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Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy

Dissertation, University of Colorado (2014)

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  1. A Nietzschean Diagnosis of Philosophers.Jared Riggs - unknown
    Friedrich Nietzsche thought that philosophers were deeply mistaken about the nature and sources of philosophical activity. Where others took themselves to be motivated by a desire to know the truth, Nietzsche charged that his fellow philosophers, motivated by a pathological set of psychological and physiological characteristics, did little more than sublimate and rationalize their own prejudices. In this thesis, I sketch out in further detail and defend the plausibility and significance of this Nietzschean diagnosis of philosophers. I argue that since (...)
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  • Atheists and Agnostics Are More Reflective Than Religious Believers: Four Empirical Studies and a Meta-Analysis.Gordon Pennycook, Robert M. Ross, Derek J. Koehler & Jonathan A. Fugelsang - 2016 - PLoS ONE 11 (4):e0153039.
    Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this possibility, we report four studies in which a negative correlation between religious belief and performance on analytic thinking measures is found when religious belief is measured in a (...)
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  • Mapping Cognitive Structure Onto the Landscape of Philosophical Debate: An Empirical Framework with Relevance to Problems of Consciousness, Free Will and Ethics.Jared P. Friedman & Anthony I. Jack - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):73-113.
    There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution which parallels, and also extends, (...)
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