It is often assumed that most people want their life to be “meaningful”. But what exactly does this mean? Though numerous research have documented which factors lead people to experience their life as meaningful and people’s theories about the best ways to secure a meaningful life, investigations in people’s concept of meaningful life are scarce. In this paper, we investigate the folk concept of a meaningful life by studying people’s third-person attribution of meaningfulness. We draw on hypotheses from the philosophical (...) literature, and notably on the work of Susan Wolf (Study 1) and an objection Antti Kauppinen raised against it (Study 2). In Study 1, we find that individuals who are successful, competent, and engaged in valuable and important goals are considered to have more meaningful lives. In Study 2, we find that the perceived meaningfulness of a life does not depend only on its components, but also on how its elements are ordered and how it forms a coherent whole (the “narrative shape” of this life). Additionally, our results stress the importance of morality in participants’ assessments of meaningfulness. Overall, our results highlight the fruitfulness of drawing on the philosophical literature to investigate the folk concept of meaningful life. (shrink)

This article addresses three questions about well-being. First, is well-being future-sensitive? I.e., can present well-being depend on future events? Second, is well-being recursively dependent? I.e., can present well-being depend on itself? Third, can present and future well-being be interdependent? The third question combines the first two, in the sense that a yes to it is equivalent to yeses to both the first and second. To do justice to the diverse ways we contemplate well-being, I consider our thought and discourse about (...) well-being in three domains: everyday conversation, social science, and philosophy. This article’s main conclusion is that we must answer the third question with no. Present and future well-being cannot be interdependent. The reason, in short, is that a theory of well-being that countenances both future-sensitivity and recursive dependence would have us understand a person’s well-being at a time as so intricately tied to her well-being at other times that it would not make sense to consider her well-being an aspect of her state at particular times. It follows that we must reject either future-sensitivity or recursive dependence. I ultimately suggest, especially in light of arguments based on assumptions of empirical research on well-being, that the balance of reasons favors rejecting future-sensitivity. (shrink)

Definition of the problemAdvance directives involve evaluative assumptions about the further course of one’s life that can be more or less appropriate and thus call for ethical reflection. This contribution focuses on the basis and criteria of such assumptions. We argue that considerations regarding the temporal structure of a good life constitute a particularly relevant perspective in this context.ArgumentsEmpirical studies on the individual composition of advance directives point to the important role of personal values and life plans that can change (...) over time. Therefore, we first contextualize advance directives from the perspective of an ethics of the good life and then discuss their implications with regard to different levels of temporality, comprising fundamental parameters of human existence in time, cultural models of the life course, as well as narratives of the individual trajectory of life.ConclusionConceptions of a good life and its temporal structure represent an important perspective for drafting and interpreting advance directives. Their consideration provides a more nuanced understanding of the evaluative implications of advance care planning. This can benefit individual patients, service providers, as well as policy makers. (shrink)

Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...) such a judgment. What one might justifiably judge to be better are features of lives which are often (though not necessarily) correlated with, rather than constituted by, an upward slope. (shrink)

Patientenverfügungen und andere Arten gesundheitlicher Vorausverfügungen wie Advance Care Planning und in gewisser Hinsicht auch Vorsorgevollmachten und Betreuungsverfügungen schließen evaluativ gehaltvolle Annahmen und Werturteile über den weiteren Verlauf des eigenen Lebens ein, die sich als mehr oder weniger angemessen erweisen können und daher einer ethischen Klärung und Reflexion bedürfen. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach den Grundlagen dieser Annahmen und Urteile nach und argumentiert, dass für ihre Analyse eine strebensethische Perspektive auf Vorstellungen eines guten Lebens in der Zeit besonders geeignet (...) ist. Dazu geben wir zunächst einen kurzen Überblick über die empirische Forschung zu Einflussfaktoren bei der Abfassung gesundheitlicher Vorausverfügungen, insbesondere der Bedeutung von individuellen Wertvorstellungen und Lebensorientierungen. Im nächsten Schritt wenden wir uns vor diesem Hintergrund der Bewertung von Lebensqualität im Lebensverlauf zu. Wie sich dabei zeigt, verweisen die betreffenden Werturteile in mehrfacher Hinsicht auf umfassendere Vorstellungen eines guten Lebens und seines zeitlichen Verlaufs. Daher nehmen wir im Anschluss die Frage des guten Lebens in der Zeit in den Blick und arbeiten typologisierend unterschiedliche Vorstellungen heraus, an denen sich die Implikationen der zeitlichen Erstreckung und Verlaufsstruktur guten Lebens für gesundheitliche Vorausverfügungen deutlich machen lassen. Der Aufsatz formuliert so nicht nur wichtige Perspektiven für eine eingehendere empirische Erforschung evaluativer Aspekte der Abfassung gesundheitlicher Vorausverfügungen. Die Klärung der Bedeutung der Zeitstruktur guten Lebens für solche Verfügungen eröffnet auch einen theoretischen Zugang zu den grundlegenden strebensethischen Fragen, mit denen sich die Betroffenen innerhalb des Rahmens des sollensethisch gut begründeten, gesellschaftlich weithin anerkannten und gesetzlich abgesicherten Rechtes auf ein selbstbestimmtes Sterben konfrontiert sehen. (shrink)

We can imagine agents who would have the moral status to demand contractualist justification but still lack an especially strong claim against interference. In contrast, agents who can conceive of their lives in a temporally unified way have a distinctive, strong interest in non‐interference. This contrast helps illuminate the moral importance of self‐authorship. The upshot is that ordinary persons have a more general and less variable right against interference than is often supposed. Self‐authorship can also help appreciate the sense in (...) which the value of persons may be characterized as ‘self‐existent’. (shrink)