Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive (...) structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein’s insistence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other’s own intentional experiences. Section 5 concludes by assessing the extent to which their analyses lead support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds. (shrink)

Technology always provides a new perception of the world. However, it is not clear when technology produces “mere” new informations and when it provides something more such as a production of new objects in our world which start to “live” around us. The aim of this paper is to study how technology shapes our surrounding world. The questions which we are going to answer are: Is it really adding new objects to our world? If yes, does every technology have this (...) potentiality? We are going to tackle the problem using a phenomenological and post-phenomenological approach focussing our attention on the perceptual level. Using Husserl’s philosophy we will study how technology are deeply involved in our perception and, thanks to post-phenomenology and its concept of “embodiment relations,” we will be able to determine which kind of technologies have the potentiality to change our surrounding world introducing and producing new objects in it. (shrink)

Resumen Husserl emprendió varias presentaciones sintéticas de la fenomenología con el propósito de darla a conocer ante públicos amplios. En el presente trabajo estudiaremos el enfoque de las Conferencias de París, su proyección en las Meditaciones cartesianas y el destino del proyecto de la versión alemana en tensión con la redacción del Sistema de filosofía fenomenológica, a los efectos de establecer sus rasgos distintivos, evaluar los alcances del abandono del neocartesianismo, que suele asociarse con el último período de producción de (...) Husserl y, situar la dirección de estas últimas presentaciones en el clima intelectual que les dio origen.Husserl undertooks several synthetic presentations of phenomenology in order to make it known to broader audiences. In the present work we will study the approach of the Paris Lectures, their projection in the Cartesian Meditations and the idea of the German version in tension with the writing of the System of phenomenological philosophy, in order to establish its distinctive features, to evaluate the abandonment of neocartesianism that is usually associated with the last period of Husserl's production and to identify the direction of these presentations in the intellectual climate that gave rise to them. (shrink)

Artikkel lähtub Hegeli filosoofilise süsteemi mittemetafüüsilisest tõlgendusest ja keskendub ühele aspektile Hegeli dialektilise meetodi juures, mille iseloomustamiseks oleks autori arvates kõige adekvaatsem kasutada narratiivi mõistet. Artikli tees on kokkuvõtlikult järgmine: Hegeli arvates ei ole filosoofiline tõde väljendatav ühe lause või propositsiooniga, vaid see nõuab tervet väidete jada, kusjuures mõistete määratlused selles väidete jadas peavad suutma teiseneda --- nii nagu kirjandusliku jutustuse käigus võivad teiseneda tegelaste iseloom ja arusaamine asjadest . Lisaks neile kahele omadusele on narratiivile iseloomulik talle omaste struktuurielementide abil (...) loodud terviklikkus, mis võimaldab tal anda edasi sellist mõtet, mis ei sisaldu üheski narratiivi moodustavas lauses üksikult võetuna. Need kolm omadust võimaldavad Hegeli "dialektilisele" meetodile narratiiviteooria vahenditega uut valgust heita ja spekulatiivse tõe loomust paremini mõista. The paper discusses the nature of Hegel's dialectical method and criticizes its wide-spread interpretation according to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula. It is argued that there is no evidence of triadic structures in Hegel's works. Rather, the elements or "determinations" ) that make up the body of Hegel's texts, are organized as "series" that form circles, in which, as Hegel maintains, the last element leads us back to the first. If synthesis means creating something new by using the initial elements then it is problematic whether anything becomes synthesized in Hegel texts. The paper argues against interpreting the every third element of the series or the end-points of the series as synthetic unities. Instead, the paper proposes that Hegel's speculative method uses the form of narrative for creating a vessel that is able to express the "speculative truth" which is "fluid" and which requires a "plastic" form of presentation. Narrative can accomplish what a singular proposition and a deductive system cannot, because it consists of a series of claims that is able to express the movement of what is said in each claim, and because its ending creates a point at which the story as a whole obtains a meaning that is not expressed in any particular sentence constituting the story. (shrink)

Recently the relevance of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger has been critiqued in nursing literature. However, this critique is based primarily upon an appropriation of Heidegger that does not reflect an understanding of meaning as grounded in temporality. Therefore, this paper aims to (1) explicate Heidegger's grounding of meaning, (2) briefly contrast Heidegger's and Husserl's notions of the origin of meaning, (3) describe how Heidegger was first introduced to nursing, and (4) illustrate through examples from a research study how the (...) philosophy of Heidegger might inform the phenomenological researcher. (shrink)

This dissertation explores and argues for the import of the imagination (Phantasie) in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. It contends that Husserl's extensive analyses of the imagination influenced how he came to conceive the phenomenological method throughout the main stages of his philosophical career. The work clarifies Husserl's complex method of investigation by considering the role of the imagination in his main methodological apparatuses: the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions, and eidetic variation - all of which remained ambiguous despite (...) his extensive programmatic discussions. The work illuminates and clarifies aspects of the Husserlian phenomenological method never before explored. -/- In order to clarify Husserl's eidetic method of inquiry, I propose a new way of thinking about the imagination - as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung) and as horizonal-nexic level of consciousness exhibiting the neutrality, freedom, and possibility as its essential features. Following Husserl's studies of the imagination, I propose a three-level model of consciousness (realizing, imagining, and eidetic) and explore the dynamic flexibility of each level (as horizon within which acts such as judgments or memories can unfold). This model of consciousness allows for a rethinking of the sources and conditions for the possibility of eidetic phenomenological inquiry - topics Husserl was mostly silent about. -/- Through a rethinking of the model of consciousness, I propose a tight and substantial relationship between the natural (everyday) and artificial (methodological, theoretical) attitudes. I argue that the structure and systems of possibilities pertaining to the artificial attitude - i.e., our actual as well as possible methodological tools - are structurally and well as informationally bound to the structure and system of possibilities pertaining to the natural attitude. In order to explore the nature of the relationship between these two attitudes I argue that we must take a closer look at the structure and abilities of imagining consciousness - the sole nexic-horizonal level that can function both naturally and artificially. This insight regarding the nature of consciousness clarifies Husserl's transcendental idealism in its intimate connection to the everyday. Understanding Husserl's philosophical stance is thus purged of all possibility of mistakenly labeling it as entailing immanent detachment, solipsism, or Platonic idealism. (shrink)

Intersubjectivity is the proposition that human experience occurs in a world of shared and embodied understandings, mediated by culture and language. Nursing is fundamentally relational, and nursing research stems from an exchange between participants and researchers and indeed around the transaction of the patient and the nurse in the intersubjective space of clinical settings. Through the philosophical standpoints of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty, Heidegger, and Gadamer we examine these differing philosophical constructs of intersubjectivity and the contribution of these positions to phenomenological nursing (...) inquiry. Particular framings of intersubjectivity should influence the way researchers interact with their participants and data so that the chosen philosophy sits coherently within a research plan and methodology. This exploration of philosophical standpoints is extended through examples of, and reflections upon, the authors' experiences of intersubjectivity in our published phenomenological nursing studies and through dynamic interactions that characterise interpretive activities within a research team. (shrink)

Resumen Las distintas dimensiones de la investigación fenomenológica y su vínculo intrínseco con las cuestiones de método llevan a prestar atención a la esfera de lo inaparente, y especialmente a la cuestión del acceso al plano trascendental. El inicio de la discusión se remonta al planteo sobre el abandono -o no- del cartesianismo en Husserl, tema que devino un tercer problema asociado con las vías de acceso a la reducción. En este trabajo estudiaremos este decurso con objeto de sugerir que (...) los desarrollos sobre generatividad y filosofía de lo inaparente invitan a redefinir el problema en términos más generales, explorando qué accesos a lo trascendental se despliegan en las diversas dimensiones de investigación fenomenológica. En este sentido, seguiremos la deriva de las dos primeras discusiones para bosquejar finalmente las direcciones que surgirían en una labor de desarrollo de la tercera.The different dimensions of phenomenological research and its intrinsic link to methodology lead to pay attention to this area and, within it, especially to the ways to transcendental dimension. The beginning of this discussion goes back to the abandonment -or absence of abandonment- of Cartesianism in Husserl, an issue that became a third problem in the issue of the ways to reduction. In this paper we study these problems in order to suggest that developments on generativity and phenomenology of the inapparent redefine the problem in more general terms, exploring the ways leading into the transcendental realm that unfold in the various dimensions of phenomenological research. In this regard, we will continue the first two discussions and finally point out the directions that arise in the development of the third question. (shrink)