Many amateur sportsmen in the West, have today started undertaking long and intensive ordeals where their personal capacity to withstand increasing suffering is the prime objective. Running, jogging, the triathlon and trekking are the sorts of ordeal where people without any particular ability are not pitting themselves against others but are committed to testing their own capacity to withstand increasing pain. Constantly called upon to prove themselves in a society where reference points are both countless and contradictory and where values (...) are in crisis, people are now seeking a one-to-one relationship by redical means, testing their strength of character, their courage and their personal resources. Going right on to the end of a self-imposed ordeal gives a legitimacy to life and provides a symbolic plank that supports them. Performance itself is of secondary significance; it has a value only to the individual. There is no struggle against a third party, only a method for reinforcing personal will-power and over-coming suffering by going right to the limit of a personally imposed demand. The physical limit has come to replace the moral limit that present-day society is failing to provide. Overcoming suffering tempers the individual, providing a renewed significance and value to his life. (shrink)

In his work, Bernard Suits presents and pursues a stated objective: to define ‘game’ or, more precisely, ‘game-playing’. In The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia, the author seeks a definition not as a ‘commitment to the universal fruitfulness of definition construction’, but rather with the idea ‘that some things are definable, and some are not’. This is something he believed could resolve many of the issues surrounding the debate on ‘game’ and ‘play’, such as those with Huizinga (in Homo Ludens) (...) or proposed by the anti-definitionism of Wittgenstein, a philosopher who did not accept that it was possible to define ‘game’. In this article, we will trace Suits’ definitional steps and aim to critique his resolution as a kind of ‘formalism’, as it tended to prioritize rules. Furthermore, notwithstanding the merit of his theoretical endeavor – seen in the attempt to define a social component that is so complex and the target of the most diverse interpretations and misconceptions –, it seems to us that, with his theoretical unifying element (lusory attitude), the author has summoned another problem to the debate, that of ‘subjectivism’, rather than a solution (especially to his formalism), even subjecting himself to comparisons with other conceptions (e.g. Fichte) that are also problematic. This aspect will also be criticized. The attention of this article will shift to these two lines of critique, drawing on an insightful analysis of Malaby’s work at a specific juncture, aiming to delve further into the subject and taking an additional step. (shrink)

Drawing on reflections from a collaborative autoethnography, this article argues that ultramarathon running is defied by a 'dark' ecological sensibility (Morton 2007, 2010, 2016), characterised by moments of pain, disgust, and the macabre. In contrast to existing accounts, we problematise the notion that runners 'use' nature for escape and/or competition, while questioning the aesthetic-causal relationships often evinced within these accounts. With specific reference to the discursive, embodied, spatial and temporal aspects of the sport, we explore the way in which participants (...) begin to appreciate the immense power of nature, while being humbled by the fragile and unstable foundations of human experience. Accordingly this article contributes novel insights into the human-nature complex that seek to move beyond Romantic analyses towards a more sophisticated understanding of the relationships between (nature) sport, people and place. (shrink)

“Pedagogy of play” focuses on the educational value of this field of experience, by claiming that play characterizes the two fundamental guidelines which are at the basis of education; the spontaneous and natural direction on the one side, and the intentional one on the other side. It is commonly assumed that pedagogy of play concerns only the latter of the two above-mentioned aspects of education, that is to say the design and management of playing experiences and materials with clear educational (...) goals; instead, this discipline critically analyzes the whole playing experience, therefore trying to grasp its potentialities, its material conditions, and its overall meanings in the making of the subject. Moving from some considerations about the discovery of play as an emblematic index of the “discovery of childhood” at the beginning of Modern Age (Ariès, 1960), the first part of this essay underlines three aspects: the first concerns the investment on play as an educational device (from Locke to Montessori, up to Children’s Museums), pointing out the shift from the classic principle of ludendo docere to the modern ludendo discere. The second aspect focuses on the retrieval of the natural dimension of play, which finds in Rousseau its main source; the third takes into consideration toys and their identity both as pedagogical devices and as media. In the second part of the essay, the focus is on free play and its educational value, which is here interpreted especially as the first field of experience for children’s “political education”. The final remarks include some speculations the relationship between play and daily life, suggesting the idea that “life-long playing” could be defined as a meaningful aspect of long-life education. (shrink)

At the end of the sixteenth century, Friar Juan de Torquemada watched the game of volador on the central plaza in Mexico. At the top of a pole some twenty meters high there was a small pivoting platform. Four ropes were wound around the top of the pole and held in place by a wooden frame. Five men dressed in feathery costumes making them look like birds climbed up the shaft. One of them reached the narrow platform and began to (...) dance. Then the other four bird-men tied themselves to the ends of the ropes and plunged into space, head down, held by the ropes around their waists. This initiated a spectacular circular flight in ever widening rings as the cords unwound. They straightened up only at the last moment, just in time to put their feet on the ground, dizzy and staggering. But on that particular day, one of the dancers was not to straighten himself up. The rope had been badly attached and broke, dropping the man like a heavy mass to the ground, lifeless. The Franciscan at once used this as an argument to demand that the Viceroy prohibit this game. But the civil authorities refused to do so, to the monk's great consternation. (shrink)

Most of the images evoked by the term shamanism are derived from the soul's field of experience. These images run the gamut of possibilities, from a disconcerting exoticism to the most intimate familiarity. Sometimes the shaman's role is limited to that of pathetic hero, struggling in solitude against hostile nature; sometimes he becomes the rudimentary model of the mystic or even of the psychiatrist of contemporary societies. These images, however, without being completely false, wrongly reduce the shamanic phenomenon to the (...) shaman's personality and limit his field of action to the individual psyche. This limitation hardly does justice to the realities of shamanistic societies. What is missing in the shaman-centered view is the collective's slumbering velleity of itself entering into shamanic experience. Each cure becomes an occasion for collective renewal and joy. The shaman's activities in séance, it is believed, are an expression of the direct contact he has established with the spirits and of his power over them; his duties are the realization of a ritual act carried out at the behest of the community. (shrink)

This essay defends that mimesis is an inherently agonistic and paradoxical human practice. The divergent views on mimesis by Plato and Aristotle, as well as by Adorno and Benjamin, are the philosophical manifestation of an agonistic tension of human mimesis that is not resolved in the exclusive truth of one of the positions, but remains as a permanent possibility to create alternative paths in history.

In the emerging academic field of game studies, Roger Caillois’ Les Jeux et les hommes has already received the status of an obligatory reference. It is honoured as one of the few classic texts in game theory, but some also argue that it is not useful for analysing digital games. Caillois’ book is of particular interest for cultural theorists, though, because it presents a theory of games and play while also addressing the meaning of play. After analysing more closely why (...) Caillois’ theory falls short when it is applied to digital games, we suggest a slight modification of its categories. Starting from the four game dimensions outlined by Caillois - competition, chance, simulation and vertigo - and his two modes of playing, paidia and ludus, we build on his theory by distinguishing two additional game characteristics, called repens and repositio. Both deal with the internal, temporal organization of a game. Repens is a specific characteristic of games that appeals to the player’s desire to discover, explore and get to know the surprises a game has in store and to make progress by learning from these surprises. Repositio denotes complementary experiences: having to retry, return, replay and repeat a certain action while getting better at it with every try. The balance, or unbalance, between repens and repositio, as characteristic elements of many digital games, determines to a large extent their attraction. Finally, repens and repositio are not only indicators of fun in the playing of digital games; they also hint at basic elements in learning theories and social theory. The study of the interplay between repens and repositio can help in clarifying the possibilities and limitations of digital games for learning purposes. (shrink)

Most of the images evoked by the term shamanism are derived from the soul's field of experience. These images run the gamut of possibilities, from a disconcerting exoticism to the most intimate familiarity. Sometimes the shaman's role is limited to that of pathetic hero, struggling in solitude against hostile nature; sometimes he becomes the rudimentary model of the mystic or even of the psychiatrist of contemporary societies. These images, however, without being completely false, wrongly reduce the shamanic phenomenon to the (...) shaman's personality and limit his field of action to the individual psyche. This limitation hardly does justice to the realities of shamanistic societies. What is missing in the shaman-centered view is the collective's slumbering velleity of itself entering into shamanic experience. Each cure becomes an occasion for collective renewal and joy. The shaman's activities in séance, it is believed, are an expression of the direct contact he has established with the spirits and of his power over them; his duties are the realization of a ritual act carried out at the behest of the community. (shrink)

Husserls Ansatz der Transzendentalphänomenologie wird gemeinhin als Versuch einer rationalen Letztbegründung von Erkenntnis überhaupt gedeutet. Sein Verständnis der konstitutiven Rolle des reinen Bewußtseins gegenüber dem Weltphänomen als solchem sowie seine Betonung des teleologischen Aspektes der transzendentalen Vernunft scheint sein Denken von vornherein in radikalen Gegensatz zu all jenen phänomenologischen Entwürfen zu bringen, die – wie etwa Heidegger oder Fink – die Beziehung von Subjekt und Welt sowie die Philosophie als ganze wesentlich vom Spiel her zu verstehen suchen. Andererseits hat die (...) phänomenologische Epoché durch die in ihr liegende Neutralisierung der Existenzsetzung von transzendenter Wirklichkeit bisweilen in dem Ruf gestanden, sich in die freischwebende Sphäre der „reinen Denkbarkeiten und Fiktionen zurückziehen zu wollen. Ausgehend von gewissen kritischen Bemerkungen Husserls zu den Analysen der praktischen Verwendungs- und Verstehenszusammenhänge in Sein und Zeit soll in diesem Artikel gezeigt werden, daß der Spielbegriff bei Husserl so vielschichtig ist wie die intentionale Struktur des Bewußtseins selbst. Zwischen der existenzneutralen Betrachtung „freischwebender eidetischer Strukturen einerseits und der Betonung des absoluten teleologischen Zwecksinnes der transzendentalen Bewußtseinsaktivität andererseits versucht Husserl, die Motivation des Durchbruchs der rein theoretischen Haltung als solcher vor dem Hintergrund spielerischer Freiheit und Spontaneität zu verstehen. Im Gegensatz zu Heidegger wird die „spielerische Neugierde der theoretischen Haltung, die auch der Epoché zugrunde liegt, als ein positives Grundphänomen verstanden, das auf die Freiheit des transzendentalen Subjekts von dinglichen Zweckzusammenhängen und damit auf seine überweltliche Würde als transzendentale Person verweist. (shrink)

This paper investigates how play practices affect players’ relationships with the urban environment through the bodily movement and performances that characterize them. Building on a definition of playful behavior derived by semiotics of culture, we investigate urban play from the perspective of motor praxology to outline how movement is central for the experience of the players. We then concentrate on the role of semiotic valorizations in different urban contexts, notably the famous typology of Metro users by Floch and different kinds (...) of ludic mobility. Finally, we combine these two perspectives with the zemic model realized within existential semiotics in order to create a typology or urban players as well as urban playful enunciation modes. (shrink)

Rencontre Ce numéro est le fruit de la rencontre entre CLIO, Histoire Femmes et Sociétés, revue d’histoire des femmes et du genre, et les historiens du sport. S’agit-il d’une stratégie de renforcement et de légitimation réciproque? Il n’en est rien. Les champs de recherche ne sont pas de même nature : le sport est un objet, le genre un concept devenu catégorie d’analyse. De plus, il est possible d’affirmer, sans naïveté ni arrogance, mais peut-être avec une touche d’optimisme, que l’illégiti...

Images share a common feature with all phenomena of imagination, since they make us aware of what is not present or what is fictional and not existent at all. From this perspective, the philosophical approach of Kendall Lewis Walton—born in 1939 and active since the 1960s at the University of Michigan—is perhaps one of the most notable contributions to image theory. Walton is an authoritative figure within the tradition of analytical aesthetics. His contributions have had a considerable influence on a (...) broad range of topics, such as the role of categories in the understanding of the arts (Walton, “Categories of Art”. Philosophical Review, 79(3): 334–367, 1970), the ambiguous nature of emotions in the experience of fictional stories (Walton, “Fearing Fictions”. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(1): 5–25, 1978), the transparency of photographic images compared to other depictions (Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism”. Noûs, 18(1): 67–72, 1984) and, above all, the development of a general theory of fiction as imaginative activity. His 1990 book Mimesis as Make-believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts collects and re-elaborates articles Walton published on the subject since the 1970s. Though he does not attempt to give a definitive answer for what imagination is, Walton thoroughly investigates its role in all cases of representational works, describing depictions as a specific case of “make-believe” activity: images, in short, are specific props of a visual and perceptual “make-believe” game. (shrink)