As a fervent rationalist, Husserl placed considerable emphasis on the delineation of the different levels of reason. Its highest form, he contends, is position-taking (Stellungnahme) understood as a critical stance towards a positional act P. Specifically, such a Stellungnahme is a three-step procedure: the subject, possibly motivated by a passive discordance, starts by questioning P (active doubt); she then seeks to validate P by returning to its originary fulfillment (active search for evidence); finally, she ratifies such a fulfillment in an (...) act of acknowledgment (active decision), thereby making P a permanent personal conviction. In the literature, the role of position-taking in the formation of persons has been aptly emphasized, but insufficient attention has been paid to its intrinsic structure and concrete functioning; furthermore, the few existing studies on this topic are limited to the theoretical domain. The aim of this paper is to fill this twofold gap by providing a comprehensive account of critical Stellungnahme in both the intellectual and the axiological spheres, drawing especially on the manuscripts from the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. The first part examines Stellungnahme in the theoretical realm, underscoring its teleological orientation towards justification and the active role played by the subject in it. The second part shows how this procedure can be extended to rationalize value-experiences, by elucidating the nature of affective evidence and approval (Billigung). Finally, the third part demonstrates how a particular value, that of knowledge, can concretely pass the axiological position-taking and thus be recognized as an actual value. (shrink)