- The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina Maria Lissia & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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Certain and Uncertain Inference with Indicative Conditionals.Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Probability for Trivalent Conditionals.Paul Égré, Lorenzo Rossi & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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Justifying Scientific Progress.Jacob Stegenga - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91:543-560.details
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Reply to Sprenger’s “A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence”.Fabian Pregel - 2024 - Philosophy of Science 91 (1):243-252.details
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The Wisdom of the Small Crowd: Myside Bias and Group Discussion.Edoardo Baccini, Stephan Hartmann, Rineke Verbrugge & Zoé Christoff - forthcoming - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.details
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The Myside Bias in Argument Evaluation: A Bayesian Model.Edoardo Baccini & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 44:1512-1518.details
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Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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Conditionals, Causal Claims and Objectivity.Michał Sikorski - 2020 - Dissertation, Università di Torinodetails
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Rethinking the Acceptability and Probability of Indicative Conditionals.Michał Sikorski - 2022 - In Stefan Kaufmann, Over David & Ghanshyam Sharma (eds.), Conditionals: Logic, Linguistics and Psychology. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Computational modeling in philosophy: introduction to a topical collection.Simon Scheller, Christoph Merdes & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-10.details
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Abductive reasoning in cognitive neuroscience: weak and strong reverse inference.Fabrizio Calzavarini & Gustavo Cevolani - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-26.details
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Schema-Centred Unity and Process-Centred Pluralism of the Predictive Mind.Nina Poth - 2022 - Minds and Machines 32 (3):433-459.details
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Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity.Michael Deigan - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):355-373.details
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Revisiting the two predominant statistical problems: the stopping-rule problem and the catch-all hypothesis problem.Yusaku Ohkubo - 2021 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 30:23-41.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Meta-Empirical Support for Eliminative Reasoning.C. D. McCoy - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90:15-29.details
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Computational Modeling in Philosophy.Simon Scheller, Merdes Christoph & Stephan Hartmann (eds.) - 2022details
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Probability without Tears.Julia Staffel - 2023 - Teaching Philosophy 46 (1):65-84.details
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On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities.Gregory Wheeler & Fabio G. Cozman - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3761-3782.details
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Formal Methods.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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Assessing Scientific Theories: The Bayesian Approach.Stephan Hartmann & Radin Dardashti - 2019 - In Dawid Richard, Dardashti Radin & Thebault Karim (eds.), Epistemology of Fundamental Physics: Why Trust a Theory? Cambridge University Press. pp. 67–83.details
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Scientific method.Brian Hepburn & Hanne Andersen - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Causal Conditionals, Tendency Causal Claims and Statistical Relevance.Michał Sikorski, van Dongen Noah & Jan Sprenger - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1:1-26.details
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How to Assess the Epistemic Wrongness of Sponsorship Bias? The Case of Manufactured Certainty.Jon Leefmann - 2021 - Frontiers In 6 (Article 599909):1-13.details
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A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation à la Cartwright, or: fixing the chemical factory.Nina Retzlaff & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1467-1486.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Computational Philosophy.Patrick Grim & Daniel Singer - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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In Defence of an Inferential Account of Extrapolation.Tudor M. Baetu - 2021 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):81-100.details
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The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):177-193.details
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A New Approach to Testimonial Conditionals.Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn - 2020 - In Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn (eds.), CogSci 2020 Proceedings. Toronto, Ontario, Kanada: pp. 981–986.details
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Bayes Nets and Rationality.Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Jürgen Landes - 2022 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-7.details
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Non-Classical Probabilities for Decision Making in Situations of Uncertainty.Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):315-343.details
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The Rationality of Science and the Inevitability of Defining Prior Beliefs in Empirical Research.Ulrich Dettweiler - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:481878.details
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