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Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability

University of California Press (1971)

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  1. Conditional Probability in the Light of Qualitative Belief Change.David C. Makinson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):121 - 153.
    We explore ways in which purely qualitative belief change in the AGM tradition throws light on options in the treatment of conditional probability. First, by helping see why it can be useful to go beyond the ratio rule defining conditional from one-place probability. Second, by clarifying what is at stake in different ways of doing that. Third, by suggesting novel forms of conditional probability corresponding to familiar variants of qualitative belief change, and conversely. Likewise, we explain how recent work on (...)
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  • Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization.Gerhard Schurz - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness. In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures are introduced: comparative versus numeric t-measures, t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements. The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single (...)
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  • Epistemic Justification: Its Subjective and its Objective Ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.
    Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete (...)
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  • What is Probability?Patrick Maher - unknown
    In October 2009 I decided to stop doing philosophy. This meant, in particular, stopping work on the book that I was writing on the nature of probability. At that time, I had no intention of making my unfinished draft available to others. However, I recently noticed how many people are reading the lecture notes and articles on my web site. Since this draft book contains some important improvements on those materials, I decided to make it available to anyone who wants (...)
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  • Irrelevant Conjunction and the Ratio Measure or Historical Skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.
    It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that all swans are white and all lions are brave simply by observing white swans. Irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” of a theory onto another is often thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio measure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, which, it (...)
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  • Where Luce and Krantz Do Really Generalize Savage's Decision Model.Wolfgang Spohn - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):113 - 134.
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  • On Partial Exchangeability as a Generalization of Symmetry Principles.Jan Von Plato - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (1):53 - 59.
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  • Is There Any Theoretical Justification for a Nonstatement View of Theories?David Pearce - 1981 - Synthese 46 (1):1 - 39.
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  • Inducibility and Epistemic Systematization: Rejoinder to Kaufman.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):223 - 232.
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  • Carnap's Conventionalism.Richard Creath - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):141 - 165.
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  • Two Dogmas of Strong Objective Bayesianism.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon Brittan - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):45 – 65.
    We introduce a distinction, unnoticed in the literature, between four varieties of objective Bayesianism. What we call ' strong objective Bayesianism' is characterized by two claims, that all scientific inference is 'logical' and that, given the same background information two agents will ascribe a unique probability to their priors. We think that neither of these claims can be sustained; in this sense, they are 'dogmatic'. The first fails to recognize that some scientific inference, in particular that concerning evidential relations, is (...)
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  • Popper on Induction and Independence.Bruce Langtry - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):326-331.
    Karl Popper, in "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" Section *vii, argues that if you find that some objecta a,b, c ... have a specific property P, then this discovery by itself does not increase the probability that some other object also has P. He concludes that there can be no effective principle of induction. My paper disproves Popper's claim, using very elementary considerations..
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  • Symmetry’s End?J. Paris & A. Vencovská - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (1):53-67.
    We examine the idea that similar problems should have similar solutions (to paraphrase van Fraassen’s slogan ‘Problems which are essentially the same must receive essentially the same solution’, see van Fraassen in Laws and symmetry, Oxford Univesity Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 236) in the context of symmetries of sentence algebras within Inductive Logic and conclude that by itself this is too generous a notion upon which to found the rational assignment of probabilities. We also argue that within our formulation of (...)
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  • Scientific Explanation: A Critical Survey.Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
    This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...)
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  • Predictive Probability and Analogy by Similarity in Inductive Logic.Maria Concetta Di Maio - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (3):369 - 394.
    The λ-continuum of inductive methods was derived from an assumption, called λ-condition, which says that the probability of finding an individual having property $x_{j}$ depends only on the number of observed individuals having property $x_{j}$ and on the total number of observed individuals. So, according to that assumption, all individuals with properties which are different from $x_{j}$ have equal weight with respect to that probability and, in particular, it does not matter whether any individual was observed having some property similar (...)
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  • Strict Coherence, Sigma Coherence and the Metaphysics of Quantity.Brian Skyrms - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):39-55.
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  • Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science. [REVIEW]Samir Chopra & Eric Martin - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.
    We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class of structures in (...)
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  • J. M. Keynes's Position on the General Applicability of Mathematical, Logical and Statistical Methods in Economics and Social Science.Michael Emmett Brady - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):1 - 24.
    The author finds no support for the claim that J. M. Keynes had severe reservations, in general, as opposed to particular, concerning the application of mathematical, logical and statistical methods in economics. These misinterpretations rest on the omission of important source material as well as a severe misconstrual ofThe Treatise on Probability (1921).
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  • Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.
    The characteristic difference between laws and accidental generalizations lies in our epistemic or inductive attitude towards them. This idea has taken various forms and dominated the discussion about lawlikeness in the last decades. Likewise, the issue about ceteris paribus conditions is essentially about how we epistemically deal with exceptions. Hence, ranking theory with its resources of defeasible reasoning seems ideally suited to explicate these points in a formal way. This is what the paper attempts to do. Thus it will turn (...)
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  • Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  • The New Tweety Puzzle: Arguments Against Monistic Bayesian Approaches in Epistemology and Cognitive Science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.
    In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...)
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  • How Evolutionary Biology Challenges the Classical Theory of Rational Choice.W. S. Cooper - 1989 - Biology and Philosophy 4 (4):457-481.
    A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always in (...)
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  • Points of View Beyond Models: Towards a Formal Approach to Points of View as Access to the World. [REVIEW]Fernando Charro & Juan J. Colomina - 2014 - Foundations of Science 19 (2):137-151.
    According to Vázquez and Liz (Found Sci 16(4): 383–391, 2011), Points of View (PoV) can be considered in two different ways. On the one hand, they can be explained following the model of propositional attitudes. This model assumes that the internal structure of a PoV is constituted by a subject, a set of contents, and a set of relations between the subject and those contents. On the other hand, we can analyze points of view taking as a model the notions (...)
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  • A Note on Irrelevance in Inductive Logic.Jeff B. Paris & Alena Vencovská - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (3):357 - 370.
    We consider two formalizations of the notion of irrelevance as a rationality principle within the framework of (Carnapian) Inductive Logic: Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, JSP, which is classically important because it leads to Carnap's influential Continuum of Inductive Methods and the recently proposed Weak Irrelevance Principle, WIP. We give a complete characterization of the language invariant probability functions satisfying WIP which generalizes the Nix-Paris Continuum. We argue that the derivation of two very disparate families of inductive methods from alternative perceptions of (...)
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  • Probabilism and Induction.Richard Jeffrey - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):51-58.
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  • Carnap's New System of Inductive Logic.Risto Hilpinen - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):307 - 333.
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  • Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions and Counterfactuals.William L. Harper - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.
    This paper uses Popper's treatment of probability and an epistemic constraint on probability assignments to conditionals to extend the Bayesian representation of rational belief so that revision of previously accepted evidence is allowed for. Results of this extension include an epistemic semantics for Lewis' theory of counterfactual conditionals and a representation for one kind of conceptual change.
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  • Carnap's Inductive Probabilities as a Contribution to Decision Theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):325-367.
    Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a (...)
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  • The Representation of Popper Measures.Wolfgang Spohn - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):69-74.
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  • On Carnap: Reflections of a Metaphysical Student. [REVIEW]Abner Shimony - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):261 - 274.
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  • The Philosophy of Hans Reichenbach.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 34 (1):5 - 88.
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  • The Logico-Linguistic Evidence Underlying Montague's Language Descriptions.William S. Cooper - 1978 - Synthese 38 (1):39 - 71.
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  • Explicativity, Corroboration, and the Relative Odds of Hypotheses.Irving John Good - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):39 - 73.
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  • Propensity and Necessity.Ronald N. Giere - 1979 - Synthese 40 (3):439 - 451.
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  • Some Observations on Induction in Predicate Probabilistic Reasoning.M. J. Hill, J. B. Paris & G. M. Wilmers - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):43-75.
    We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties.
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  • Carnapian and Tarskian Semantics.Pierre Wagner - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):97-119.
    Many papers have been devoted to the semantic turn Carnap took in the late 1930s after Tarski had explained to him his method for defining truth and his work on the establishment of scientific semantics. Commentators have often argued that the major turn in Carnap’s approach to languages had already been taken in the Logical Syntax of Language, but they have usually assumed that Carnap was happy to subsequently follow Tarski and adopt Tarskian semantics. In this paper, it is argued (...)
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  • A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
    Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi-propositional attitude that is generally not truth-evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme (...)
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  • The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  • Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2006 - In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. pp. 90--100.
    Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes and effects (...)
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  • Carnap and de Finetti on Bets and the Probability of Singular Events: The Dutch Book Argument Reconsidered.Klaus Heilig - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):325-346.
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  • Semantical Questions in Carnap's Inductive Logic.Howard Smokler - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):129-135.
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  • Must the Logical Probability of Laws Be Zero?C. Howson - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):153-163.
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  • A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.
    Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility [Joyce, 1998]. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations [Pettigrew, 2012]. Joyce’s argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that (...)
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  • The Nature and Structure of Scientific Theories.C. Ulises Moulines - 2010 - Metatheoria – Revista de Filosofía E Historia de la Ciencia 1:15--29.
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  • Unexpected Expectations.Alan Hájek - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):533-567.
    A decade ago, Harris Nover and I introduced the Pasadena game, which we argued gives rise to a new paradox in decision theory even more troubling than the St Petersburg paradox. Gwiazda's and Smith's articles in this volume both offer revisionist solutions. I critically engage with both articles. They invite reflections on a number of deep issues in the foundations of decision theory, which I hope to bring out. These issues include: some ways in which orthodox decision theory might be (...)
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  • Carnapian Inductive Logic for a Value Continuum.Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):78-89.
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  • Analogical Predictions for Explicit Similarity.Jan Willem Romeijn - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (2):253 - 280.
    This paper concerns exchangeable analogical predictions based on similarity relations between predicates, and deals with a restricted class of such relations. It describes a system of Carnapian λγ rules on underlying predicate families to model the analogical predictions for this restricted class. Instead of the usual axiomatic definition, the system is characterized with a Bayesian model that employs certain statistical hypotheses. Finally the paper argues that the Bayesian model can be generalized to cover cases outside the restricted class of similarity (...)
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  • Causality as a Theoretical Concept: Explanatory Warrant and Empirical Content of the Theory of Causal Nets.Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1073-1103.
    We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal nets and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour. In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause–effect relations can be (...)
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  • Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering: Inductive Logic in Rudolf Carnap's Scientific Philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
    My dissertation explores the ways in which Rudolf Carnap sought to make philosophy scientific by further developing recent interpretive efforts to explain Carnap’s mature philosophical work as a form of engineering. It does this by looking in detail at his philosophical practice in his most sustained mature project, his work on pure and applied inductive logic. I, first, specify the sort of engineering Carnap is engaged in as involving an engineering design problem and then draw out the complications of design (...)
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  • From Bayesian Epistemology to Inductive Logic.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):468-486.
    Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) (...)
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