Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 49, Issue 2, Page 290-313, June 2021.

BackgroundThe Ethiopian law on abortion was liberalized in 2005. However, as a strongly religious country, the new law has remained controversial from the outset. Many abortion providers have religious allegiances, which begs the question how to negotiate the conflicting demands of their jobs and their commitment to their patients on the one hand, and their religious convictions and moral values on the other.MethodA qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with 30 healthcare professionals involved in abortion services in either private/non-governmental clinics (...) or in public hospitals in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Transcripts were analyzed using systematic text condensation, a qualitative analysis framework.ResultsFor the participants, religious norms and the view that the early fetus has a moral right to life count against providing abortion; while the interests and needs of the pregnant woman supports providing abortion services. The professionals weighed these value considerations differently and reached different conclusions. One group appears to have experienced genuine conflicts of conscience, while another group attempted to reconcile religious norms and values with their work, especially through framing provision of abortion as helping and preventing harm and suffering. The professionals handle this moral balancing act on their own. In general, participants working in the private sector reported less moral dilemma with abortion than did their colleagues from public hospitals.ConclusionsThis study highlights the difficulties in reconciling tensions between religious convictions and moral norms and values, and professional duties. Such insights might inform guidelines and healthcare ethics education. (shrink)

Amongst traditionally-available frameworks within which end-of-life decisions in Intensive Care Units (ICU) are situated, we favour Ordinary versus Extra-ordinary care distinctions as the most helpful. Predicated on this framework, we revisit the concepts of personhood and autonomy. We argue that a full account of personhood locates its foundation in relationships with others, rather than merely in “rationality”. A full account of autonomy also recognises relationships with others, as well as the actual reality of the patient’s situation-in-the-world. The fact that, when (...) critically ill, the patient may no longer be able to take an active role in decision-making does not bring about the end of their personhood, or of their autonomy. Because the patient’s autonomy is intimately linked to their relationships with others, once critical illness supervenes, respect for their autonomy devolves to those others with whom the patient is in relationship. In practical application, this means that there must be a dialogue, as the end-of-life of the critically-ill patient in ICU comes into view. Such dialogue should be grounded on this understanding in order to conform best to moral philosophical principles. Ideally the dialogue will involve all those with whom the patient is in relationship and, practical difficulties within an ICU notwithstanding, will aim to be inclusive, non-coercive and reflective as it seeks to maximise the good of the patient in their unique context. (shrink)