This paper analyses the text Vital Dispositions Come Via Mandate (Xing Zi Ming Chu, 性自命出) and argues that central to its account of the cultivation of inner virtue are the affections (qing, 情), the heart-mind (xin, 心), and the techniques of the heart-mind (xinshu, 心术; or simply ‘culture’). Qing, it is argued, are intersubjective, socio-culturally produced non-sensory data that act on the heart-mind and serve as the foundation for moral behavior. Qing is encoded in cultural forms such as Music and (...) poetry. Hence, there is an internal relationship between qing, xin, and xinshu. Correctly understanding the connection between these and how they shape the human being will help elucidate the nature of the Confucian moral program. In foregrounding qing, this paper presents Confucian moral philosophy as grounded in a hermeneutic and sympathetic understanding of the perspective of the other. (shrink)

This paper articulates the relationship between knowledge and qing 情 in the Zhuangzi. I argue that Zhuangzi has a twofold view of qing, which is structurally similar to his view of knowledge. I sta...

The Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 presents a distinctive account of human dispositions that centers on the spontaneous arising of affects like joy and sadness. This focus on emotion grounds a particular conception of the function of music and ritual that gives music a central role in self-cultivation. Although the account of human dispositions in XZMC was ultimately overshadowed by the opposing views of Mengzi 孟子 and Xunzi 荀子 and the question of whether our dispositions are good or bad, its (...) views remained central for Ru 儒 philosophy of music. The first three parts of the essay trace the development of the ideas appearing in XZMC through the “Discourse on Music” chapter of the Xunzi and parts of the Yueji 樂記. The fourth section highlights the distinctiveness of XZMC’s account through a contrast with the views of Mengzi and Xunzi. The essay concludes by examining the ways in which, in accounting for ritual and music, both the Mengzi and Xunzi employ views like those of the XZMC, even if those are in tension with their core philosophical theories. (shrink)

This essay develops a comparison between the Stoic and Daoist theories of emotions in order to provide a new interpretation of the emotional life of the wise person according to the Daoist classic Zhuangzi 莊子, and to shed light on larger divergences between the Greco-Roman and Chinese intellectual traditions. The core argument is that both Zhuangzi and the Stoics believed that there is a peculiar kind of emotional responses that emerge by themselves and are therefore wholly natural, since they do (...) not involve evaluative judgment and desire, and distinguished them sharply from emotions, or “passions,” that arise as a result of mistaken evaluative judgments and artificial additions to things as they are, as well as to self-emerging feelings themselves. It is argued that while both Zhuangzi and the Stoics acknowledged the natural and therefore normative status of self-emerging feelings, Zhuangzi assessed them more favorably than the Stoics. The final part of the essay suggests that this divergence can be ultimately traced to different dichotomies that structured the debates in both traditions: rational versus non-rational in the Greco-Roman tradition, and artificial versus natural in the Chinese. (shrink)

What is the viewpoint regarding the emotional lives of sages in the Zhuangzi 莊子? There are two conflicting positions in current scholarship: sages have emotions, and sages are without emotions. In this essay, we introduce these positions with their corresponding textual support and show that they are not satisfactory accounts. Specifically, we point out that the conflict arises as scholars adopt a static model of emotions. Thus, we propose that a better way to understand the emotional lives of sages is (...) to adopt a dynamic model of emotions characterized by the process of forgetting. Through the discussion of such a dynamic process, we show how conflicting textual evidence can be integrated into this dynamic process and, at the same time, be read consistently. Ultimately, we argue that the ideal emotional lives of sages in the Zhuangzi adopt a dynamic model of emotions characterized by the vacillation of activity of the mind between the state with and without emotions. (shrink)

“Heart-mind” has almost become the standard English translation of Mengzi’s concept of xin 心. However, it remains largely unsettled (1) on what basis xin can be regarded as possessing a mind aspect that allows it to function as a faculty that both feels and thinks, and (2) what role this mind aspect of xin plays in Mengzi’s ethics, which revolves around character formation. This paper aims to address these two questions through a detailed analysis of the original text and a (...) critical review of the relevant secondary literature. First, the paper argues that it is through the ability to si, which literally means “to think,” “to reflect,” and “to contemplate,” that xin can be understood as both an emotional and a rational faculty. Then, the paper demonstrates that si has the functions of being “attentive,” “associative,” “evaluative,” and “corrective,” which enable it to contribute to the process of self-cultivation by identifying, intensifying, and approving primitive moral feelings in an appropriate and self-regulating way. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe early Chinese idea of non-action refers not to spontaneity, as has been argued, but to a relation between agency and spontaneity. Non-action needs to be seen in connection with the idea...

This article examines the problem of mental partitioning and mental conflict in Han 漢 dynasty sources. It begins by outlining two Greek psychological models—the Platonic tripartite model and the Stoic monistic model—and explains the connection between the two psychological models and their differing descriptions of mental conflict. It then analyzes passages from a seldom discussed text, the _Extended Reflections_ (_Shenjian_ 申鑒), written by the Eastern Han thinker X un Yue 荀悅. A combined analysis of the _Extended Reflections_ with fragments from (...) other Han dynasty thinkers uncovers debates on mental partitioning and mental conflict that are in some ways analogous to those found in Greek philosophical literature. One view posits that the human psyche is composed of two parts capable of producing conflicting motivations. The other view sees all actions as stemming from a single psychological center. The conclusions of this article offer new perspectives on early Chinese moral psychology that have important implications for modern research on early Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

Among the various claims by early Chinese philosophers to hear someone’s de 德 or virtue through their music, the most astonishing statement may be found in the Yue Ji 樂記 : “Only Music cannot be faked”. While this classic Ru 儒 musical treatise on the development of human excellence in accordance with music is wide-ranging, the aim of this essay is narrow, in that it seeks to interpret this single sentence of the text by way of an explanation of the (...) reciprocal patterning between authentic emotions, character, and sound described by the Yue Ji. (shrink)

The concept of tong played an important role in early Chinese political thought, as in the “Shangtong” chapter of the Mozi and the “Liyun” chapter of the Liji. Nevertheless, tong as a political thought has received little scholarly attention. In this article, I diverge from the common understandings of tong as sameness or unity and call on etymological and textual evidence to suggest that tong fundamentally refers to “difference to one.” In light of this understanding of tong as “difference to (...) one,” I focus on the “Shangtong” and the “Liyun” and compare the two visions of political tong that the two chapters present. With this research, I argue that the “Shangtong” and “Liyun” represent two different political streams as to how to unite a society with early China’s differences and divisions. (shrink)

Li, often translated as "ritual" or "ritual propriety," is among the most controversial notions of the Confucian philosophy. Its strong association with the Zhou tradition has caused it to be regarded with suspicion by both Western and Chinese representatives of modernity, mainly on the basis of the Enlightenment insistence of progressive rationality and liberation from the yoke of tradition. This work endeavors to offer a more balanced discussion of li by approaching it from the point of view of the Confucian (...) view of learning or education. It offers a general philosophical discussion of the limitations of the critique of tradition and of rationality's claim to authority, leaning on several Western sources, notably Hans-Georg Gadamer, John Dewey and Pierre Bourdieu. Through an exposition of the ancient Chinese worldview of time and continuous change, it further points to the inevitability of li's adaptable and flexible nature. This underscores the argument, running through the work, that Confucius and his immediate followers did not endorse a program of returning to the Zhou tradition, but rather of reviving the "spirit" of the Zhou culture, involving active and personalized participation in tradition's sustention and evolution. An emphasis on li, therefore, is far from suggesting irrationality---such a view rather indicates the narrow definition of rationality as handed over from the Enlightenment "tradition." The difficulties with such a definition reveal themselves when trying to distinguish between education and indoctrination on a rational vs. irrational basis. The ancient Confucian philosophy of education and personal cultivation steers clear of these problems altogether while at the same time insisting on teaching methods that maximize the student's own initiative and personal realization. In this regard, li reveals itself as an indispensable pedagogical tool, both deepening students' understanding of the significance of their tradition, enabling them to realize their own contribution to its continuous unfolding and thereby providing them with a profound sense of meaning in their daily activities. The concluding chapter brings the issue to the present, and begins with a critical discussion of the prospects of li in the modern world. Lastly, it turns to the state of education both in the world at large and in the People's Republic of China, pointing out some problems for the development of effective education, but certainly some promising signs as well. (shrink)