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Span Operators

Analysis 67 (1):72-79 (2007)

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  1. Tense Logic.Ulrich Meyer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):406-419.
    This article surveys some of the key issues that arise when one tries to use tense logic as a metaphysical theory of the nature of time. Topics discussed include basic tense logic, tense logic and verb tense, the structure of the time series, instants of time, quantified tense logic, and the expressive resources of tense logic.
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  • A Sketch of a Presentist Theory of Passage.Jonathan Tallant - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):133-140.
    In this paper I look to develop a defence of “presentist temporal passage” that renders presentism immune from recent arguments due to Eric Olson. During the course of the paper, I also offer comment on a recent reply to Olson’s argument due to Ian Phillips. I argue that it is not clear that Phillips’ arguments succeed.
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  • Essays in Formal Metaphysics.Daniel Rubio - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswick
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  • (1 other version)Hyperintensionality and Ontological Categories.James Miller - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1–19.
    In this paper, I discuss how to distinguish between ontological categories and ordinary categories. Using an argument against van Inwagen’s proposed account of what makes a category ontological as a springboard, I argue that if ontological categories are modally robust, then ontological categories need to be understood hyperintensionally. This conclusion opens up a wide range of new ways to define ‘ontological category’, and I close by briefly outlining one such way in order to illustrate the advantages of embracing hyperintensionality in (...)
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  • A Believable A-Theory.Alexander Jackson - manuscript
    The A-theory of time is plagued by certain standard armchair problems: the presentism–eternalism dilemma, the problem of truth-makers, the alleged impossibility of cross-temporal relations, and the problem of temporary intrinsics. These challenges supposedly force A-theories to make incredible claims. I argue that these challenges are not deep antinomies in common sense, but rest on avoidable mistakes. Then I present a new A-theory that shows what’s possible once we move past the old problems. On this proposal, time’s passing is a metaphysically (...)
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  • Presentism and the Spans of Time.Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):200-214.
    Presentists, who believe that only present entities exist, face a problem of how to analyse tensed plural quantification. The idea, in broad outline, is that presentists can't employ the usual method for analysing tensed singular quantification, using primitive ‘slice’ tense operators, to analyse plurals. One option is to introduce a new theoretical primitive: a ‘span’‐operator. But there are reasons to worry about this option. For one, we might agree with Lewis that span‐operators are ill‐behaved or introduce unpalatable complexity. For another, (...)
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  • Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and (...)
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  • Presentism and Truthmaking.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
    Three plausible views—Presentism, Truthmaking, and Independence—form an inconsistent triad. By Presentism, all being is present being. By Truthmaking, all truth supervenes on, and is explained in terms of, being. By Independence, some past truths do not supervene on, or are not explained in terms of, present being. We survey and assess some responses to this.
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  • Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi.Berit “Brit” Brogaard - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):556-581.
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  • The world as I found it. A subjectivist metaphysics of the mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2015 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona
    The first part of this thesis articulates and defends the Subjectivist View of the Mental. According to this view, my mental states are essentially different from the mental states of everyone else, but the fact that they are is a subjective fact, rather than an objective one. Chapter 1 explains what it takes for a fact to be subjective, what kind of difference holds between my mental states and everyone else's mental states and what kind of intuitions lead me to (...)
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  • Still cheating, still prospering.Jonathan Tallant - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):502-506.
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  • Presentism, eternalism and where things are located.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2963-2974.
    In several recent papers, Daniel Deasy has argued that the presentism–eternalism debate is unclear and should be abandoned. According to Deasy, there is no way of spelling out the predicate ‘is present’ that leads to a satisfactory definition of presentism: on some interpretations, presentism turns out to be compatible with eternalism, on others, it is clearly false or unacceptable for other reasons. The aim of this paper is to show that this line of argument should be resisted: if the predicate (...)
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  • Frankfurt counter-example defused.Brendan Larvor - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):506-508.
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  • (1 other version)Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?Sam Baron - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):153-173.
    In this article I consider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematical Platonism with serious presentism. I argue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if one accepts (...)
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  • (1 other version)Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?Sam Baron - 2014 - Theoria 80 (2):153-173.
    In this articleIconsider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematicalPlatonism with serious presentism.Iargue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if one accepts the indispensability argument for mathematical (...)
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