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Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability

University of California Press (1971)

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  1. Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
    My dissertation explores the ways in which Rudolf Carnap sought to make philosophy scientific by further developing recent interpretive efforts to explain Carnap’s mature philosophical work as a form of engineering. It does this by looking in detail at his philosophical practice in his most sustained mature project, his work on pure and applied inductive logic. I, first, specify the sort of engineering Carnap is engaged in as involving an engineering design problem and then draw out the complications of design (...)
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  • Causality as a theoretical concept: explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets.Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1073-1103.
    We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal nets and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour. In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause–effect relations can be (...)
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  • Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.
    I introduce a mathematical account of expectation based on a qualitative criterion of coherence for qualitative comparisons between gambles (or random quantities). The qualitative comparisons may be interpreted as an agent’s comparative preference judgments over options or more directly as an agent’s comparative expectation judgments over random quantities. The criterion of coherence is reminiscent of de Finetti’s quantitative criterion of coherence for betting, yet it does not impose an Archimedean condition on an agent’s comparative judgments, it does not require the (...)
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  • Points of View Beyond Models: Towards a Formal Approach to Points of View as Access to the World. [REVIEW]Fernando Charro & Juan J. Colomina - 2014 - Foundations of Science 19 (2):137-151.
    According to Vázquez and Liz (Found Sci 16(4): 383–391, 2011), Points of View (PoV) can be considered in two different ways. On the one hand, they can be explained following the model of propositional attitudes. This model assumes that the internal structure of a PoV is constituted by a subject, a set of contents, and a set of relations between the subject and those contents. On the other hand, we can analyze points of view taking as a model the notions (...)
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  • Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  • Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain how recent work on (...)
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  • Analogical Predictions for Explicit Similarity.Jan Willem Romeijn - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):253 - 280.
    This paper concerns exchangeable analogical predictions based on similarity relations between predicates, and deals with a restricted class of such relations. It describes a system of Carnapian λγ rules on underlying predicate families to model the analogical predictions for this restricted class. Instead of the usual axiomatic definition, the system is characterized with a Bayesian model that employs certain statistical hypotheses. Finally the paper argues that the Bayesian model can be generalized to cover cases outside the restricted class of similarity (...)
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  • Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
    It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that all swans are white and all lions are brave simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it (...)
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  • Regularity reformulated.Weng Hong Tang - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):329-343.
    This paper focuses on the view that rationality requires that our credences be regular. I go through different formulations of the requirement, and show that they face several problems. I then formulate a version of the requirement that solves most of, if not all, these problems. I conclude by showing that an argument thought to support the requirement as traditionally formulated actually does not; if anything, the argument, slightly modified, supports my version of the requirement.Send article to KindleTo send this (...)
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  • The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.
    In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...)
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  • Predictive Probability and Analogy by Similarity in Inductive Logic.Maria Concetta Di Maio - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (3):369 - 394.
    The λ-continuum of inductive methods was derived from an assumption, called λ-condition, which says that the probability of finding an individual having property $x_{j}$ depends only on the number of observed individuals having property $x_{j}$ and on the total number of observed individuals. So, according to that assumption, all individuals with properties which are different from $x_{j}$ have equal weight with respect to that probability and, in particular, it does not matter whether any individual was observed having some property similar (...)
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  • What is Probability?Patrick Maher - unknown
    In October 2009 I decided to stop doing philosophy. This meant, in particular, stopping work on the book that I was writing on the nature of probability. At that time, I had no intention of making my unfinished draft available to others. However, I recently noticed how many people are reading the lecture notes and articles on my web site. Since this draft book contains some important improvements on those materials, I decided to make it available to anyone who wants (...)
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  • Carnapian Inductive Logic for a Value Continuum.Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):78-89.
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  • Two dogmas of strong objective bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
    We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ' strong objective Bayesianism' is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is 'logical' and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are 'dogmatic'. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is (...)
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  • Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge. pp. 90--100.
    Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes and effects (...)
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  • The representation of Popper measures.Wolfgang Spohn - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):69-74.
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  • On Carnap: Reflections of a metaphysical student. [REVIEW]Abner Shimony - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):261 - 274.
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  • Meaning constraints.H. Schnelle - 1973 - Synthese 26 (1):13 - 37.
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  • The philosophy of Hans Reichenbach.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 34 (1):5 - 88.
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  • Is there any theoretical justification for a nonstatement view of theories?David Pearce - 1981 - Synthese 46 (1):1 - 39.
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  • Truthlikeness: Comments on recent discussion.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1978 - Synthese 38 (2):281 - 329.
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  • Review. [REVIEW]Andreas Kamlah - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (2):235-252.
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  • Probabilism and induction.Richard Jeffrey - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):51-58.
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  • Carnap's new system of inductive logic.Risto Hilpinen - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):307 - 333.
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  • Carnap's conventionalism.Richard Creath - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
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  • The logico-linguistic evidence underlying Montague's language descriptions.William S. Cooper - 1978 - Synthese 38 (1):39 - 71.
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  • Scientific explanation: A critical survey.Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
    This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...)
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  • Popper on induction and independence.Bruce Langtry - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):326-331.
    Karl Popper, in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" Section *vii, argues that if you find that some objecta a,b, c ... have a specific property P, then this discovery by itself does not increase the probability that some other object also has P. He concludes that there can be no effective principle of induction. My paper disproves Popper's claim, using very elementary considerations..
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  • Must the logical probability of laws be zero?C. Howson - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):153-163.
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  • Some observations on induction in predicate probabilistic reasoning.M. J. Hill, J. B. Paris & G. M. Wilmers - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):43-75.
    We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties.
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  • Carnap and de finetti on bets and the probability of singular events: The dutch book argument reconsidered.Klaus Heilig - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):325-346.
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  • Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn (...)
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  • From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):468-486.
    Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) (...)
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  • (1 other version)From values to probabilities.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3901-3929.
    According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value , to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This (...)
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  • A Note on Irrelevance in Inductive Logic.Jeff B. Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):357 - 370.
    We consider two formalizations of the notion of irrelevance as a rationality principle within the framework of (Carnapian) Inductive Logic: Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, JSP, which is classically important because it leads to Carnap's influential Continuum of Inductive Methods and the recently proposed Weak Irrelevance Principle, WIP. We give a complete characterization of the language invariant probability functions satisfying WIP which generalizes the Nix-Paris Continuum. We argue that the derivation of two very disparate families of inductive methods from alternative perceptions of (...)
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  • On Partial Exchangeability as a Generalization of Symmetry Principles.Jan Von Plato - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):53 - 59.
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  • Probability logic in the twentieth century.Theodore Hailperin - 1991 - History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (1):71-110.
    This essay describes a variety of contributions which relate to the connection of probability with logic. Some are grand attempts at providing a logical foundation for probability and inductive inference. Others are concerned with probabilistic inference or, more generally, with the transmittance of probability through the structure (logical syntax) of language. In this latter context probability is considered as a semantic notion playing the same role as does truth value in conventional logic. At the conclusion of the essay two fully (...)
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  • Review. [REVIEW]Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):417-436.
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  • Propensity and necessity.Ronald N. Giere - 1979 - Synthese 40 (3):439 - 451.
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  • J. M. Keynes's position on the general applicability of mathematical, logical and statistical methods in economics and social science.Michael Emmett Brady - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):1 - 24.
    The author finds no support for the claim that J. M. Keynes had severe reservations, in general, as opposed to particular, concerning the application of mathematical, logical and statistical methods in economics. These misinterpretations rest on the omission of important source material as well as a severe misconstrual ofThe Treatise on Probability (1921).
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  • Fitness and Propensity’s Annulment?Marshall Abrams - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):115-130.
    Recent debate on the nature of probabilities in evolutionary biology has focused largely on the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF), which defines fitness in terms of a conception of probability known as “propensity”. However, proponents of this conception of fitness have misconceived the role of probability in the constitution of fitness. First, discussions of probability and fitness have almost always focused on organism effect probability, the probability that an organism and its environment cause effects. I argue that much of the (...)
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  • Epistemology, Pettigrew Style: A Critical Notice of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, by Richard Pettigrew1.Scott Sturgeon - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1319-1336.
    The sharpest corner of the cutting edge of recent epistemology is to be found in Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. In this fine book Pettigrew argues that a certain kind of accuracy-based value monism entails that rational credence manifests a host of features emphasized by anti-externalists in epistemology. Specifically, he demonstrates how a particular version of accuracy-based value monism—to be discussed at length below—when placed with some not implausible views about how epistemic value and rationality relate to (...)
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  • Reward versus risk in uncertain inference: Theorems and simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
    Systems of logico-probabilistic reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems _O, P_, _Z_, and _QC_. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence _. LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In the first part of the paper, we (...)
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  • Some Aspects of Polyadic Inductive Logic.Jürgen Landes, Jeff Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (1):3-16.
    We give a brief account of some de Finetti style representation theorems for probability functions satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic, together with applications to Non-splitting, Language Invariance, extensions with Equality and Instantial Relevance.
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  • Unexpected Expectations.Alan Hájek - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):533-567.
    A decade ago, Harris Nover and I introduced the Pasadena game, which we argued gives rise to a new paradox in decision theory even more troubling than the St Petersburg paradox. Gwiazda's and Smith's articles in this volume both offer revisionist solutions. I critically engage with both articles. They invite reflections on a number of deep issues in the foundations of decision theory, which I hope to bring out. These issues include: some ways in which orthodox decision theory might be (...)
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  • Carnapian and Tarskian semantics.Pierre Wagner - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):97-119.
    Many papers have been devoted to the semantic turn Carnap took in the late 1930s after Tarski had explained to him his method for defining truth and his work on the establishment of scientific semantics. Commentators have often argued that the major turn in Carnap’s approach to languages had already been taken in the Logical Syntax of Language, but they have usually assumed that Carnap was happy to subsequently follow Tarski and adopt Tarskian semantics. In this paper, it is argued (...)
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  • Strict coherence, sigma coherence and the metaphysics of quantity.Brian Skyrms - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):39-55.
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  • Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals.William L. Harper - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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  • Explicativity, corroboration, and the relative odds of hypotheses.Irving John Good - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):39 - 73.
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  • How evolutionary biology challenges the classical theory of rational choice.W. S. Cooper - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (4):457-481.
    A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always in (...)
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