This article distinguishes between two historical ways of presenting the catchphrase “Once true, always true” (semel verum, semper verum), associated with the twelfth-century logical school of the nominales. Within the Time-Jumping Model, a hypothetical tenseless propositional content (enuntiabile) is treated as the common significate of differently tensed statements, such as “Socrates will die” and “Socrates died,” uttered before and after Socrates’s death. This hypothetical enuntiabile is “always true” thanks to its tenseless nature. By contrast, the Fixed-Present Model preserves the tensed (...) character of enuntiabilia. By revealing an implicit temporal index, the nominales could apply “Once true, always true” to enuntiabilia such as Christum venisse (that Christ has come), which not only is true and will always be true but also – paradoxically – has always been true. It has always been true because it amounts to the propositional content that Christ came before this instant, where “this instant” rigidly denotes the present moment. The Fixed-Present Model alleviates the worry that the nominales confused truth-bearers with truthmakers. (shrink)

Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only (...) in judgment. The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception. (shrink)