This article has three main aims. First, it argues that the question of the inclusion of “non‐Western” thought in philosophy cannot be resolved by appealing to definitions of philosophy, as such definitions are an integral part of the epistemically hegemonic practices responsible for the exclusion of non‐Western thought in the first place. Second, it argues that philosophy is structurally Eurocentric. It makes this argument first by looking at metaphilosophy. It argues that metaphilosophy is primarily performative and that its performativity is (...) a form of boundary work that is engaged in hegemonic practices of the epistemic type. It then argues that philosophy as a whole is inescapably engaged in boundary work and hegemonic practices, some of which partake in structural Eurocentrism. Finally, it promotes sociometaphilosophy, an approach that draws from the new sociology of knowledge to identify illegitimate mechanisms of exclusion inscribed in the rules that codify philosophical practice. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to suggest, via case study, that if Anglo-American philosophy is to become more inclusive of non-western traditions, the discipline requires far greater efforts at self-scrutiny. I begin with the premise that Confucian ethical treatments of manners afford unique and distinctive arguments from which moral philosophy might profit, then seek to show why receptivity to these arguments will be low. I examine how ordinary good manners have largely fallen out of philosophical moral discourse in the (...) west, looking specifically at three areas: conditions in the 18th and 19th centuries that depressed philosophical attention to manners; discourse conventions in contemporary philosophy that privilege modes of analysis not well fitted to close scrutiny of manners; and a philosophical culture that implicitly encourages indifference or even antipathy toward polite conduct. I argue that these three areas function in effect to render contemporary discourse inhospitable to greater inclusivity where Confucianism is concerned and thus, more broadly, that greater self-scrutiny regarding unexamined, parochial western commitments and practices is necessary for genuine inclusivity. (shrink)

In contemporary academic philosophy, Chinese Philosophy remains a niche. This has a lot to do with its presentation, which often creates an impression of alienness and allegory, making its contribution, especially to analytical questions, not obvious. This paper examines how a change in presentation eases the inclusion of Chinese Philosophy into the mainstream. On the assumption that there has been an “activist turn” in the discipline in general, philosophical interest in a tradition that ranges from conceptual analysis, to ethics and (...) politics, but that is ultimately focused on motivating actions, becomes more relevant and pressing. Since, in much of Chinese Philosophy, the philosopher is an activist, if the wider discipline is indeed undergoing an “activist turn”, then there is a connection here that should be made. In this paper, the connection is explained using two examples, Mozi and Xu Fuguan. (shrink)

Using the example of cross-cultural philosophy’s relation to disciplinary philosophy, this article seeks to think through some of the issues relevant to diversifying philosophy as an academic discipline. Guided by James Tully’s ruminations on non-domination, it attempts to make a case for a practice of philosophy which is more attuned to its social situatedness in a postindustrial, liberal society. Within this context, it argues that disciplinary philosophy must seek to contribute to making meaning of our place in the world.

What factors shape the movement of systems of thought from one historical‐cultural context to another? This paper provides a preliminary answer to this question by constructing an analytic framework drawn from the sociology of philosophy, and it uses this framework to consider the prospects for the contemporary transposition of Confucianism from China to America. The central, though still provisional, conclusion is that while global power dynamics matter, the particular conditions of the “philosophical fields” of both the original and the recipient (...) locations are of primary importance in determining the extent and significance of any particular case of philosophical transposition. Therefore, due to the dynamics of the philosophical fields in both countries, it is unlikely that Confucianism will gain greater intellectual and political influence in the United States. (shrink)

Because of political, economic, technological, and other developments, foreigners who come as students or academics to practice philosophy in a country, geography, and culture other than their own are increasingly prevalent in academic philosophy today. Yet this reality is insufficiently discussed and is under‐thematized, so that it remains opaque even to foreigners themselves. This article seeks first to dissipate that opacity by developing an account of what it is like to be a foreigner in philosophy. I offer an understanding of (...) foreignness through a cluster of interrelated experiences, and I describe “existential dislocation” as the core experience that characterizes the foreigner. Next, the article follows some consequences of these descriptions and analyses. I address considerations of equality in the academy, and then I examine the significance of “existential dislocation” for the philosophical enterprise and propose that it occasions revitalizing possibilities for the discipline. (shrink)