There have been many attempts during the history of applied ethics that have tried to develop a theory of moral reasoning. The goal of this paper is to explicate one aspect of the debate between various attempts of offering a specific method for resolving moral dilemmas. We contrast two kinds of deliberative methods: deliberative methods whose goal is decision-making and deliberative methods that are aimed at gaining edifying perspectives. The decision-making methods assessed include the traditional moral theories like utilitarianism and (...) Kantianism, as well as second order principles, such as principlism and specified principlism. In light of this assessment, we suggest taking a closer look at two perceptive models, casuistry and particularism. These models are used for dealing with moral dilemmas that provide for edifying perspectives rather than decision-making. These perceptive models, though less scientific and not as good at prescribing an action, are more human in the sense that they enrich our moral sensibilities and enhance our understanding of the meaning of the situation. (shrink)

Bioethicists, medical professionals and lawyers who support Posthumous Assisted Reproduction as an ethical procedure in the case of the deceased’s spouse often oppose it in the case of the deceased’s parents. In addition, supporters of PAR usually rely on an individualistic version of liberalism, thus focusing on a personal rather than relational approach to autonomy. This article proposes an alternative and comprehensive theoretical framework for the practice of PAR, based on the concepts of solidarity and relational autonomy. By analyzing empirical (...) data on people’s attitudes towards PAR, we reveal an important distinction between the deceased’s wish and the deceased’s consent. In addition, we show that in the majority of cases individuals report that the well-being of their relatives is paramount once they are dead. This finding, as will be demonstrated in the article, is not fully in line with Tremellen and Savulescu’s position who allow PAR in the case of the deceased’s spouse but not in the case of his parents. We also suggest that a relational autonomy perspective can be used to evaluate the choices and actions of the deceased, and to justify the requests for PAR by his spouse or parents. Furthermore, the discussion leads us to analyze both Sandel’s account of solidarity and the more recent account of Prainsack and Buyx. We conclude that PAR can be considered as a solidarity-based practice, both at the familial and societal level, an aspect that should be given more emphasis in the discourse surrounding PAR. (shrink)

Several methods have been reported for extracting sperm from a man after he dies or enters a persistent vegetative state. Although such sperm retrieval could be performed for nonprocreative purposes, such as research, in this paper I focus on cases involving procreative intent. Since 1980, more than ninety cases have occurred in which family members requested sperm retrieval from patients who died or were irreversibly unconscious, with the intent that a wife, girlfriend, or other woman would be inseminated. Recently, the (...) first report of pregnancy and birth following postmortem sperm retrieval appeared in the media.In these cases, death or PVS typically is caused by anoxic injuries, trauma, or rapidly progressing infections. (shrink)

Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak (2008) provide a lucid and convincing account of the conceptual errors made by abortion opponents in using the term unborn child as a rhetorical device...

Since it can sometimes seem necessary to undertake research that might affect a developing fetus, it would be useful to have a satisfactory ethical framework governing such efforts. Frank Chervenak...

Reproductive counseling includes counseling of prospective parents by obstetricians, clinical geneticists, and genetic counselors regarding, for example, the use of assisted reproductive technologies, prenatal testing, and preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Two different views on wisdom and the goal of reproductive counseling are analyzed. According to the first view, the goal of reproductive counseling is to help prospective parents reach a wise decision. A specific course of action is recommended by the counselor in contrast to other possible alternatives. According to the second (...) view, the goal of reproductive counseling is not to help prospective parents reach a wise decision but to help them reach their own decision wisely. It is the prospective parents who should make the decision, and it is their value commitments that should be decisive. It is argued that the second approach is to be preferred to the first. It combines respect for autonomy with a recognition of the need for assistance in decision-making. Both the first and second views relate the goal of reproductive counseling to wisdom. A problem is, however, what wisdom more precisely means — there are many different views. A casuistic view of wisdom is investigated. This view roughly defines wisdom as practical prudence in dealing with particular cases. What characterizes a casuistic decision-making method is elaborated in more detail. Applied to the second view, a casuistic view of wisdom implies that the counselor should encourage prospective parents to take into consideration the nature of the particular problem at hand, the context of the problem, their own individual identities, their personal value commitments, and various alternative perspectives, values and arguments. (shrink)

This essay has two purposes. The first is to argue that our moral duties towards human embryos should be assessed in light of the Golden Rule by asking the normative question, “how would I want to be treated if I were an embryo?” Some reject the proposition “I was an embryo” on the basis that embryos should not be recognized as persons. This essay replies to five common arguments denying the personhood of human embryos: (1) that early human embryos lack (...) ontological individuation; (2) that they are members of the species Homo sapiens but not yet human persons; (3) that the argument for personhood commits the “heap argument” fallacy; (4) that since human procreation in nature is inefficient, human embryos cannot be persons; and (5) the “burning building” scenario proves that all arguments for personhood are irrational or inconsistent. The second purpose is to set forth and criticize in light of the normative judgement defended in part one the present legal situation of cryo-preserved embryos in the U.S. The essay ends by proposing legislative reforms to protect ex utero human embryos. (shrink)

Durch Fortschritte in der modernen Reproduktionsmedizin ist es Frauen heute möglich, auch nach der Menopause mit eigenen Eizellen schwanger zu werden. Damit wird die Fortpflanzung im homologen System auch im Alter zu einer realistischen Option. Gegen derartige späte Schwangerschaften gibt es vielfältige Argumente, die vor allem auf mögliche Schädigungen aufgrund des hohen Alters der Mutter verweisen. Maßnahmen der Anti-Aging-Medizin zum Erhalt bzw. zur Verbesserung der kognitiven und physischen Leistungsfähigkeit im fortgeschrittenen Alter könnten diese Einwände gegen den Einsatz von Reproduktionstechniken nach (...) der Menopause entkräften. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie erstrebenswert postmenopausale Schwangerschaften unter diesen Voraussetzungen eigentlich sind. Es wird die These vertreten, dass eine Schadensargumentation für eine ethische Bewertung allein nicht ausreichend ist, sondern auch Überlegungen zu Status und Authentizität des Kinderwunsches, zum Selbstverständnis der Medizin, zur Autonomie der Betroffenen sowie zur Natürlichkeit der Lebensführung berücksichtigt werden müssen. Darüber hinaus zeigt sich, wie Entwicklungen in zwei spezifischen Anwendungsbereichen (Anti-Aging- und Reproduktionsmedizin) in einer gemeinsamen Betrachtung zusammengeführt und mit Gewinn für allgemeinere medizinethische Überlegungen bewertet werden können. (shrink)

Stimulated by development of reproductive technologies, many current bioethical accounts of parenthood focus on defining parenthood at or around birth. They tend to exclude from their scope some parent-child relationships that develop later in a child’s life. In reality, a parent-child relationship can emerge or dissolve over time: the parents of person A as an adolescent or adult may be different to her parents when she is a young child. To address this aspect of parenthood, we propose a new ‘mutuality (...) account’ of parenthood, grounded in the concept of ontological security. We argue that in most cases a parent-child relationship exists if there is mutual ontological security between the parent and child. We suggest that this mutual ontological security is constituted and sustained by shared frameworks of reality and cohesive personal narratives. Our intention is to broaden the conceptual understanding of parenthood, to include parent-child relationships that do not fall neatly into current bioethical accounts, and to argue against the notion that objective physiological, causal, or social ties are necessary to ‘make’ a parent. (shrink)

Assisted reproductive technology has enabled thousands of infertile couples to experience the joys of parenthood. At various times, however, significant problems have come to light concerning the providing of infertility treatment in the United States. An early problem was misleading advertising by some infertility programs, particularly in regard to pregnancy success rates. This unacceptable activity suggested the need for more oversight of assisted reproductive technology and prompted the passage of a federal law requiring the reporting of success rates in a (...) standardized format. Another problem, one that was especially disturbing, was the transfer of preembryos to infertile women at the University of California, Irvine, without the consent of the progenitor couples. Disclosure of these events added fuel to the debate over whether assisted reproductive technology should be subject to greater governmental regulation. (shrink)

An objection often is raised against the use of reproductive technology to create "nontraditional families," as in ovum donation for postmenopausal women or postmortem artificial insemination. The objection states that conceiving children in such circumstances is harmful to them because of adverse features of these nontraditional families. A similar objection is raised when parents, through negligence or willful disregard of risks, create children with serious genetic diseases or other developmental handicaps. It is claimed that such reproduction harms the children who (...) are created. In reply to this Harm to the Child Argument, it has been pointed out that the procreative acts that supposedly harm the child are the very acts that create the child. This reply has been developed into an argument that, in most of the types of cases under consideration, creating the child does not harm her. This reply, the No Harm Argument, has been stated in three main ways, and it is one of the most misunderstood arguments in bioethics. This paper examines the main rebuttals that have been made to the No Harm Argument and argues that none of them is successful. (shrink)

Much has been written about the ethics of sex selection. This article thoroughly explores the ethical arguments put forth in the literature both for and against non-medical sex selection using sperm sorting. While most of these arguments come from philosophers, feminist scholars, social scientists and members of the healthcare community, they are often echoed in empirical studies that have explored community values. This review is timely because the first efficacious method for sex selection via sperm sorting, MicroSort, is currently in (...) clinical trials and moving closer to FDA approval for marketing in the USA. While the clinical trials are currently focused on the use of MicroSort to avoid X-linked genetic diseases, MicroSort can also be used to satisfy parental preferences. (shrink)

The President’s Council on Bioethics has addressed the moral status of human preembryos in its reports on stem cell research and human therapeutic cloning. Although the Council has been criticized for being hand-picked to favor the right-to-life viewpoint concerning human preembryos, it has embraced the idea that the right-to-life position should be defended in secular terms. This is an important feature of the Council’s work, and it demonstrates a recognition of the need for genuine engagement between opposing sides in the (...) debate over stem cell research. To promote this engagement, the Council has stated in secular terms several arguments for the personhood of human preembryos. This essay presents and critiques those arguments, and it concludes that they are unsuccessful. If the best arguments in support of the personhood of human preembryos have been presented by the Council, then there are no reasonable secular arguments in support of that view. (shrink)