This paper introduces the logic _Q__L__E__T_ _F_, a quantified extension of the logic of evidence and truth _L__E__T_ _F_, together with a corresponding sound and complete first-order non-deterministic valuation semantics. _L__E__T_ _F_ is a paraconsistent and paracomplete sentential logic that extends the logic of first-degree entailment (_FDE_) with a classicality operator ∘ and a non-classicality operator ∙, dual to each other: while ∘_A_ entails that _A_ behaves classically, ∙_A_ follows from _A_’s violating some classically valid inferences. The semantics of _Q__L__E__T_ (...) _F_ combines structures that interpret negated predicates in terms of anti-extensions with first-order non-deterministic valuations, and completeness is obtained through a generalization of Henkin’s method. By providing sound and complete semantics for first-order extensions of _FDE_, _K3_, and _LP_, we show how these tools, which we call here the method of _anti-extensions + valuations_, can be naturally applied to a number of non-classical logics. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce first-order versions of logics of evidence and truth, together with corresponding sound and complete Kripke semantics with variable and constant domains. According to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, these logics intend to represent possibly inconsistent and incomplete information bases over time. The paper also discusses the connections between Belnap-Dunn’s and da Costa’s approaches to paraconsistency, and argues that the logics of evidence and truth combine them in a very natural way.

One of the oldest systems of paraconsistent logic is the set of so-called C-systems of Newton da Costa, and this has been generalized into a family of systems now known as logics of formal inconsistencies by Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio and João Marcos. The characteristic notion in these systems is the so-called consistency operator which, roughly speaking, indicates how gluts are behaving. One natural question then is to ask if we can let not only gluts but also gaps be around (...) and generalize the notion of consistency into classicality. This is already considered by Andréa Loparić and da Costa in the style of C-systems. The aim of this paper is to develop a family of systems that generalizes the system of Loparić and da Costa which may be called logics of formal classicality. (shrink)

We prove that the minimal Logic of Formal Inconsistency $\mathsf{QmbC}$ validates a weaker version of Fraïssé’s theorem. LFIs are paraconsistent logics that relativize the Principle of Explosion only to consistent formulas. Now, despite the recent interest in LFIs, their model-theoretic properties are still not fully understood. Our aim in this paper is to investigate the situation. Our interest in FT has to do with its fruitfulness; the preservation of FT indicates that a number of other classical semantic properties can be (...) also salvaged in LFIs. Further, given that FT depends on truth-functionality, whether full FT holds for $\mathsf{QmbC}$ becomes a challenging question. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider some contributions to the model theory of the logic of formal inconsistency $\mathsf{QmbC}$ as a reply to Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio, Rodrigo Podiacki and Tarcísio Rodrigues’ call for a ‘wider model theory.’ This call demands that we align the practices and techniques of model theory for logics of formal inconsistency as closely as possible with those employed in classical model theory. The key result is a proof that the Keisler–Shelah isomorphism theorem holds for $\mathsf{QmbC}$, i.e. (...) that the strong elementary equivalence of two $\mathsf{QmbC}$ models $\mathfrak{A}$ and $\mathfrak{B}$ is equivalent to them having strongly isomorphic ultrapowers. As intermediate steps, we introduce some notions of model-theoretic equivalence between $\mathsf{QmbC}$ models, explicitly prove Łoś’ theorem and introduce a useful technique of model-theoretic ‘atomization’ in which the satisfaction sets of non-deterministically evaluated formulae are associated with new predicates. Finally, we consider some of the extensions of $\mathsf{QmbC}$, explicitly showing that Keisler–Shelah holds for $\mathsf{QCi}$ and suggesting that it holds of extensions like $\mathsf{QCila}$ and $\mathsf{QCia}$ as well. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs, for short) are paraconsistent logics (that is, logics containing contradictory but non-trivial theories) having a consistency connective which allows to recover the ex falso quodlibet principle in a controlled way. The aim of this paper is considering a novel semantical approach to first-order LFIs based on Tarskian structures defined over swap structures, a special class of multialgebras. The proposed semantical framework generalizes previous aproaches to quantified LFIs presented in the literature. The case of QmbC, (...) the simpler quantified LFI expanding classical logic, will be analyzed in detail. An axiomatic extension of QmbC called QLFI1o is also studied, which is equivalent to the quantified version of da Costa and D'Ottaviano 3-valued logic J3. The semantical structures for this logic turn out to be Tarkian structures based on twist structures. The expansion of QmbC and QLFI1o with a standard equality predicate is also considered. (shrink)