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  1. What (if anything) morally separates environmental from neurochemical behavioral interventions?Viktor Ivanković - 2023 - Neuroethics 17 (1):1-14.
    Drawing from the literatures on the ethics of nudging and moral bioenhancement, I elaborate several pairs of cases in which one intervention is classified as an environmental behavioral intervention (EBI) and the other as a neurochemical behavioral intervention (NBI) in order to morally compare them. The intuition held by most is that NBIs are by far the more morally troubling kind of influence. However, if this intuition cannot be vindicated, we should at least entertain the _Similarity Thesis_, according to which (...)
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  • At odds with the truth.William Simkulet - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):548-550.
    > The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to. 1 - Harry Frankfurt In both lying and truth-telling, the speaker intends the audience to believe what she says is true; that her enterprise is (...)
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  • Tolerant paternalism: pro-ethical design as a resolution of the dilemma of toleration.Luciano Floridi - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (6):1669-1688.
    Toleration is one of the fundamental principles that inform the design of a democratic and liberal society. Unfortunately, its adoption seems inconsistent with the adoption of paternalistically benevolent policies, which represent a valuable mechanism to improve individuals’ well-being. In this paper, I refer to this tension as the dilemma of toleration. The dilemma is not new. It arises when an agent A would like to be tolerant and respectful towards another agent B’s choices but, at the same time, A is (...)
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  • The Ethical Merits of Nudges in the Clinical Setting.Ester Moher & Khaled El Emam - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics 15 (10):54-55.
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  • Nudging, informed consent and bullshit.William Simkulet - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):536-542.
    Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person’s behaviour without restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent. I assume informed consent requires (...)
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  • Nudging in Context: Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Nudging and Informed Consent”.Shlomo Cohen - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (11):W1 - W6.
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  • Public health nudges: weighing individual liberty and population health benefits.Derek Soled - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11):756-760.
    Libertarian paternalism describes the idea of nudging—that is, steering individual decision-making while preserving freedom of choice. In medicine, libertarian paternalism has gained widespread attention, specifically with respect to interventions designed to promote healthy behaviours. Some scholars argue that nudges appropriately balance autonomy and paternalistic beneficence, while others argue that nudges inherently exploit cognitive weaknesses. This paper further explores the ethics of libertarian paternalism in public health. The use of nudges may infringe on an individual’s voluntary choice, autonomy and informed consent, (...)
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  • Why we should not “help bad choosers:” screening, nudging, and epistemic risk.Jay Zameska - 2024 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 27 (3):419-429.
    One prominent line of support for nudging in screening programs is the claim that nudging can help ‘bad choosers’ — that is, it can help some patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. In this article, I argue that due to the presence of epistemic risk in many screening programs, the argument that nudging can help ‘bad choosers’ should be revised or rejected. Expanding on the work of Biddle, J. B. 2020. Epistemic risks in cancer (...)
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