‘Immanent criticism' has been discussed by philosophers of quite different persuasions, working in separate areas and in different traditions of philosophy. Almost all of them agree on roughly the same story about its origins: It is that Hegel invented immanent criticism, that Marx later developed it, and that the various members of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, refined it in various ways, and that they are all paradigmatic practitioners of immanent criticism. I call this the Continuity Thesis. There are four (...) different claims that interest me. Hegel is the originator of immanent criticism. Hegel's dialectical method is that of immanent criticism. Adorno practises immanent criticism and endorses the term as a description of his practice. Adorno's dialectical method is fundamentally Hegelian. In this article, I offer an account of immanent criticism, on the basis of which, I evaluate these four claims and argue that the Continuity Thesis should be rejected. (shrink)

The present essay aims to throw light on the study of dialectical thinking from a cultural-historical perspective. Different forms of dialectic are articulated as ideal types, including the Greek dialectic, the Hegelian dialectic, the contemporary German negative dialectic, the Chinese dialectic, and the Indian negative dialectic. These influential cultural products in the history of the East and the West, articulated as ideal types, serve as constellations that could facilitate further empirical studies on dialectical thinking. An understanding of the complexity of (...) these constellations reveals the pitfalls of investigating dialectical thinking without an appropriate conceptualization of the research target. With the ideal types of dialectic as "figure," and Vygotsky's thesis of the cultural-historical origin of higher psychological processes as "ground," we explore possibilities for further lines of inquiry on dialectical thinking. Adhering to the Scribnerian multilevel scheme that reconstructs Vygotsky's thesis, and returning to the core ideas of Vygotsky himself, we discover new, meaningful questions about the study of dialectical thinking. In the research area of "culture and cognition," consideration of a cultural-historical perspective appears to be both necessary and promising. (shrink)

In response to the increasingly acknowledged power of metaphor upon everyday and scientific thinking, the present essay aims to revitalize the metaphoric process in commonsense psychology from the interaction view perspective. As prerequisites, a historical review of the "man-the-scientist" metaphor inherited in commonsense psychology, and a situation analysis of its dormant state are attempted. With metaphorical imagination, a holistic-paradigmatic view of personal theories is postulated on the basis of new knowledge in the philosophy and history of science, namely, the Duhem (...) - Quine (holism) thesis and Kuhn's paradigmatic perspective of scientific activities. To optimize the metaphoric process, deliberations are made on the similarities as well as the differences between the principal subject (i.e. everyday activities) and the subsidiary subject (i.e. scientific activities). It is shown that the "man-the-scientist" metaphoric process can be far-reaching and dialectic in nature, resulting in fresh perspectives for understanding both everyday and scientific activities. The focus of the present essay lies in elaborating a more sophisticated view on personal theories, and in calling for a non-reductionist approach to the investigation of commonsense psychology. (shrink)

Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot be (...) considered sufficient in this respect. It does not enable us to defend the dialectical procedure against objections or to answer questions of method. In the following, a detailed reconstruction of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing' in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' will reveal basic structures of dialectical argumentation. As will be shown, antinomic structures play a key role. Such a 'reconstruction', however, will not be a simple confirmation of Hegelian texts, but will always have the character of a critique. In fact, it will turn out that in comparison with Hegel's development of categories, radical revisions are to be expected. ----- Bisherige Bemühungen, das Verfahren Hegelscher Dialektik einer Klärung näherzubringen, geben Anlass zur Skepsis. Die Frage: „Was ist Dialektik?“, so Dieter Henrich, sei „bisher ohne Antwort geblieben“. Das objektiv-idealistische Programm Hegels ist indes so sehr mit der Möglichkeit einer dialektischen Logik verknüpft, daß über die Stringenz dialektischer Argumentation Klarheit zu gewinnen ein dringliches Desiderat darstellt. Das aber ist nur auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der Dialektik möglich. Hegels eigene Methodenreflexion kann diesbezüglich nicht als zureichend erachtet werden. Sie versetzt uns nicht in die Lage, das dialektische Verfahren gegen Einwände zu verteidigen oder Methodenfragen zu beantworten. Im Folgenden sollen in einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Dialektik von ‘Sein’ und ‘Nichts’ in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ Grundstrukturen dialektischer Argumentation sichtbar gemacht werden. Wie gezeigt wird, kommt dabei antinomischen Strukturen eine Schlüsselfunktion zu. Eine solche 'Rekonstruktion' wird allerdings nicht eine umstandslose Bestätigung der Hegelschen Textvorlage sein können, sondern immer auch den Charakter einer Kritik haben. In der Tat wird sich ergeben, daß im Vergleich mit Hegels Kategorienentwicklung einschneidende Revisionen zu gewärtigen sind. (shrink)