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  1. Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
    An overview of the knowing-how debates over the last ten years.
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  • Ryle’s “Intellectualist Legend” in Historical Context.Michael Kremer - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that emerged from his criticism of the “intellectualist legend” that to do something intelligently is “to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice,” and became a philosophical commonplace in the second half of the last century. In this century Jason Stanley has attacked Ryle’s distinction, arguing that “knowing-how is a species of knowing-that,” and accusing Ryle of setting up a straw man in his critique of “intellectualism.” Examining the (...)
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  • Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.
    How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.
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  • Against intellectualism about skill.Daniel D. Hutto & Ian Robertson - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-20.
    This paper will argue that intellectualism about skill—the contention that skilled performance is without exception guided by proposition knowledge—is fundamentally flawed. It exposes that intellectualists about skill run into intractable theoretical problems in explicating a role for their novel theoretical conceit of practical modes of presentation. It then examines a proposed solution by Carlotta Pavese which seeks to identify practical modes of presentation with motor representations that guide skilled sensorimotor action. We argue that this proposed identification is problematic on empirical (...)
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  • Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control.J. Adam Carter & Joshua Shepherd - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):957-977.
    Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is (...)
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