We defend the moral and legal right to secede in accordance with plebiscitary theory. Our paper has three main goals. First, by offering a schematic characterization of plebiscitary theory, the main arguments in its favour (and the main objections to them), we contribute to clarify the structure of this complex debate. Second, we stress the point that, if the moral right to secede is established, the resistance for its inclusion into positive law is unjustified. Finally, by addressing old and new (...) objections to plebiscitary theory, we hope to make a compelling case for a wider recognition of secessionist rights. (shrink)

This article asks whether states have a right to close their borders because of their right to self-determination, as proposed recently by Christopher Wellman, Michael Walzer, and others. It asks the fundamental question whether self-determination can, in even its most unrestricted form, support the exclusion of immigrants. I argue that the answer is no. To show this, I construct three different ways in which one might use the idea of self-determination to justify immigration restrictions and show that each of these (...) arguments fails. My conclusion is that the nature and value of self-determination have to do with the conditions of genuine self-government, not membership of political society. Consequently, the demand for open borders is fully consistent with respect to self-determination. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether there can be a right to secede from a liberal state by examining the concept of a liberal state and the different forms of liberalism that may be appealed to in order to justify secession. It argues that where the foundations of the state’s legitimacy are conceived in terms of a non-derivative right to self-determination, then secession from a liberal state may be a justified form of action for different types of groups including (...) ‘illiberal’ ones. If, however, a broader definition of political legitimacy is adopted – one that is predicated upon the liberal notions of individual moral autonomy and equality – then the right to independent statehood will generally not include a right to secede from a state that already upholds these principles. Consequently, liberal theorists of secession are forced to choose between particularizing a right of independent statehood to groups trapped in illiberal states, or acknowledging that the right to secede includes a right to establish an ‘illiberal’ state that bestows upon its citizens unequal rights and entitlements other than a right of exit. (shrink)

What is the moral value of formal democratic decision-making? Egalitarian accounts of democracy provide a powerful answer to this question. They present formal democratic procedures as a way for a society of equals to arrive at collective decisions in a transparent and mutually acceptable manner. More specifically, such procedures ensure and publicly affirm that all members of a political community, in their capacity as autonomous actors, are treated as equals who are able and have a right to participate in collective (...) decision-making. Recently, a number of authors have raised what I describe as the ‘no impact’ objection. This objection focuses on the egalitarian emphasis on autonomy to cast doubt on the moral value of formal democratic procedures. It holds that individual participation in formal democratic decision-making has no impact on the eventual result, and therefore cannot be understood as an exercise in autonomy. Consequently, the ‘no impact’ objection claims that the moral value of formal democracy cannot be explained with reference to an egalitarian ideal of ‘rule by the people’. In this article, I refute this objection by complementing an egalitarian account of democracy with an account of basic autonomy. (shrink)

Politics is about managing conflict, about how we should live together. Many traditions of thought and political thinkers have nonetheless taken this shared space of conflict, this we the people, as a given. The people is considered as a necessary precondition for politics. What happens when a part of this we disagrees with that? When, for some, this shared community is not taken as a given and claim their right to secede and build their own independent political community. Such claims (...) bear on the fundamental questions: who is the “ demos ”? who are the people entitled to self-government?’. (shrink)

L’interprétation d’un acte de violence de masse est toujours délicate puisqu’elle confère un certain statut au groupe visé. Ce statut peut devenir un facteur important dans la décision de la communauté internationale de reconnaître ou non l’indépendance d’un groupe et de son territoire. Cet article examine le cas de la reconnaissance du Kosovo par la communauté internationale, en février 2008, et soutient que cette reconnaissance a été rendue possible par l’utilisation d’arguments basés sur le statut collectif de victime de nettoyage (...) ethnique détenu par la population albanaise du Kosovo. L’article comble le fossé entre, d’un côté, la théorie de la sécession comme réparation, et de l’autre, les travaux sur la violence de masse contre les groupes ethnonationaux. L’analyse montre que la pratique de la reconnaissance étatique a été réorientée vers un critère restrictif lié au type de violence subie par le groupe réclamant l’indépendance. Dans cette optique, le territoire devient une forme tangible de compensation pour les injustices subies, ce qui tranche par rapport à la pratique antérieure de la reconnaissance étatique dans l’ex-Yougoslavie et ailleurs.The interpretation of an act of mass violence is always a contentious issue since it confers a certain status to the targeted group. This status may become an important factor in the international community’s decision to recognize or not the independence of a group and its territory. This article examines the case of Kosovo’s February 2008 recognition by the international community and argues that this recognition was made possible by the summoning of arguments based on Kosovo Albanians’ collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The article bridges the gap between on the one hand the Remedial Right theory of secession, and on the other hand, works on mass violence against ethnonational groups. The article shows that the practice of state recognition was reoriented towards a restrictive criterion linked to the type of violence sustained by the group claiming independence. Under this interpretation, territory becomes a tangible form of compensation for suffered injustices, which contrasts with earlier practice of state recognition in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of whether astatute of limitations on injustice is morallyjustified. Rectificatory justice calls for theascription of a right to rectification once aninjustice has been perpetrated. To claim amoral statute of limitations on injustice is toclaim a temporal limit on the moral legitimacyof rights to rectification. A moral statute oflimitations on injustice establishes an amountof time following injustice after which claimsof rectification can no longer be valid. Such astatute would put a time limit on the life ofall (...) moral rights to rectification. Sinceascribing a right to rectification for aninjustice is a requirement of justice, andsince the temporal limit called for by astatute of limitations on injustice is aconstraint on that requirement, the idea of astatute of limitations on injustice is morallyjustified only if we have good reasonsfor accepting this constraint. I argue that theidea of a moral statute of limitations oninjustice is not justified, since we lackgood reasons for imposing the constrainton justice it requires. (shrink)