Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why is Bayesian Confirmation Theory Rarely Practiced?Robert W. P. Luk - 2019 - Science and Philosophy 7 (1):3-20.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is a leading theory to decide the confirmation/refutation of a hypothesis based on probability calculus. While it may be much discussed in philosophy of science, is it actually practiced in terms of hypothesis testing by scientists? Since the assignment of some of the probabilities in the theory is open to debate and the risk of making the wrong decision is unknown, many scientists do not use the theory in hypothesis testing. Instead, they use alternative statistical tests that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Is Bayesian Confirmation For?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.
    ABSTRACTPeter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussed—it can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Confirmation and the Ordinal Equivalence Thesis.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2017 - Synthese:1-17.
    According to a widespread but implicit thesis in Bayesian confirmation theory, two confirmation measures are considered equivalent if they are ordinally equivalent—call this the “ordinal equivalence thesis”. I argue that adopting OET has significant costs. First, adopting OET renders one incapable of determining whether a piece of evidence substantially favors one hypothesis over another. Second, OET must be rejected if merely ordinal conclusions are to be drawn from the expected value of a confirmation measure. Furthermore, several arguments and applications of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Confirmation and the Ordinal Equivalence Thesis.Olav B. Vassend - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1079-1095.
    According to a widespread but implicit thesis in Bayesian confirmation theory, two confirmation measures are considered equivalent if they are ordinally equivalent—call this the “ordinal equivalence thesis”. I argue that adopting OET has significant costs. First, adopting OET renders one incapable of determining whether a piece of evidence substantially favors one hypothesis over another. Second, OET must be rejected if merely ordinal conclusions are to be drawn from the expected value of a confirmation measure. Furthermore, several arguments and applications of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.
    The current state of inductive logic is puzzling. Survey presentations are recurrently offered and a very rich and extensive handbook was entirely dedicated to the topic just a few years ago [23]. Among the contributions to this very volume, however, one finds forceful arguments to the effect that inductive logic is not needed and that the belief in its existence is itself a misguided illusion , while other distinguished observers have eventually come to see at least the label as “slightly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations