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What is a brain state?

Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742 (2006)

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  1. The Brain and its States.Richard Brown - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 211-238.
    In recent times we have seen an explosion in the amount of attention paid to the conscious brain from scientists and philosophers alike. One message that has emerged loud and clear from scientific work is that the brain is a dynamical system whose operations unfold in time. Any theory of consciousness that is going to be physically realistic must take account of the intrinsic nature of neurons and brain activity. At the same time a long discussion on consciousness among philosophers (...)
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  • The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
    In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
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  • Towards a computational theory of experience.Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
    A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must (...)
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  • The semantics of moral communication.Richard Brown - 2008 - Dissertation, The Graduate Center, Cuny
    Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...)
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  • Fundamentals of whole brain emulation: State, transition and update representations.Randal A. Koene - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):5-21.
    Whole brain emulation aims to re-implement functions of a mind in another computational substrate with the precision needed to predict the natural development of active states in as much as the influence of random processes allows. Furthermore, brain emulation does not present a possible model of a function, but rather presents the actual implementation of that function, based on the details of the circuitry of a specific brain. We introduce a notation for the representations of mind state, mind transition functions (...)
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  • Phenomenal Intentionality and the Temporal Shape of Experience.Christopher M. Stratman - 2023 - Disputatio 15 (68):55-89.
    This paper argues for the claim that the mental ontology required for what has been called the “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” (PIT) should be understood in terms of mental events or episodes, not mental states that instantiate phenomenal properties because the former but not the latter has a kind of temporal shape. I begin by laying out the basic commitments of PIT. I then introduce the notion of “temporal shape” and defend the following simple but powerful argument: (1) If conscious experiences (...)
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  • Experimental research in whole brain emulation: The need for innovativein vivomeasurement techniques.Randal A. Koene - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):35-65.
    Whole brain emulation aims to re-implement functions of a mind in another computational substrate with the precision needed to predict the natural development of active states in as much as the influence of random processes allows. Furthermore, brain emulation does not present a possible model of a function, but rather presents the actual implementation of that function, based on the details of the circuitry of a specific brain. We introduce a notation for the representations of mind state, mind transition functions (...)
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  • Replicating Cortical Signatures May Open the Possibility for “Transplanting” Brain States via Brain Entrainment.Alexander Poltorak - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15.
    Brain states, which correlate with specific motor, cognitive, and emotional states, may be monitored with noninvasive techniques such as electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography that measure macroscopic cortical activity manifested as oscillatory network dynamics. These rhythmic cortical signatures provide insight into the neuronal activity used to identify pathological cortical function in numerous neurological and psychiatric conditions. Sensory and transcranial stimulation, entraining the brain with specific brain rhythms, can effectively induce desired brain states correlated with such cortical rhythms. Because brain states have distinct (...)
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  • The standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience: Some lessons from Broca’s area.Marco Viola & Elia Zanin - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):945-969.
    Since cognitive neuroscience aims at giving an integrated account of mind and brain, its ontology should include both neural and cognitive entities and specify their relations. According to what we call the standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience, the aim of cognitive neuroscience should be to establish one-to-one mappings between neural and cognitive entities. Where such entities do not yet closely align, this can be achieved by reforming the cognitive ontology, the neural ontology, or both. In order to assess the (...)
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