How does match-fixing, or other unfair manipulation of matches, that involves under-performance by players, or refereeing and umpiring that prevents fair competition, be thought of in ethical terms? In this article, I outline the different forms that match-fixing can take and seek to comprehend these disparate scenarios within Kantian, Hegelian and contractualist ethical frameworks. I tentatively suggest that, by developing an ethical opposition to match-fixing in sport, we can give much greater substance to popular phrases such as ‘respect for the (...) game’, encompassing the value of sport itself and respect for other players, fans, sponsors and organisers. Arguing that match-fixing denies recognition to these ‘others’ demonstrates how fundamentally match-fixing ‘hollows out’ sport because a fixed match is of no worth: the whole value of the game has literally been evacuated. (shrink)

“What are you prepared to do to win?” This is a question that any serious competitor will at one time or another have to consider. The answer that one is inclined to make, I shall argue, is revealing of the deeper character of the individual participant in sport as both physical competitor and moral person. To that end, I examine one of the classic responses to the question, gamesmanship, which can be characterised as an attempt to win one game by (...) playing another. I contend that gamesmanship is a deliberate strategy of competition that has certain paradoxical outcomes; while it may produce an enhanced competitive environment that calls forth superior performances from participants, its more aggravated manifestations are in the long term athletically self-destructive for those who rely on them as a competitive device, and argue the presence of more profound underlying moral failings as well. (shrink)

As sports have become more professional, winning has become more important. This emphasis on results, rather than sporting virtue and winning in style, probably explains the rising incidence of the Strategic Foul. Surprisingly, it has found some apologists among the philosophers of sport. The discussion of the Strategic Foul in the literature has produced subtle distinctions (e.g. Cesar Torres: constitutive skills versus restorative skills) as well as implausible distinctions (e.g. D’Agostino: ‘impermissible’ but ‘acceptable’ behaviour). In this paper I will review (...) Robert Simon’s defence of strategic fouling and conclude that his justification is not convincing. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an Irreconcilability Thesis, claiming that two commonly held views about athletic contests are in fact incompatible. The first view is that athletic contests are essentially...

In this paper, I link philosophical discussion of policies for trans inclusion or exclusion, to a method of policy making. I address the relationship between concerns about safety, fairness, and inclusion in policy making about the inclusion of transwomen athletes into women’s sport. I argue for an approach based on lexical priority rather than simple ‘balancing’, considering the different values in a specific order. I present justifying reasons for this approach and this lexical order, based on the special obligations of (...) International Federations such as World Rugby. As a result, I provide a justificatory framework for the WR Guidelines that exclude transwomen from the women’s game in WR competitions. Finally, I give an account of a maximally safe, maximally fair and maximally inclusive form of sex categorisation in sport. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is confronting internal or intrinsic values of sport detected by different sport-philosophers, such as W. J. Morgan, J. S. Russell, R. L. Simon, N. Dixon, S. Kretchmar, to today’s bio-technologized sports in order to find the ethical guidance for (non)acceptance of new bio-technologies in sport. Thus, in the first part, I will produce an overview of the internal values of sport in the sports-philosophical literature. In the second part, I will provide my understanding of ‘bio-technologized (...) sports’, leaning mostly on W. J. Morgan’s and S. Loland’s previous work in this regard. In the third part, I will show that the key internal value of sport is ‘excellence’ and that the perfectionist account of sport dominates high-level professional competitive sports. However, I will show that ‘excellence’ is prone to different interpretations and understandings which (could) have different implications for the ‘bio-technologized sport’. Finally, I will propose going back to Aristotle and his account of _eudaimonia_ to build principles for the regulation of (non)acceptance of bio-technology in sport. (shrink)

The current World Anti-doping Code can be characterised as a tough approach to doping. In this paper we investigate how the World Anti-Doping Agency justifies this tough approach. To this end, WADA advances two justificatory arguments. It maintains, first, that protection of the spirit of sport warrants tough measures and, second, that athletes have voluntarily consented to the Code. We argue that in the way they are presented by WADA, neither of these arguments can withstand scrutiny. In the second part (...) of the paper, we go on to show that these arguments are in fact ideological in nature. The specific aim of these arguments is not to be correct, but rather to distort social reality, because in this way they can be used to ward off any critical discussion of the Code. We conclude that WADA’s interest is to create a façade of justice, not in serving justice itself. (shrink)

Traditionally, acts of sportsmanship have been upheld as worthy of praise. The purpose of this paper is to discern whether Bernard Suits’ Grasshopper -- in "The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia" -- would share this approval. The paper begins with a conceptual analysis of good sportspersonship. From this, four action categories are identified including good sportspersonship in the forms of game desertion, changing the game, not trying, and lusory self-handicapping. A strategy for evaluation is derived from the Grasshopper’s theory. Game-playing (...) is defined as action reflecting lusory attitude acknowledgement. Game-spoiling is introduced as action demonstrating lusory attitude abandonment. Three of the four actions categories are characterized as game-spoiling including good sportspersonship in the forms of game desertion, changing the game, and not trying. It is concluded that genuine good sportspersonship is characterized solely by altruistic forms of lusory self-handicapping. (shrink)

What is sportsmanship? Following Keating, we may say that sportsmanship is conduct befitting a person involved in sports. This raises the question of what kind of activity exactly sport is. This is notoriously difficult to answer, but roughly speaking, sport is a rule-governed activity that is about excellence, an understanding of how to play the game, and, in competitive sports, winning. Accordingly, there are four elements of sportsmanship: fairness, equity, good form and the will to win. These four elements are (...) equally important and not reducible to one another. Yet, the will to win is in systematic conflict with the other three elements. Hence, sportsmanship is not only compromised of these four elements, but also requires that a balance be held between them. (shrink)

This paper centers two complementary theoretical approaches to advance the debate about transgender women’s inclusion in elite women’s sports – namely, non-ideal theory and cultural studies. In doing so, the paper highlights divisions between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, normative internalism in sports and normative externalism in sports, and essentialist views of sports compared to non-essentialist views of sports. The paper’s main agenda is to show the value of applying non-ideal theory, externalism, and non-essentialism to the discourse over transgender inclusion.

I call the trait that makes for a good or great competitor, the trait that makes its possessor compete well, ‘competitive excellence’. We seem to be of two minds about this trait: on the one hand, we often admire great competitors, but on the other hand, we sometimes identify their competitive drive as ‘pathological’, recognizing something unhealthy in it. Why are we so ambivalent? The answer I will defend is that there are at least three distinct traits, each of which (...) satisfies the definition of competitive excellence and so has something of a claim to be the trait we admire in great competitors. One of these traits is a virtue, one a vice, and one can be either a virtue or a vice depending on what other traits accompany it. This accounts for our deep ambivalence about great competitors and implies that we should only seek to be great competitors in a qualified sense. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that Bernard Suits’ definition of game playing, suitably extended with David Lewis’ account of coordinating conventions, is robust enough to withstand some common objections made ag...

Artikkelen ønsker å gi et konstruktivt bidrag til forståelsen og anvendelsen av fair play i en kroppsøvingsfaglig kontekst. Dette er et tema som er blitt aktualisert i og med at fair play er kommet inn som et sentralt element i kroppsøvingsfagets nye reviderte læreplan. Fair play omhandler regler, normer og verdier som skal gjelde ved idrettsutøvelse, og det er et etablert verdikonsept innenfor organisert idrettsliv og idrettsetisk forskning. I skolen, derimot, er fair play mindre kjent. Kroppsøvingsplanen hevder fair play omfatter (...) aspekter ved idrettsspillet som å overholde regler, vise hverandre respekt og gjøre hverandre gode. Hva betyr så dette? Hva vil det si å gjøre hverandre gode? Rommer det bare en teknisk eller også en sosialetisk kvalitet? Dersom det siste er tilfelle, bør det diskuteres hvilke danningskvaliteter det så ligger i det å gjøre hverandre gode i faget, og om disse har noen tilknytningspunkt til Aristoteles' klassiske dyder om rettferdighet, måtehold, mot og klokskap. Dette er de sentrale spørsmålene artikkelen reiser og prøver å gi noen svar på. Artikkelen ser først på fair play i kroppsøvingsfagets planer, for deretter å gi begrepet en nærmere etymologisk og ideologisk-historisk avklaring, med utgangspunkt i begrepene «fair» og «play». Videre drøftes fair play i lys av de aristoteliske dydene, relatert til kroppsøvingsfaglig kontekst og diskurs.Nøkkelord: kroppsøving, fair play, idrett, lek og danningEnglish summary: Fair play in Physical Education in the light of Aristotelian virtue ethicsThe aim of this article is to give a constructive contribution to the understanding and the application of the concept of fair play in the Physical Education context. This is a topic that has come into focus since fair play has been introduced as a central element in the newest revision of the subject curriculum. Fair play concerns the rules, norms, and values that apply to sports activities, and constitutes an established value concept within organized sports and research related to sports ethics. In schools, however, fair play is less known. The Physical Education curriculum states that fair play concerns aspects of sports and games such as adhering to rules, showing each other respect, and helping each other achieve. What, then, does this mean? What does it mean to help each other achieve? Does it entail purely technical, or also socio-ethical qualities? If the latter is the case, a discussion is needed as to what ethical formation qualities are involved in helping each other achieve in the subject and whether these have any connection to Aristotle's classical virtues of justice, moderation, courage, and wisdom. These are the central issues the article raises and attempts to shed some light on. The article takes a closer look at fair play in the curricula of Physical Education, moving on to an etymological and ideological-historical clarification of the concept, taking the concepts of fair and play as starting points. Further, it discusses fair play in the light of Aristotelian virtues, related to a Physical Education context and discourse. (shrink)

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 5, Issue 2, Page 161-174, May 2011.

Participation trophies in youth sports have become controversial in the so-called “culture wars” of recent years in Western countries. Conservative professional athletes and media pundits deride participation trophies, as they perceive them as akin to equality of outcome and Communist ideology. However, this is a mischaracterization of participation trophies, as liberalism can also provide a philosophical basis for a defense of these trophies. In this article, I rely on John Rawls’ contractual theory to build a defense of participation trophies. These (...) prizes can serve as educational resources to teach young athletes about the dignity of losers in sports, and the need for taxation in order to sustain a safety net in society at large. (shrink)

Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen Pearson’s Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics and Mark J. Hamilton’s There’s No Lying in Baseball. On a Kantian foundation, I argue that attempts to deceive officials, such as framing pitches in baseball, are morally unacceptable because they necessarily regard others as incompetent and as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends. More dramatically I argue, contrary to Pearson and Hamilton, that some forms of competitor-to-competitor deception are (...) similarly unacceptable. Specifically, I offer a ‘principle of caustic deceit’ according to which any strategic deception that divorces a game from its constitutive skills is morally untoward and ought to be met with negative social pressure at least, and/or legislated out of existence. The problem with these forms of strategic deception is that they treat one’s opponents, again in the Kantian sense, as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends. (shrink)

(2004). Normativity, Justification,and (MacIntyrean) Practices: Some Thoughts on Methodologyfor the Philosophy of Sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 15-33.

The World Anti-Doping Code (2021) includes a substance on the prohibited list if it meets at least two of the following: (1) it has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; (2) it represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete; (3) it violates the spirit of sport. This paper uses a case study to illustrate points of tension between this code and enhancements that are appropriate to ban; we argue that there are banned drugs (e.g., acetazolamide (...) and dexamethasone) the use of which we have good reason to not only permit but encourage for high-altitude sports. Drawing on lessons from this case study, we propose a reformulation of the Code that requires (1–3) be met but offers preferable ways of unpacking conditions (1) and (3) – and in a way that better preserves how the spirit of sport condition should be indexed to particular sports. Our formulation is inclusive enough to rule in drugs like acetazolamide and dexamethasone as permissible in high-altitude sports while at the same time ruling out problem cases – including many drugs already on the prohibited list. The result is an attempted alignment between the conditions specified and those drugs that should be banned. (shrink)

Questions and analyses centered on race have become more prominent in philosophy. By employing a ‘critical philosophy of race’, thinkers become enabled to address how race and racism continue to operate in subtle and unintended ways, including within concepts, theories, principles, practices, and methodologies otherwise purported to be race-neutral. Yet, North American sports philosophy provides few examples of work that grapples with race, racism, or theories of race. In this essay, I ask why and conclude that the shortage of discussions (...) that include explicit references to race or ethnicity in North American sport philosophy is due to the dominance and normalization of white epistemologies – white ways of experiencing, seeing, and knowing the world. (shrink)

This paper continues the discussion of three values of sport (safety, fairness, inclusion) that has developed around the theme of inclusion of transwomen in the female category in World Rugby, as discussed by Pike, Burke and Imbrišević. In contrast to their discussion, in which these three values have been seen from the limited perspective of the inclusion of one group of athletes into a specific category of one sport, they are here discussed in the context of the categorization in sport (...) in general, with a focus on constitutive and eligibility rules. Constitutive rules give a strong foundation for eligibility rules. From the perspective of eligibility rules, the value of inclusion is identified as the underlying main value, while fairness and safety are its functions. This view rehabilitates the value of inclusion and has implications for how we think about the inclusion of athletes in sport, and for the creation of categories. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the normative role of conventions in sports. However, the approach I have in mind does not dispatch the theory of interpretivism. What I offer is a synthesis that aims to show how interpretivism works in concert with – and relies heavily on – conventions. To make this point, I will argue that historical, cultural, and even simple preferential needs and desires help to determine what counts as athletic ‘excellence’ in sports.

ABSTRACTBernard Suits and other formalists endorse both the logical incompatibility thesis and the view that rule-breakings resulting in penalties can be a legitimate part of a game. This is what Fred D’Agostino calls ‘the problem of penalties’. In this paper, I reject both Suits’ and D’Agostino’s responses to the problem and argue instead that the solution is to abandon Suits’ view that the constitutive rules of all games are alike. Whereas the logical incompatibility thesis applies to games in which players’ (...) actions are perfectly controlled, it does not apply to sports. This insight not only justifies the rejection of formalism as a theory about the nature of sport but it also helps explain the greater normative complexity of sports, which in turn leads to the idea that in sports ‘cheating’ should be interpreted as a genus. (shrink)

There is much discussion in sports on whether certain behavior should be considered Fair Play. This moral judgment on Fair Play is influenced by the conceptualization of the term Fair Play as either “respect for the rules” or “respect for the spirit of the game,” as well as by other determinants. To uncover the moral judgment of athletes and which conceptualization of Fair Play dominates in practice, a factorial survey approach is used. The act and the level of the match (...) played a role in the judgment, as well as the gender of the athlete. Our results showed that both conceptualizations “respect for the rules” and “respect for the spirit of the game” were important in this judgment, with the spirit conceptualization being more dominant. (shrink)

It is customary for institutions that organize sporting competitions and events to exercise a considerable degree of authority over the participants. That authority is often manifested in the enforcement of penalties for infringements of fair play. This paper focuses on one concrete case from soccer, although I take the discussion to extend to other sports as well. I argue that not all fair play rules should be enforced by the respective organizing institutions, and that enforcing all of them indiscriminately is (...) a cause of injustice, rather than promoting fairness in sports. I propose a principled way of making the necessary distinction between those fair play rules that are enforceable and those that are not. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Match-fixing is a major ethical issue in sports. Although research interest in match-fixing has increased in recent years, we remain largely in the dark regarding how both betting- and non-betting-related match-fixing relate to the moral decision-making of those involved. Drawing on Rest’s theory of morality and on the perceptions of a large sample of participants in Flemish sports, this study indicates that most match-fixing incidents are non-betting-related, while moral motivation and associated challenges clearly differ according to the type of (...) match-fixing. Therefore, each type of match-fixing requires different preventive measures. (shrink)

Bernard Suits and other formalists endorse both the logical incompatibility thesis and the view that rule-breakings resulting in penalties can be a legitimate part of a game. This is what Fred D’Ag...

En este artículo analizaremos el impacto que el libro de Alasdair MacIntyre Tras la virtud ha tenido en el ámbito de la filosofía del deporte. Nuestro punto de partida será que los filósofos del deporte han diferenciado entre propuestas internalistas y externa-listas del deporte siguiendo la distinción de MacIntyre entre bienes internos y externos a las prácticas sociales. Con el fin de mostrar si esta apropiación del lenguaje de MacIntyre es adecuada, responderemos a la pregunta de si el deporte actual (...) puede ser considerado una práctica social en sentido macintyreano. Defenderemos que sólo el deporte amateur encaja con la definición de “práctica social” de modo que nuestro deporte contemporáneo no puede ser considerado como tal. Según esto, defenderemos que, en tanto que el paradigma internalista y externalista es una consecuencia de la recepción de la obra de MacIntyre, la filosofía del deporte debe ir más allá de este paradigma dualista hacia uno que no esté fundado en los conceptos de práctica social y bienes internos del filósofo escocés. (shrink)

In 2011 the IAAF introduced the Hyperandrogenism Regulations in an attempt to deal with a difficult problem; that of ensuring ‘fair’ competition in female athletics as a result of athletes with differences in sexual development competing against women without such conditions. In 2015, following a challenge to those regulations by Indian athlete, Dutee Chand, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) considered the merit of the regulations and determined that there was insufficient scientific evidence to justify their imposition. The regulations (...) were suspended by the CAS, until more convincing evidence could be provided (CAS 2014/A/3759 _Chand v AFI and IAAF_). The IAAF duly commissioned further research (Bermon and Garnier, 2017) and introduced amended regulations (the Eligibility Regulations for Female Classification (the DSD Regulations)). Although not universal, the IAAF has faced significant criticism from several angles about its approach to the problem. In particular, there has been criticism of the value of the scientific research on which the regulations are based (Franklin et al., 2018; Karkazis et al., 2012; Koh et al., 2018; Sőnksen et al., 2018; Tucker, 2017, Pielke, Tucker & Boye 2019) and also from those in the ethical and human rights fields seeking to ensure that the rights of individual athletes are protected (Adair, 2011; Buzuvis, 2016; Koh et al., 2018). In light of such criticism, this paper considers the IAAF’s approach in dealing with the perceived problem and considers its conduct against an objective framework of ‘good sporting governance’ (Geeraert, 2013; Henry and Lee 2004). It is this paper’s contention that the IAAF’s approach to rule creation in this area demonstrates less than ideal governance practice and, in doing so, notes the role of historical, cultural and institutional barriers as well as an over-reliance on insufficiently conclusive scientific evidence to provide a seemingly objective solution to a fundamentally more complex problem. (shrink)