Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Unity Argument

In Self and World. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (1997)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Agency, simulation and self-identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • XII—Is There a Problem of Other Minds?Anil Gomes - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action.Christopher Frey & Jennifer A. Frey - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):202-247.
    Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):946-969.
    In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Feeling of Bodily Ownership.Adam Bradley - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):359-379.
    In certain startling neurological and psychiatric conditions, what is ordinarily most intimate and familiar to us—our own body—can feel alien. For instance, in cases of somatoparaphrenia subjects misattribute their body parts to others, while in cases of depersonalization subjects feel estranged from their bodies. These ownership disorders thus appear to consist in a loss of any feeling of bodily ownership, the felt sense we have of our bodies as our own. Against this interpretation of ownership disorders, I defend Sufficiency, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Perception and reflection.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):131-152.
    What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • ‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant.Thomas Khurana - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):956-979.
    The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Bodily awareness, imagination, and the self.Joel Smith - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):49-68.
    Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in way in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.
    Suppose that the following describes an intelligible scenario. A subject is wired up to another's body in such a way that she has bodily experiences ‘as from the inside’ caused by states and events in the other body, that are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary somatosensory perception of her own body. The supposed intelligibility of such so-called crossed wire cases constitutes a significant challenge to the claim that our somatosensory judgements are immune to error through misidentification relative to uses of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Embodied subjectivity and objectifying self‐consciousness: Cassam and phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):97-105.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 97-105, March 2021.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Immunity to error and subjectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):581-604.
    Since Sydney Shoemaker published his seminal article ‘Self-Reference and Self-Awareness’ in 1968, the notion of ‘Immunity to Error through Misidentification’ has received much attention. It crops up in discussions of personal identity, indexical thought and introspection, and has been used to interpret remarks made by philosophers from Wittgenstein to William James. The precise significance of IEM is often unspecified in these discussions, however. It is unclear, for example, whether it constitutes an important status of judgments, whether it explains an important (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Kant’s Transcendental-Psychological Approach to Metaphysics.Chong-Fuk Lau - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    The paper reinterprets Kant’s Copernican revolution as a transcendental-psychological transformation in the approach to metaphysics. It tackles the prevalent scholarly view that Kant’s theory of the faculty of cognition appears incompatible with his broader metaphysical framework of transcendental idealism, primarily due to difficulties in integrating cognitive faculties such as sensibility and understanding within the dichotomy of appearances and things in themselves. The paper proposes that Kant’s transcendental psychology is neither a metaphysical-rational doctrine of the noumenal mind, nor an empirical-naturalized study (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Unity and objectivity in Strawson and Cassam.Anil Gomes - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):84-96.
    Some comments on Quassim Cassam’s Self and World written for a conference at the Institute of Philosophy in 2017. I consider the objection that Cassam raises to Strawson’s argument from unity to objectivity in The Bounds of Sense and raise some general questions about Cassam’s problem of misconception and its application to transcendental arguments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • La pensée sans sujet pensant.Paul Bernier - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (4):589-602.
    Since Hume, some philosophers deny that conscious thinking requires the existence of a thinking subject. This claim is well illustrated by LichtenbergI thinkThinking is going on” (Es denkt). Bernard Williams has argued that the claim that there can be thinking without a thinking subject is incoherent. My purpose, in this paper, is to suggest an interpretation of that claim which overcomes the problem raised by Williams.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Introduction: Sensing the self in world.Tony Cheng - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):57-60.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 57-60, March 2021.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Revisiting Quassim Cassam’s Self and World.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (1):70-83.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 70-83, March 2021.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness of Oneself as Subject.Quassim Cassam - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):736-741.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Chimeric Self: A Neo Naturalist Bundle Theory of the Self.Lucrezia Compiani - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.
    Critical notice of Béatrice Longuenesse's book *I, Me, Mine*.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation