The religious borders of Europe, which are more evident and controversial than ever, challenge established forms of political legitimacy and the legal requirements for citizenship. Perhaps covertly rather than overtly, they shape politics and policies. While scholars have once again resorted to Edward Said’s Orientalism to describe the dynamic at play, this article argues that the Orientalism narrative of East and West is too simple to capture the actual complexity of Europe’s borders. There are four religious and thus four cultural-symbolic (...) borders, which are increasingly defining the continent: north-western Europe is Protestant, southern Europe is Catholic, the East is Orthodox and increasingly nationalist, and the South and Near East are Muslim. The cultural purity and the values that Europe craves in search of identity and order are simply not available in a world of global interconnectedness and social diversity. (shrink)

While one of the arguments against religious belief relates to its apparent irrationality, it can be shown phenomenologically that there is a different kind of rationality at work in religious knowledge, undermining the sharp distinction between sacred and secular that enables theology to be marginalised as irrational. Approaching Christianity through the category of revelation, that is, as a way of living and believing that draws not only on founding narratives of revelation but on the ongoing ‘experience’ of transcendence in unveiling (...) truth, I seek to examine how the possibility of truth itself can inspire hatred and so open onto violence. ‘Religious’ violence typically emerges from a hatred directed at otherness. Hatred of what truth reveals is a powerful motivation for violence, but it cannot be shown that this is specifically religious. Nevertheless, otherness is characterised by an excess that resists objectification and may be revelatory of truth. Violence may be religious precisely to the extent that it is directed against the otherness before which each person stands accused. (shrink)

Abstract: There has been an ongoing dispute between defenders of world disclosure (understood here in a loosely Heideggerian sense) and advocates of normative debate. I will take up a recent confrontation between Charles Taylor and Robert Brandom over this question as my point of departure for showing how world disclosure can expand the range of normative argument. I begin by distinguishing pre-reflective disclosure—the already interpreted, structured world in which we find ourselves—from reflective disclosure—the discrete intervention of a particular utterance or (...) text. I discuss Taylor’s notion of social imaginaries as a way of thematizing our pre-reflective background and Talal Asad’s critique of Taylor to show how this background can be one space of argument. I then develop my own understanding of reflective disclosure, of which Taylor gives an indequate account, developing my argument with help of literature, including a close analysis of Susan Glaspell short story “A Jury of Her Peers.” This story illustrates how world disclosure can make normative arguments without confining itself to Brandom’s or Habermas’s idea of the exchange of reasons. (shrink)

This PhD thesis is about communication concerning nature in the Netherlands. The purpose of this exploratory study is to take both a theoretical and an empirical look at whether religious elements play a role in this communication about nature in the Netherlands. In this PhD thesis it is argued that the role of communication practitioners is to signal, articulate, and interpret normative elements in the discourse. In other words, to make congruent frames explicit and clarifying the associated world views in (...) the discourse, including that of the government itself. The government has to be impartial as possible in its communications, but the communications about nature shows that there are questions to be asked about this neutrality. Although not explicit, but through the communications of NGOs, who operate as delegated executors of the Dutch nature policy in the context of this PhD thesis, certain images, i.e., frames regarding nature are communicated. However, the question is raised to what extent the government, based on its alleged neutrality, should condition the communication of NGOs. Here, _tension can be observed. If _nature conservation NGOs communicate a specific vision about nature, using ‘religious subtexts’, the government appears to support these ‘subtexts’. For nature conservation NGOs, it is appropriate to put forth a certain opinion to raise support for their actions among the public. However, in this PhD thesis it is argued that it is not the responsibility of the government to promote a specific religiously phrased view of nature and nature policy. Hence, this PhD thesis reveals a necessity for reflection on the relationship between government and NGOs regarding their communication, i.e., awareness of distinction and a need for mutual adjustment in the case of close cooperation. The results of this PhD thesis are placed in a broader cultural context with respect to nature development. A paradox is highlighted: creating nature ‘according to our view of nature’ and, simultaneously, wanting to experience wilderness-nature, preferably without too much human influence. This paradox appears to form a cultural basis for many new nature development projects. In other words, nature development is no longer just driven by ecological interests. In today’s ‘wilderness desire’, a certain form of anthropocentric thinking also manifests, because it focuses on the human experience of nature. In addition, because nature projects can be places to have meaningful experiences, in this PhD thesis it is concluded that nature projects, such as _Tiengemeten_, not only have ecological value, but societal value as well. It is also argued that in a secular society, we should not lose sight of the mediating role of creating and maintaining nature parks. Designing or maintaining natural areas in a certain way can create conditions for certain meaningful experiences. With our designing vision and communication, we can reap ‘benefits’ from nature. With this conclusion, this PhD thesis shines a different light on the concept of nature development and, indirectly, on the Dutch nature policy. Finally, this PhD thesis shows that religious elements play a role in the communication about nature. These are linked to meaningful experiences that people can have in nature. A religious depth dimension can be discovered in meaningful experiences. This religious depth dimension is the reason that there are ‘religious subtexts’ in the communication about nature. However, the word ‘subtext’ is crucial. The communication about nature is ‘religionised’ to some extent, but there is no mentioning of a personal God or other reference to a supernatural reality. This PhD thesis also shows that the religious depth dimension does not explicitly come to the fore in what visitors are saying. This means that this PhD thesis, in addition to questioning the appropriateness of ‘religious subtexts’ in the communication about nature, also doubts whether those ‘subtexts’ are convincing from visitors’ perspective. (shrink)

Recent years have seen numerous sociological disagreements devolve into heated debates, with scholars openly accusing their peers of being both empirically wrong and morally misguided. While social scientists routinely reflect on the ethical implications of certain research assumptions and data collection methods, the sociology of knowledge production has said little about how moral debates over scholarship shape subsequent research trajectories. Drawing on the new French pragmatic sociology, this article examines how sociologists respond to criticisms of the moral worth of their (...) research. The article outlines three typical responses: (1) accepting the criticism and changing direction completely; (2) accepting the criticism but changing discursive framing to incorporate existing research without being subject to critique; and (3) navigating through the debate by devising new research directions that do not trigger such criticism. To demonstrate, the article looks at how sociologists of religion responded, in their published scholarship, to criticisms of secularization theory as depreciating religious people and spiritual experience. Across the responses, we show that sociologists have included moral considerations in their empirical investigations, and have switched among several diverse moral justifications to address—and also avoid—criticism. We conclude by demonstrating that this model can be extended to other domains of sociological inquiry, including the study of gender-based wage inequality and methodological nationalism. The article highlights the importance of mapping the moral frameworks sociologists use for the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of morality. (shrink)

While Taylor and Habermas respectively follow communitarian vs cosmopolitan lines in their political theories, trends in each of their writings on religion in a global context have taken surprising turns toward convergence. However, what both views lack would be a further analytical and normative classification that better captures the pluralistic dimensions of this shared turn. I consider Taylor’s critique of Habermas’ appeals to constitutional patriotism that lead to recanting the exceptionalist thesis attributed to the USA in order to own up (...) to the exceptionalism of European secularity. I then take up the more pragmatic concern of the religion in a global public, using their writings on Islam in the USA and in the EU as a litmus test for the epistemic scope of our respective degrees of Jamesian openness, referring to the inherent potentials for the moral, social and political integration of immigrants and minorities into a more encompassing cosmoi politanism. (shrink)

Despite its promises, the Islamic state of Iran has systematically prioritized political considerations over religious precepts, inadvertently generating a reformist religious discourse that challenges the very foundations of the Islamic state. This article conceptualizes the religious secularity discourse and the paradoxes ingrained in the Islamic state. The religious secularity discourse rejects the notion that Islamic holy texts offer a blueprint for governance and calls for the secular democratic state to realize the core principle of Islam: justice [Adl]. Towards this end, (...) inclusive secular democratic principles champion a socio-political polity conducive to the cultivation of genuine religiosity, whereby faith and religious practices are free of coercion by fellow citizens or state institutions. By blurring the boundary between the religious and the secular and challenging the religious secular dichotomy, religious secularity highlights the relevance and possibility of harmonizing Islamic and inclusive secular democratic principles. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow do researchers explain religion’s durability in Costa Rica and intense secularization in Uruguay in spite of parallel historical developments? This article seeks to explain why current theories of secularization and religious stability are inadequate to explain this outcome due to the limits of positivistic assumptions and methodological individualism. Archer’s morphogenetic approach provides a better model because it avoids conflation by emphasizing emergence and analytic dualism between individual action and social context over time. Causation is explained by analysing historically contingent (...) outcomes which allow for a synthesis of both abstract properties and how conjunctive events are related thus necessitating the role of human agency as opposed to macro-social forces. (shrink)

This paper examines the May 2008 abolition of the British law against blasphemy. The blasphemy law had been the subject of debate since the 1970’s, which began a series of high profile attempts to invoke the law against perceived offenders. No action was taken until after September 11th, when the Labour government sought to institute a law criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred. It was not until that law came into statute, that the Houses of Commons and Lords seriously debated abolishing (...) the blasphemy law. Against those who argued that changing the legislation amounted to ‘the death of Christian Britain’, I argue that this case offers evidence that the meta-narrative of secularization is neither helpful nor accurate; it fails to account for the reasons why the law was eliminated, or for its relation to ongoing efforts to accommodate religious diversity. The elimination of the blasphemy law and enactment of the Incitement to Religious Hatred legislation should be situated as part of ongoing efforts to negotiate diversity in Britain, and serves as an illustration that a more thoughtful analysis of religion should be a major part of the debate on cultural pluralism. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 st1:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) } /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} In order to see whether there is a common European model that gives a place to religion in the public sphere two issues have to be taken into account: first, if there is a theory of secularization that accurately describes the current situation of European societies and second (...) if, there is a European model on Church – State relationship. The first part is dedicated to the different accounts on secularization that may be applied to European countries: the classical Weber theory that view secularization as an “iron law” of any society, the institutional secularization, secularization as the decline and adequacy of religious practice, the continuation of the classical theory in the 60’s and beyond, the criticism of this theory and the particular argument of the increase of fundamentalist religious movements. The attempts to formulate new theories on secularization based on other assumptions than the classical one are also presented. The increased presence of religion in private life does not mean a decrease of religion in the public space but rather a new definition of it. Despite the different intensity of belief in national terms, some trends like “believing without belonging” are common, meaning that secularization could have a single meaning in Europe, apart from other continents. The second part starts with presenting the three types of Church - State relationship at the national level. All these have in common the fact that the state is neutral towards religious subjects, a religious subsection is singled out within the public sphere and the state has the right to intervene in this area only as an arbiter. There is already a European law on religion and this statement is supported by examples from the Lisbon Treaty, The Charter of Fundamental Rights, different Directives and decisions of the European Court of Justice. Common rules on religion agreed at the European level helps better to understand why there is a common European model on religions, different from the national models. After taking into account the two aspects described above, a common European model on religion in the public sphere emerges as a necessary conclusion. (shrink)

In this article I contend that the re-emergence of religion in Western liberal states is a feature of a much broader phenomenon, namely, the re-establishment of legal pluralism whereby various social actors claim to be the legitimate producers of their own law. To prove this, I first offer an account of secularization as the successful attempt of modern states to dismantle a legal-pluralist system. Based on this, I argue that the reviviscence of religions is the reviviscence of their practical side: (...) religious practices tend to be perceived by religious group members as providing guidance for conduct, one that challenges the rules of the state legal order and its monistic structure. Finally, by exploring the issue of same-sex union recognition, I defend the claim that, in a truly post-secular society, the state should allow a multiplicity of relationship-recognition models that reflect and meet different interests and needs. (shrink)

A persistent sociological thesis posits that the spread of formal education causes an inevitable decline in religion as a social institution and diminishes adherence to religious beliefs in postindustrial society. Now that worldwide advanced education is a central agent in developing and disseminating Western rationality emphasizing science as the ultimate truth claim about a humanly constructed society and the natural world this seems an ever more relevant thesis. Yet in the face of a robust “education revolution,” religion and spirituality endure, (...) and in certain respects thrive, thus creating a sociological paradox: How can both expanding education and mass religion coexist? The solution proposed here is that instead of educational development setting the conditions for the decline and eventual death of religion, the two institutions have been, and continue to be, more compatible and even surprisingly symbiotic than is often assumed. This contributes to a culture of mass education and mass religion that is unique in the history of human society, exemplified by the heavily educated and churched United States. After a brief review of the empirical trends behind the paradox, a new confluence of streams of research on compatible worldviews, overlapping ideologies, and their enactments in educational and religious social movements illustrates the plausibility of an affinity argument and its impact on theory about post-secular society. (shrink)

Referring to basic Weberian notions of rationalization and secularization, I try to find a more accurate sense of the term “secularization”, intending to describe adequately the position of religion in modernity. The result of this query is—or at least should be—a new, original conceptualization of religion as one of finite provinces of meaning within one paramount reality of the life-world, as defined by Alfred Schutz. I proceed by exposing a well known, major oversimplification of the Weberian concept of secularization, very (...) well outlined in Peter Berger’s The sacred canopy, in order to point to the genuine, much more differentiated position of Max Weber in this matter (especially from the period of Foundations of social economic and Economy and society), and, consequently, to return to the roots of Berger’s thought: phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, an attempt to assure the philosophical foundations of Weber’s sociological theory. At a closer glimpse, transformation of religion in the modern process of rationalization does not consist—according to Weber—in eliminating religion and thus depriving society of the religious source of meaning, but in parallel emancipation of many different domains of rationality, including religion itself. Using Schutz’s analysis of the social world as a complex structure of many different final provinces of meaning, I describe religion as such a province and show what does the process of rationalization of this province consist and what it should consist in: a complex, ongoing exchange of cognitive relevances and contents, combined with growing autonomy of many different sub-worlds. Schutz’s theory of symbol, rooted in Edmund Husserl’s description of constitution of complex objects in mono- and polythetic acts of consciousness, moves the analysis to the epistemological level, pointing to a chance of intensifying our cognitive relation to reality through increasing interpenetration of various sub-universes of meaning. (shrink)