Background No two countries have adopted identical regulatory measures on cloning. Understanding the complexity of these regulatory variations is essential. It highlights the challenges associated with the regulation of a controversial and rapidly evolving area of science and sheds light on a regulatory framework that can accommodate this reality. Methods Using the most reliable information available, we have performed a survey of the regulatory position of thirty countries around the world regarding the creation and use of cloned embryos (see Table (...) 1). We have relied on original and translated legislation, as well as published sources and personal communications. We have examined the regulation of both reproductive cloning (RC) and non-reproductive cloning (NRC). Results While most of the countries studied have enacted national legislation, the absence of legislation in seven of these countries should not be equated with the absence of regulation. Senator Morin was not correct in stating that the majority of recent legislation bans both RC and NRC. Recent regulatory moves are united only with regard to the banning of RC. While NRC is not permitted in seventeen of the countries examined, it could be permitted in up to thirteen countries. Conclusions There is little consensus on the various approaches to cloning laws and policies, and the regulatory position in many countries remains uncertain. (shrink)

In this article, the authors review some contemporary cases where biotechnologies have been employed, where they have had global implications, and where there has been considerable debate. The authors argue that the concept of dignity, which lies at the center of such documents as the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) and the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997) is useful, if not necessary, in engaging in (...) decision making in relation to the moral evaluation of biotechnologies on a global scale. (shrink)

:Something strange has happened to the concept of dignity in bioethics. After a long period in which U.S. pragmatist and U.K. consequentialist philosophers have argued that the concept is useless and vacuous, and in which they have been reasonably successful in expunging it from mainstream English-language academic bioethics, dignity has suddenly become popular again in debates about the legalization of physician-assisted dying. And, even stranger, it is deployed not by conservatives but by liberals. In the debates about PAD, liberal proponents (...) of legalization seem to accept without question that there is such a state or process as “death with dignity,” which is juxtaposed to “undignified dying.” It also seems to be accepted that both of these states can be fairly easily identified and that they carry great moral weight. This article provides an analysis of the current resurgence of “undignified” arguments and argues on the basis of that analysis that a proper understanding of the concept of dignity shows that the previous reductive arguments against dignity are partially incomplete and therefore partially misguided and that, despite dignity having meaning, the idea of an undignified death cannot carry the moral weight it is given by proponents of the legalization of PAD. (shrink)

Is freedom of research protected at the constitutional level? No obvious answer can be given to this question, as European and Northern American constitutional systems are not unequivocal and the topic has not been discussed deeply enough.Looking at the constitutions of some European and Northern American countries, it is possible to immediately note that there are essentially two ways to deal with freedom of scientific research. On the one hand, in Canada and in the US, constitutions have no specific provisions (...) to protect freedom of scientific research, with the result that such freedom ends up having to be protected as a specific aspect of the wider freedom of thought and expression . On the other hand, other countries’ constitutional systems, mainly European ones, expressly recognise freedom of research and teaching arts and science. For instance, article 5 of the German Constitution states that “Art and science, research and teaching are free”, article 33 of the Italian Constitution1i establishes that “The arts and sciences as well as their teaching are free” and article 59 of the Slovenian Constitution states that “Freedom of scientific research and artistic endeavor shall be guaranteed”.Within this second group, some constitutions limit their protection to the provision of freedom of scientific research, whereas other fundamental laws engage governments in promoting and supporting it. For example, the Italian Constitution, which states that “The Republic promotes cultural development and scientific and technical research” , the Spanish Constitution, according to which “public authorities shall promote science and scientific and technical research for the benefit of general interest” and, also, the Greek Constitution, whose article 16 establishes that art, science, research and their teaching are free, and their promotion is mandatory for the State.2 It …. (shrink)