Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend has recently gained more sustained attention for its role in clarifying Kant’s published positions in political philosophy. However, too little attention has been given to the lecture’s relation to Gottfried Achenwall, whose book was the textbook for the course. In this paper, I will examine how Kant rejected and transforms Achenwall’s natural law system in the Feyerabend Lectures. Specifically, I will argue that Kant problematizes Achenwall’s foundational notion of a divine juridical state which opens up a normative (...) gap between objective law and subjective rights. In the absence of a divine sovereign, formal natural law is unable to justify subjective natural rights in the state of nature. In the Feyerabend Lectures, Kant, in order to close this gap, replaces the divine will with the “will of society”, making the state necessary for the possibility of rights. (shrink)

O artigo trata de dois pontos polêmicos e interconectados na teoria de Kant sobre o direito das gentes: a natureza da personalidade dos Estados e o arranjo soberano da República Mundial. Em relação ao primeiro ponto, procura-se mostrar que as dificuldades dos intérpretes de Kant em determinar o tipo e o fundamento da personalidade dos Estados decorrem de diferenças no modo como Kant implicitamente considera a função da lei moral, o que permite mostrar que os direitos relativos à guerra não (...) são uma espécie de direito natural dos Estados, mas se fundam na dignidade dos indivíduos. A elucidação desse primeiro ponto também contribui para a compreensão, no segundo ponto, dos motivos das dificuldades de Kant em encontrar um arranjo consistente para a soberania dos Estados na constituição de uma República Mundial. Dificuldades essas que fazem com que ele não exponha diretamente as características dessa República Mundial, mas apenas indiretamente por meio de críticas aos modelos do Estado Mundial e da Liga de Estados. (shrink)

Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? This book presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts (...) across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, the book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having. (shrink)

I criticize two ways of interpreting Kant's claim that property rights are merely ‘provisional’ in the state of nature.Weak provisionalityholds that in the state of nature agents can make rightful claims to property. What is lacking is the institutional context necessary to render their claims secure. By contrast,strong provisionalityholds that making property claims in the state of nature wrongs others. I argue for a third view,anticipatory provisionality, according to which state of nature property claims do not wrong others, but anticipate (...) a condition in which the authority to make such claims can no longer be unilaterally determined. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of peace has been reinterpreted under one of the most influential research programs of our times: The so-called democratic peace theory. In particular, the third ingredient of Kant’s “recipe” for peace —the cosmopolitan right to visit—has been recognized as a powerful and effective instrument to reduce militarized interstate conflicts. In the hands of political scientists, however, this ingredient has often become nothing more than a set of rules for securing and facilitating international trade and economic interdependence. This article (...) argues that this narrow reading mistakes international trade as the essence of the third definitive article. Kant sees economic interdependence as a means to realize what cosmopolitan right is truly about, that is, the affirmation of a set of rules for protecting humans qua humans, the creation of communal bonds among individuals beyond national or group loyalties, and the promotion of a global moral conscience modeled on the natural rights of man. An accura... (shrink)

An existential interpretation of student angst in Chinese universities raises issues of autonomy and freedom. The governance arrangements in China create a conflict for Chinese students who in their coursework are urged to become critical-minded and open-minded. In this essay, Kant’s moral theory provides access to this phenomenon. His theory of duty–rationality–autonomy–freedom relates the liberty of thought to principled action. Kantian ideals still influence western business and university practice and they become relevant in China as that country modernises. The abilities (...) of graduates which officials say the country needs—insightfulness, creativity, innovation, progressiveness and commitment—are only achievable by professionals who are independent minded, rational and who commit to act on their own conclusions. Such people are Kant’s autonomous persons. Chinese students increasingly confront a conflicted educational environment. Universities require students to think, analyse and argue. An outcome of this deliberation is freedom, as construed by Kant as an ‘inner’construct. When students are unable to exercise Kantian freedom in matters which concern them they experience the angst of freedom. Students may carry a burden derived from bridles on information and authoritarian restrictions on dialogue. (shrink)

Overview over some core themes re: Kantian autonomy.

In this paper I explore elements from Kant’s philosophy of right to develop a relational account of the wrong of poverty. Poverty is a relational wrong because it involves relations of problematic dependence, inequality, and humiliation. Such relations infringe the rights to freedom and equality of the poor. And the called-for response is one of public recognition and protection of the rights of the poor. This position means we must radically reconceptualize our individual duties to the poor: not _private beneficence_, (...) but _private remedies for public failures_. (shrink)

Individualist normative theories appear inadequate for the complex moral challenges of climate change. In climate ethics, this is especially notable with the relative marginalization of Kant. I argue that Kant’s philosophy, understood through its historical and cosmopolitan dimensions, has untapped potential for the climate crisis. First, I situate Kant in climate ethics and evaluate his marginalization due to perceived individualism, interiority and anthropocentrism. Then, I explore aspects of Kant’s historical and cosmopolitan writings, which present a global, future-orientated picture of humanity. (...) Ultimately, Kant’s philosophy offers a unique take on the climate deadlock capable of sustaining the individual in the collective. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA much debated passage in the Metaphysics of Morals often leads commentators to believe that it is not possible to act from juridical duty. On the one hand, Kant says that all lawgiving inc...

ABSTRACTDid Kant believe we need a world government? It has been a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship whether Kant endorsed the creation of a world state or merely a voluntary federation of states with no coercive power. I argue that Kant's main concern was with a global juridical condition, which he regarded as a rational requirement given the equal freedom and equality of individuals. However, he recognized that implementing this rational ideal requires sensitivity to contingent aspects of world politics. (...) I will argue that Kant offers an ideal theory not disentangled from realist considerations and that he adopts what I will call methodological realism: the attempt to realize the requirements of Right in a world governed by its own laws and mechanisms. I will illustrate this interpretation with Kant's discussion of the right of nations. The confusion in regard to Kant's actual position on the matter, I will argue, is a direct consequence of Kant's methodological realism. The... (shrink)

We often make a distinction between what we owe as a matter of repayment, and what we give or offer out of charity. But how shall we describe our obligations to fellow citizens when we are in a position to be charitable because of a past injustice on the part of the state? This essay examines the moral implications of past injustice by considering Immanuel Kant's remarks on this phenomenon in his lectures and writings. In particular, it discusses the role (...) of the state and the individual in addressing the problem. (shrink)

Several commentators have tried to ground legal prohibitions of kidney sales in some form of Kant’s moral arguments against such sales. This paper reconsiders this approach to justifying laws and policies in light of Kant’s approach to law in his political philosophy. The author argues that Kant’s political philosophy requires that kidney sales be legally permitted, although contracts for such sales must remain unenforceable. The author further argues that Kant’s approach to laws, such as those governing kidney distribution, was formed (...) in part by considering and rejecting an assumption frequently employed in the bioethics literature, namely, that legal duties can be grounded directly in moral duties. The author explains some of Kant’s reasons for rejecting this assumption and concludes that arguments pertaining to the legality of kidney sales developed on the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy should no longer be considered tenable. (shrink)

In this essay I reply to Alyssa Bernstein and Helga Varden's comments on my book, Kant and Cosmopolitanism. In response to Bernstein, I argue that Kant's opposition to the coercive incorporation of states into an international federation should be interpreted as permitting no exceptions. In response to Varden, I clarify Kant's conception and defence of patriotism as a duty, and I show how Kantian cosmopolitans can rebut Bernard Williams's objection. I also explicate why, given a specific feature of Kant's defence (...) of the state's duty to provide poverty relief, an international federation can be seen to have an analogous duty. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Kant’s Doctrine of Right resulted in many attempts to apply Kant’s position to current affairs. This research often faces the problem of defining clear borders of what in Kant’s texts needs to be considered as rational core of his theory and what is merely a theoretically less significant consequence of particular political situation of 18th century. My claim is that in order to be able to adequately apply Kant’s ideas and concepts to the 21st century problems, the (...) process of application of his rational principles to the world of experience must be reconstructed. This will not only bring about the core structure of right but may also determine which elements of Kant’s legal theory are contingent to changing empirical data. I recognise two levels of Kant’s application of the rational principles to human condition, which consecutively determine the rational core of right and secondary structural divisions that emerge from contingent data about political history of mankind. The aim of the article is to investigate the fundamental steps of Kant’s application on the first level, in order to reconstruct the rational core of his legal theory. In the first step I analyse the universal principle of right in order to clarify Kant’s concept of a right. Further, I investigate the axiom of external freedom, which, in conjunction with human condition generates the necessity of using external objects of choice and therefore grounds the emergence of acquired rights. Nevertheless, these rights, as particular legal titles that limit the freedom of others, cannot be reconciled with universal freedom in the state of nature. Therefore, from the establishment of innate and acquired right, there arises the necessity of public right and entering the civil condition. (shrink)

Best known for his ethical works, Immanuel Kant was part of the liberal Enlightenment and addressed most of the principal political issues of his day. Several of his major works were written in the wake of the storming of the Bastille in Paris, while Europe was engaged in the French Revolutionary Wars. His rejection of revolution but endorsement of the principles for which the French revolutionaries were fighting, as well as his plea for a federation of European states that would (...) settle disputes peacefully, reflected his engagement with the controversies raised by the Revolution. But, although he could not countenance revolution, he declared that, once a revolutionary government has succeeded in establishing itself, citizens should obey the new government, rather than try to restore the ousted authorities. (shrink)

La posesión común de la tierra fue una idea prominente en la filosofía moderna del siglo xvii. En este artículo, sostendré que Kant no sólo propuso una versión secular de la posesión común de la tierra, sino que también se diferenció de forma radical de la concepción iusnaturalista de sus predecesores. Propongo que la revisión kantiana del derecho cosmopolita se dirige al mismo problema que el derecho de necesidad de Grocio, a saber, la implausibilidad de asumir derechos adquiridos absolutos cuando (...) esto contradice la razón por la que se introducen esos mismos derechos. Sin embargo, mientras que Grocio pretendió excusar violaciones de la propiedad privada en casos de necesidad, Kant limitó su discusión al derecho de rechazar la entrada de personas en un territorio. Muestro que para Kant, negar la ocupación del espacio que puede salvar la vida a otro ser humano que está, en principio, tan legitimado como cualquier otro a tener un derecho en la tierra está en contradicción con la justificación misma del derecho territorial de los Estados. Esto se debe a que el permiso para controlar el territorio y el derecho de los visitantes involuntarios a ser admitidos en una región están basados en el mismo fundamento legal o Rechtsgrund, a saber, la comunidad original de la tierra. (shrink)