Switch to: References

Citations of:

Knowing How

Analysis 79 (3):487-503 (2019)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    This idea that what is distinctive of intentional performances (or at least of those intentional performances that amount to skilled actions) is one’s practical knowledge in it —i.e., knowledge of what one is doing while doing it— famously traces back to Anscombe ([]1963] 2000). While many philosophers have theorized about Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge (e.g., Setiya (2008), Thompson et al. (2011), Schwenkler (2019), O’Brien (2007)), there is a wide disagreement about how to understand it. This paper investigates how best (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
    1. Introduction‘Knowledge-how’ is the knowledge you have when you know how to do something. For example, when you know how to dance the tango, or solve a certain equation, or ride a bike etc. Influenced by Ryle (1949), the traditional view of knowledge-how had two components: (i) a negative claim (anti-intellectualism) that knowledge-how is not any kind of knowledge-that (or any other propositional attitude state); and (ii) a positive claim (abilitism or dispositionalism) that knowledge-how is some kind of ability or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Collective Practical Knowledge is a Fragmented Interrogative Capacity.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):180-199.
    What does it take for a group of people to know how to do something? An account of collective practical knowledge ought to be compatible with the linguistic evidence about the semantics for collective knowledge-how ascriptions, be able to explain the practicality of collective knowledge, be able to explain both the connection between individual and collective know-how and the possibility of a group knowing how to do something none of its members know, and be applicable to a suitably wide range (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria.N. Waights Hickman - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):311-335.
    I advance a variety of intellectualism about knowing-how that is, paradoxically, suggested by Ryle's positive discussions of that phenomenon. I discuss the roots of the view in Ryle's work, its affinity with John Hyman's () view of factual knowledge, and important points of contrast with Stanley and Williamson's () proposal. Drawing on work by Cath () and Wiggins () I also discuss conditions on knowing practically, in ‘the executive way’, as an alternative to appealing to practical modes of presentation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • A Cognitive Perspective on Knowledge How: Why Intellectualism Is Neuro-Psychologically Implausible.Andreas Stephens & Cathrine V. Felix - 2020 - Philosophies 5 (21):21-0.
    We defend two theses: Knowledge how and knowledge that are two distinct forms of knowledge, and; Stanley-style intellectualism is neuro-psychologically implausible. Our naturalistic argument for the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that is based on a consideration of the nature of slips and basic activities. We further argue that Stanley’s brand of intellectualism has certain ontological consequences that go against modern cognitive neuroscience and psychology. We tie up our line of thought by showing that input from cognitive neuroscience and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to Bozşahin.William J. Rapaport - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):227-237.
    A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Skill acquisition without representation.Albert Piacente - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45 (3):241-258.
    ABSTRACTA paper in two parts, the first is a critique of the commonly held view among both cognitivist and non-cognitivist sport philosophers that conscious mental representation of knowledge that is a necessary condition for skill acquisition. The second is a defense of a necessary causal condition for skill acquisition, a necessary causal condition that is mimetic, physically embodied, and socially embedded. To make my case I rely throughout on a common thought experiment in and beyond the philosophy of sport literature, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Skills as Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese & Beddor Bob - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    This paper advances a unified theory of skillful and intentional action. According to our theory, the distinguishing feature of both skillful and intentional actions is that they are guided by the agent’s knowledge of the means of performing the task at hand. This theory leads naturally to an intellectualist view of skills, according to which skills are propositional knowledge states. We show that this view enjoys a number of explanatory advantages over more familiar dispositional accounts of skills.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowing‐Wh and Embedded Questions.Ted Parent - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):81-95.
    Do you know who you are? If the question seems unclear, it might owe to the notion of ‘knowing-wh’ (knowing-who, knowing-what, knowing-when, etc.). Such knowledge contrasts with ‘knowing-that’, the more familiar topic of epistemologists. But these days, knowing-wh is receiving more attention than ever, and here we will survey three current debates on the nature of knowing-wh. These debates concern, respectively, (1) whether all knowing-wh is reducible to knowing-that (‘generalized intellectualism’), (2) whether all knowing-wh is relativized to a contrast proposition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • One More Twist ~ Knowledge How and Ability.Masaharu Mizumoto - forthcoming - Episteme:1-9.
    According to Bengson et al.’s Salchow case, Irina is a novice skater who has a mistaken belief about what amounts to a Salchow, but also has a neurological abnormality which, unknowingly to her, affects both her movement and her sense of it. As a result of this twist, she always ends up succeeding in jumping the Salchow whenever she tries. This story was presented as a counterexample to a variant of anti-intellectualism, and as Bengson and colleagues expected, the vast majority (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Joint Abilities, Joint Know-how and Collective Knowledge.Seumas Miller - 2019 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):197-212.
    In this article, I introduce and analyze the notion of joint abilities; a species of ability possessed by agents who perform joint actions of a certain kind. Joint abilities are abilitie...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Epistemic Actions, Abilities and Knowing-How: A Non-Reductive Account.Seumas Miller - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (4):466-485.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Show and Tell: Demonstration as Practical Testimony.Ben Kotzee - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):356-376.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Gilbert Ryle’s adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
    I argue that understanding why p involves a kind of intellectual know how and differsfrom both knowledge that p and knowledge why p (as they are standardly understood).I argue that understanding, in this sense, is valuable.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Shared Know-how in Linguistic Bodies.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1):94-101.
    The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations