The amount of information conveyed by linguistic conventions depends on their precision, yet the codes that humans and other animals use to communicate are quite ambiguous: they may map several vague meanings to the same symbol. How does semantic precision evolve, and what are the constraints that limit it? We address this question using a multiplayer gaming app, where individuals communicate with one another in a scaled-up referential game. Here, the goal is for a sender to use black and white (...) symbols to communicate colors. We expected that the players’ mappings between symbols and colors would grow more specific over time, through a selection process whereby precise mappings are preferentially copied. We found that players become increasingly more precise in their use of symbols over the course of their interactions. This trend did not, however, result from selective copying of precise mappings. We explore the implications of this result for the study of lexical ambiguity, Zipf's Law of Meaning, and disagreements over semantic conventions. (shrink)

Traditional explanations for the presence of ambiguous words in natural language have focused on the cost of added complexity that would accompany unambiguous languages. In these theories, ambiguity arises because it represents the optimal trade-off between the informational benefits from precision and the costs for rich languages. In this paper, we suggest that ambiguity remains an inevitable feature of learning languages even without complexity costs. We show that ambiguous words occur more frequently and will therefore be learned more readily, thus (...) triggering more semantic activations between senses of the ambiguous word. We illustrate this through a game-theoretical example. (shrink)

The language we use over the course of conversation changes as we establish common ground and learn what our partner finds meaningful. Here we draw upon recent advances in natural language processing to provide a finer‐grained characterization of the dynamics of this learning process. We release an open corpus (>15,000 utterances) of extended dyadic interactions in a classic repeated reference game task where pairs of participants had to coordinate on how to refer to initially difficult‐to‐describe tangram stimuli. We find that (...) different pairs discover a wide variety of idiosyncratic but efficient and stable solutions to the problem of reference. Furthermore, these conventions are shaped by the communicative context: words that are more discriminative in the initial context (i.e., that are used for one target more than others) are more likely to persist through the final repetition. Finally, we find systematic structure in how a speaker's referring expressions become more efficient over time: Syntactic units drop out in clusters following positive feedback from the listener, eventually leaving short labels containing open‐class parts of speech. These findings provide a higher resolution look at the quantitative dynamics of ad hoc convention formation and support further development of computational models of learning in communication. (shrink)

In Lewisean signaling games with common interests, perfect signaling strategies have been shown to be optimal in terms of communicative success and evolutionary fitness. However, in signaling game models that involve contextual cues, ambiguous signaling strategies can match up to or even outperform perfect signaling. For a minimalist example of such a context signaling game, I will show that three strategy types are expected to emerge under evolutionary dynamics: perfect signaling, partial ambiguity and full ambiguity. Moreover, I will show that (...) partial ambiguity strategies are the most expected outcome and have the greatest basin of attraction among these three types when sender and receiver costs are arbitrarily small or similar. I will demonstrate that the evolutionary success of partial ambiguity is due to being risk dominant, which points to a better compatibility with other strategy types. (shrink)