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Thomas Byrne
Sun Yat-Sen University
Thomas Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  1.  59
    Surrogates and Empty Intentions: Husserl’s “On the Logic of Signs” as the Blueprint for His First Logical Investigation.Thomas Byrne - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (3):211-227.
    This paper accomplishes two tasks. First, I examine in detail Edmund Husserl’s earliest philosophy of surrogates, as it is found in his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs ”. I analyze his psychological and logical investigations of surrogates, where the former is concerned with explaining how these signs function and the latter with how they do so reliably. His differentiation of surrogates on the basis of their genetic origins and degrees of necessity is discussed. Second, the historical importance of this (...)
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  2.  39
    Husserl’s 1901 and 1913 Philosophies of Perceptual Occlusion: Signitive, Empty, and Dark Intentions.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (2):123-139.
    This paper examines the evolution of Edmund Husserl’s theory of perceptual occlusion. This task is accomplished in two stages. First, I elucidate Husserl’s conclusion, from his 1901 Logical Investigations, that the occluded parts of perceptual objects are intended by partial signitive acts. I focus on two doctrines of that account. I examine Husserl’s insight that signitive intentions are composed of Gehalt and I discuss his conclusion that signitive intentions sit on the continuum of fullness. Second, the paper discloses how Husserl (...)
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  3.  43
    Husserl’s Early Genealogy of the Number System.Thomas Byrne - 2019 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 2 (11):408-428.
    This article accomplishes two goals. First, the paper clarifies Edmund Husserl’s investigation of the historical inception of the number system from his early works, Philosophy of Arithmetic and, “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”. The article explores Husserl’s analysis of five historical developmental stages, which culminated in our ancestor’s ability to employ and enumerate with number signs. Second, the article reveals how Husserl’s conclusions about the history of the number system from his early works opens up a fusion point with (...)
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  4.  47
    The Evolution of Husserl’s Semiotics: The Logical Investigations and its Revisions (1901-1914).Thomas Byrne - 2018 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 14 (5):1-23.
    This paper offers a more comprehensive and accurate picture of Edmund Husserl’s semiotics. I not only clarify, as many have already done, Husserl’s theory of signs from the 1901 Logical Investigations, but also examine how he transforms that element of his philosophy in the 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation. Specifically, the paper examines the evolution of two central tenets of Husserl’s semiotics. I first look at how he modifies his classification of signs. I disclose why he revised his (...)
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  5.  43
    Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 52 (1):16-32.
    This paper examines the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of nonintuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term “signitive” too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical (...)
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  6.  43
    The Dawn of Husserl’s Pure Logical Grammar: Husserl’s Study of Inauthentic Judgments From “On The Logic Of Signs” as the Germ of the “Fourth Logical Investigation”.Thomas Byrne - 2017 - Studia Phaenomenologica 17:285-308.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I elucidate Edmund Husserl’s theory of inauthentic judgments from his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs.” It will be shown how inauthentic judgments are distinct from other signitive experiences, in such a manner that when Husserl seeks to account for them, he is forced to revise the general structure of his philosophy of meaning and in doing so, is also able to realize novel insights concerning the nature of signification. Second, these conclusions are revealed (...)
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  7. Might Anything Be Plain Good?Thomas Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3335-3346.
    G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is not a predicative adjective, but only ever an attributive adjective: just like ‘big.’ And just as there is no such thing as plain bigness but only ever big for or as a so-and-so, there is also no such thing as plain goodness. They conclude that Moore’s goodness is thus a nonsense. However attention has been (...)
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  8.  53
    A “Principally Unacceptable” Theory: Husserl’s Rejection and Revision of His Philosophy of Meaning Intentions From the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Studia Phaenomenologica 20:357-378.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, Husserl not only (...)
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  9.  58
    Husserl’s Early Semiotics and Number Signs: Philosophy of Arithmetic Through the Lens of “On the Logic of Signs ”.Thomas Byrne - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (4):287-303.
    This paper demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s frequently overlooked 1890 manuscript, “On the Logic of Signs,” when closely investigated, reveals itself to be the hermeneutical touchstone for his seminal 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic. As the former comprises Husserl’s earliest attempt to account for all of the different kinds of signitive experience, his conclusions there can be directly applied to the latter, which is focused on one particular type of sign; namely, number signs. Husserl’s 1890 descriptions of motivating and replacing signs will (...)
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  10.  37
    Ingarden’s Husserl: A Critical Assessment of the 1915 Review of the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 9 (2):513-531.
    This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden’s 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. I elucidate and critique Ingarden’s analysis of the differences between the 1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden’s interpretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl’s claim that he only engages in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, (...)
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  11.  45
    Smashing Husserl’s Dark Mirror: Rectifying the Inconsistent Theory of Impossible Meaning and Signitive Substance From the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (2):127-144.
    This paper accomplishes three goals. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. I show that Husserl, in 1901, describes non-intuitive meaning consciousness as a direct parallel or as a ‘mirror’ of intuitive consciousness. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like intuitions, have substance and represent their objects. I reveal that, by defining meaning acts in this way, Husserl cannot account for our experiences (...)
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  12.  28
    The Dawn of Pure Logical Grammar: Husserl’s Study of Inauthentic Judgments From ‘On the Logic of Signs’ as the Germ of the Fourth Logical Investigation.Thomas Byrne - 2017 - Studia Phaenomenologica 1 (17):285-308.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I elucidate Edmund Husserl’s theory of inauthentic judgments from his 1890 “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).” It will be shown how inauthentic judgments are distinct from other signitive experiences, in such a manner that when Husserl seeks to account for them, he is forced to revise the general structure of his philosophy of meaning and in doing so, is also able to realize novel insights concerning the nature of signification. Second, these conclusions are (...)
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  13.  28
    Drummond, John and Höffe, Otfried (Eds.). Husserl: German Perspectives: Fordham University Press, New York, 2019, 261 Pp. US-$ 75 (Hardbound); € 71.02 (Hardbound), ISBN: 978-0823284467. [REVIEW]Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Husserl Studies 36 (1):87-93.
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  14. MAKING Metaphysics.Thomas Byrne - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (20).
    We can cause windows to break and we can break windows; we can cause villages to flood and we can flood villages; and we can cause chocolate to melt and we can melt chocolate. Each time these can come apart: if, for example, A merely instructs B to break the window, then A causes the window to break without breaking it herself. Each instance of A breaking/flooding/melting/burning/killing/etc. something, is an instance of what I call making. I argue that making is (...)
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