, and interreligious misunderstanding and ignorance. Furthermore, when it came to the official curriculum and classroom practice, both schools emphasized confessional religious education, ignored the internal diversity of religion, lacked exposure to religious diversity, deemphasized democratic deliberation and opposed interreligious dialogue. As such, I argue that the schools are missing a crucial element of citizenship education for "public reasonableness" as proposed by the political liberalism model studied in Chapter 3. I conclude that in order to meet the demands of creating a citizenry prepared to address the challenges of religious diversity, disagreement, and respectful interaction, Indonesian citizenship education should seek to encourage the following characteristics: 1) maintain and increase, where possible, religiously diverse school settings, 2) ensure fairness in accommodation of diversity, 3) intensify social interaction and practice of democracy and dialogue, 4) focus on the development of deep shared civic knowledge, and 5) develop interreligious conversation and knowledge of religious diversity. It is important to start talking about these issues or otherwise as Indonesians we will continue to combat one another, with all Indonesian citizens being the losers in the end. (shrink)