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  1. In defense of language-independent flexibility, or: What rodents and humans can do without language.Alexandre Duval - 2024 - Mind and Language 39:1-27.
    There are two main approaches within classical cognitive science to explaining how humans can entertain mental states that integrate contents across domains. The language-based framework states that this ability arises from higher cognitive domain-specific systems that combine their outputs through the language faculty, whereas the language-independent framework holds that it comes from non-language-involving connections between such systems. This article turns on its head the most influential empirical argument for the language-based framework, an argument that originates from research on spatial reorientation. (...)
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  • Massive Modularity: An Ontological Hypothesis or an Adaptationist Discovery Heuristic?David Villena - 2023 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):317-334.
    Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesise that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Is the massive modularity of mind hypothesis a cogent view about the ontological nature of human mind or is it, rather, an effective/ineffective adaptationist discovery heuristic for generating predictively successful hypotheses about both heretofore unknown psychological traits and unknown properties of already identified psychological traits? Considering the inadequacies of the case in (...)
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  • Concepts and the modularity of thought.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):107-130.
    Having concepts is a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity. One thing that conceptual thought requires is obeying the Generality Constraint: concepts ought to be freely recombinable with other concepts to form novel thoughts, independent of what they are concepts of. Having concepts, then, constrains cognitive architecture in interesting ways. In recent years, spurred on by the rise of evolutionary psychology, massively modular models of the mind have gained prominence. I argue that these architectures are incapable of satisfying the Generality Constraint, (...)
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  • Massive modularity : an ontological hypothesis or an adaptationist discovery heuristic?Joseph David de Jesús Villena Saldaña - 2021 - Dissertation, Lingnan University
    Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesize that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Modules are also invoked to explain cognitive capacities associated with the performance of specific functional tasks. Jerry Fodor (1983) considered that modules are useful only for explaining relatively low-level systems (input systems). These are the systems involved in capacities like perception and language. For Fodor, the central (high-level) systems of mind — (...)
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  • Self-Deception: A Teleofunctional Approach.David Livingstone Smith - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):181-199.
    This paper aims to offer an alternative to the existing philosophical theories of self-deception. It describes and motivates a teleofunctional theory that models self-deception on the subintentional deceptions perpetrated by non-human organisms. Existing theories of self-deception generate paradoxes, are empirically implausible, or fail to account for the distinction between self-deception and other kinds of motivated irrationality. Deception is not a uniquely human phenomenon: biologists have found that many non-human organisms deceive and are deceived. A close analysis of the pollination strategy (...)
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  • É a modularidade massiva um programa de pesquisa empiricamente progressivo?César Fernando Meurer - 2019 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 64 (3):e34192.
    A modularidade massiva pode ser descrita como um programa de pesquisa, nos termos da filosofia da ciência de Lakatos. Cumpre, para tanto, identificar o núcleo, mostrar evidências de que ele é assumido como infalsificável e examinar estratégias de articulação e sofisticação do cinto de proteção. No presente trabalho, faço isso com o intuito de responder à pergunta lançada no título. Em atenção a três desenvolvimentos recentes, cujas predições encontraram corroboração empírica, sou levado a inferir que esse programa é, de fato, (...)
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  • Vocal imitation of song and speech.James T. Mantell & Peter Q. Pfordresher - 2013 - Cognition 127 (2):177-202.
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