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Stit semantics grows out of a modal tradition in the logic of action that concentrates on an operator representing the agency of an individual in seeing to it that some state of affairs holds, rather than on the actions the individual performs in doing so. The purpose of this paper is to enrich stit semantics, and especially epistemic stit semantics, by supplementing the overall framework with an explicit treatment of action types. We show how the introduction of these new action (...) |
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This work provides proof-search algorithms and automated counter-model extraction for a class of STIT logics. With this, we answer an open problem concerning syntactic decision procedures and cut-free calculi for STIT logics. A new class of cut-free complete labelled sequent calculi G3LdmL^m_n, for multi-agent STIT with at most n-many choices, is introduced. We refine the calculi G3LdmL^m_n through the use of propagation rules and demonstrate the admissibility of their structural rules, resulting in auxiliary calculi Ldm^m_nL. In the single-agent case, we (...) |
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This paper studies intentional action in stit logic. The formal logic study of intentional action appears to be new, since most logical studies of intention concern intention as a static mental state. In the formalization we distinguish three modes of acting: the objective level concerning the choices an agent objectively exercises, the subjective level concerning the choices an agent knows or believes to be exercising, and finally, the intentional level concerning the choices an agent intentionally exercises. Several axioms constraining the (...) |
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This paper presents a short survey of recent developments in stit theories, with an emphasis on combinations of stit and deontic logic, and those of stit and epistemic logic. |
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This volume seeks to further the use of formal methods in clarifying one of the central problems of philosophy: that of our free human agency and its place in our indeterministic world. It celebrates the important contributions made in this area by Nuel Belnap, American logician and philosopher. Philosophically, indeterminism and free action can seem far apart, but in Belnap’s work, they are intimately linked. This book explores their philosophical interconnectedness through a selection of original research papers that build forth (...) |
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In this paper we propose a method for modeling social influence within the STIT approach to action. Our proposal consists in extending the STIT language with special operators that allow us to represent the consequences of an agent’s choices over the rational choices of another agent. |
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In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic, with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker and Lewis. A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish between deviant and non-deviant (...) |
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One of the best known approaches to the logic of agency are the ‘stit’ logics. Often, it is not the actions of an individual agent that bring about a certain outcome but the joint actions of a set of agents, collectively. Collective agency has received comparatively little attention in ‘stit’. The paper maps out several different forms, several different senses in which a particular set of agents, collectively, can be said to bring about a certain outcome, and examines how these (...) |
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This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...) |
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Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 3(4), 535–553. Segerberg, K. (1995). Conditional action. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals: From philosophy to computer science, Studies ... |
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STIT logic is a prominent framework for the analysis of multi-agent choice-making. In the available deontic extensions of STIT, the principle of Ought-implies-Can (OiC) fulfills a central role. However, in the philosophical literature a variety of alternative OiC interpretations have been proposed and discussed. This paper provides a modular framework for deontic STIT that accounts for a multitude of OiC readings. In particular, we discuss, compare, and formalize ten such readings. We provide sound and complete sequent-style calculi for all of (...) |
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We present cut-free labelled sequent calculi for a central formalism in logics of agency: STIT logics with temporal operators. These include sequent systems for Ldm , Tstit and Xstit. All calculi presented possess essential structural properties such as contraction- and cut-admissibility. The labelled calculi G3Ldm and G3Tstit are shown sound and complete relative to irreflexive temporal frames. Additionally, we extend current results by showing that also Xstit can be characterized through relational frames, omitting the use of BT+AC frames. |
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This article proposes the use of temporal logic for an analysis of instrumentality inspired by the work of G.H. von Wright. The first part of the article contains the philosophical foundations. We discuss von Wright’s general theory of agency and his account of instrumentality. Moreover, we propose several refinements to this framework via rigorous definitions of the core notions involved. In the second part, we develop a logical system called Temporal Logic of Action and Expectations (TLAE). The logic is inspired (...) |
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This paper explores the analysis of ability, where ability is to be understood in the epistemic sense—in contrast to what might be called a causal sense. There are plenty of cases where an agent is able to perform an action that guarantees a given result even though she does not know which of her actions guarantees that result. Such an agent possesses the causal ability but lacks the epistemic ability. The standard analysis of such epistemic abilities relies on the notion (...) |
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This paper presents two general results of decidability concerning logics based on an indeterministic metric tense logic, which can be applied to, among others, logics combining knowledge, time and agency. We provide a general Kripke semantics based on a variation of the notion of synchronized Ockhamist frames. Our proof of the decidability is by way of the finite frame property, applying subframe transformations and a variant of the filtration technique. |
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This paper presents proofs of completeness and decidability of a non-temporal fragment of an Xstit logic. This shows a distinction between the non-temporal fragments of Xstit logic and regular stit logic since the latter is undecidable. The proof of decidability is via the finite model property. The finite model property is shown to hold by constructing a filtration. However, the set that is used to filter the models isn’t simply closed under subformulas, it has more complex closure conditions. The filtration (...) |
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We consider the propositional logic equipped withChellas stitoperators for a finite set of individual agents plus the historical necessity modality. We settle the question of whether such a logic enjoys restricted interpolation property, which requires the existence of an interpolant only in cases where the consequence contains no Chellas stit operators occurring in the premise. We show that if action operators count as logical symbols, then such a logic has restricted interpolation property iff the number of agents does not exceed (...) |
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