Integrative social contracts theory is a novel approach to normative questions and has been widely evaluated, discussed, and applied by academics and practitioners alike. While the "I" in ISCT leads the title, it has not received the analytical attention it deserves, especially since the "integrative" component in ISCT is multifaceted and at the conceptual core of the theory. In this paper we therefore take a closer look at two facets of integration. First, we examine the normative integration that takes place (...) in ISCT. For our analysis we draw on theories of legitimacy and obligation. Second, given that empirical inquiry is an important part of the normative integration, we take a closer look at how research that has applied or used ISCT has embraced the empirical components of the theory. This analysis of the normative–empirical integration focuses on problems and realities of empirical inquiry in ISCT. (shrink)

Our decision-making is often subject to framing effects: alternative but equally informative descriptions of the same options elicit different choices. When a decision-maker is vulnerable to framing, she may consent under one description of the act, which suggests that she has waived her right, yet be disposed to dissent under an equally informative description of the act, which suggests that she has not waived her right. I argue that in such a case the decision-maker’s consent is simply irrelevant to the (...) permissibility of proceeding. I then consider two alternative views. According to the first, people susceptible to framing are able to give valid consent so long as they are sufficiently informed. This suggestion, I argue, maintains an overly narrow focus on mere quantity of information to the exclusion of other choice-affecting factors. A second response, which appeals to hypothetical consent, is likewise of little use in resolving the moral problem posed by framing effects. I conclude that if susceptibility to framing undermines the validity of consent, we may have good reason to reconsider whether consent has the rights-waiving function commonly attributed to it. (shrink)