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  1. What Accounts for the Paradox in Goodman's Paradox. The Neglect of the Functional Character of Natural Laws as the Reason for the Paradox.Dieter Wandschneider - 2000 - In Peres, Constanze/ Greimann, Dirk (ed. 2000) Wahrheit – Sein – Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Olms 2000, 231–245. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: pp. 231–245.
    Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of change of unique unrepeatable (...)
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  • A survey of some recent results on Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic.J. Landes, J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):19 - 47.
    We give a unified account of some results in the development of Polyadic Inductive Logic in the last decade with particular reference to the Principle of Spectrum Exchangeability, its consequences for Instantial Relevance, Language Invariance and Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, and the corresponding de Finetti style representation theorems.
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  • Remarks on probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - Philosophical Studies 14 (5):65 - 75.
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  • Discussion: The non-reducibility of Koopman's theorems of probability in Carnap's system for mc.Robert M. Jones - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):368.
    Carnap gives a definition for a comparative concept of confirmation. For it he uses the notation “MC.” His defined notation is intended to be an explicatum for the explicandum: “the hypothesis h is confirmed by the evidence e equally strongly or more strongly than h′ by e′”.
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  • Notes on probability and induction.Rudolf Carnap - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):269 - 298.
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  • A Continuum of Inductive Methods Arising from a Generalized Principle of Instantial Relevance.C. J. Nix & J. B. Paris - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):83-115.
    In this paper we consider a natural generalization of the Principle of Instantial Relevance and give a complete characterization of the probabilistic belief functions satisfying this principle as a family of discrete probability functions parameterized by a single real δ ∊ [0, 1).
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  • Zum einfachheitsprinzip in der wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung.von Hans Hermes - 1958 - Dialectica 12 (3‐4):317-331.
    ZusammenfassungDa die zuletzt von Shimony, Lehman und Kemeny ausgebaute Begründung der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie durch Zurückführung auf den Begriff der Wette im wesentlichen nur die Axiome von Kolmogoroff liefert, welche für die Anwendungen nicht ausreichen, muss man nach einem neuen Prinzip suchen, um weitere Axiome zu gewinnen. Als solches bietet sich an ein Einfachheitsprinzip, welches besagt, dass eine einfachere Hypothese die wahrscheinlichere ist. Es wird kritisch berichtet über verschiedene Versuche, die in Münster insbesondere von Kiesow und W. Oberschelp unternommen worden sind, um (...)
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