What Accounts for the Paradox in Goodman's Paradox. The Neglect of the Functional Character of Natural Laws as the Reason for the Paradox

In Peres, Constanze/ Greimann, Dirk (ed. 2000) Wahrheit – Sein – Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Olms 2000, 231–245. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: pp. 231–245 (2000)
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Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of change of unique unrepeatable temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, – that is my claim – the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences, thereby implying a potentiality dimension of nature, too.
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