Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins and Applications of Folk Psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60:43-68.
    This paper promotes the view that our childhood engagement with narratives of a certain kind is the basis of sophisticated folk psychological abilities —i.e. it is through such socially scaffolded means that folk psychological skills are normally acquired and fostered. Undeniably, we often use our folk psychological apparatus in speculating about why another may have acted on a particular occasion, but this is at best a peripheral and parasitic use. Our primary understanding and skill in folk psychology derives from and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • The massive redeployment hypothesis and the functional topography of the brain.Michael L. Anderson - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):143-174.
    This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • The reflexive theory of perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Updating evolutionary epistemology.Christophe Heintz - 2018 - In Kris Rutten, Stefaan Blancke & Ronald Soetaert (eds.), Perspectives on Science and Culture. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press. pp. 195-222.
    This chapter critically analyzes evolutionary epistemology as a theoretical framework for the study of science as a historical and cultural phenomenon. As spelled out by Campbell in the 1970s, evolutionary epistemology has an ambitious goal: it aims at understanding the complex relations between bio- logical evolution, especially the biological evolution of human cognition, and the cultural evolution of scientific knowledge. It eventually aims at forming an integrated causal theory of the evolution of science, starting with the evo- lution of human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (3):387-406.
    Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theories a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be made better by insights from John Dewey. I chose Dewey because he offered important insights in cognition long before there was cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Concepts and the modularity of thought.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):107-130.
    Having concepts is a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity. One thing that conceptual thought requires is obeying the Generality Constraint: concepts ought to be freely recombinable with other concepts to form novel thoughts, independent of what they are concepts of. Having concepts, then, constrains cognitive architecture in interesting ways. In recent years, spurred on by the rise of evolutionary psychology, massively modular models of the mind have gained prominence. I argue that these architectures are incapable of satisfying the Generality Constraint, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Distinctively human thinking: Modular precursors and components.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 69--88.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Context-sensitive inference, modularity, and the assumption of formal processing.Mitch Parsell - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):45-58.
    Performance on the Wason selection task varies with content. This has been taken to demonstrate that there are different cognitive modules for dealing with different conceptual domains. This implication is only legitimate if our underlying cognitive architecture is formal. A non-formal system can explain content-sensitive inference without appeal to independent inferential modules.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Language as a Necessary Condition for Complex Mental Content: A Review of the Discussion on Spatial and Mathematical Thinking. [REVIEW]Arkadiusz Gut & Robert Mirski - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (3):33-56.
    In this article we review the discussion over the thesis that language serves as an integrator of contents coming from different cognitive modules. After presenting the theoretical considerations, we examine two strands of empirical research that tested the hypothesis — spatial cognition and mathematical cognition. The idea shared by both of them is that each is composed of two separate modules processing information of a specific kind. For spatial thinking these are geometric information about the location of the object and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Origin of Languages. A Constrained Set of Hypotheses.José Luis Guijarro - 2014 - Humana Mente 7 (27).
    As it seems impossible to find reliable evidence to back up hypotheses on the origin of our use of the linguistic tool in our acts of communication, I believe that we may start by pointing as accurately as possible to the processes involved, using a methodology that attempts to reach the levels of adequacy proposed by Chomsky, complemented by those suggested by David Marr. If we conclude that human communication and human language may have had different origins, we might find (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A partial defense of intuition on naturalist grounds.Joseph Shieber - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):321-341.
    The debate concerning the role of intuitions in philosophy has been characterized by a fundamental disagreement between two main camps. The first, the autonomists, hold that, due to the use in philosophical investigation of appeals to intuition, most of the central questions of philosophy can in principle be answered by philosophical investigation and argument without relying on the sciences. The second, the naturalists, deny the possibility of a priori knowledge and are skeptical of the role of intuition in providing evidence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Fodor’s riddle of abduction.Matthew J. Rellihan - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):313 - 338.
    How can abductive reasoning be physical, feasible, and reliable? This is Fodor’s riddle of abduction, and its apparent intractability is the cause of Fodor’s recent pessimism regarding the prospects for cognitive science. I argue that this riddle can be solved if we augment the computational theory of mind to allow for non-computational mental processes, such as those posited by classical associationists and contemporary connectionists. The resulting hybrid theory appeals to computational mechanisms to explain the semantic coherence of inference and associative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations