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  1. Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
    Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This essay considers the linguistic and normative issues side-by-side. We aim to bring some order and clarity (...)
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  • Can We Infer Our Empirical Beliefs From Our Sense Experiences?Rinita Mazumdar - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Inference is a process by which appropriate belief states get connected. Belief states are biological states in the sense that they are reentrant loops ; their intrinsic feature is recognition. In inference or reasoning the transition process between belief states is regulated by the rule of concept usage, involved in the belief state, in natural language. Like belief states experiential states are also biological states whose extrinsic feature is recognition, such that, one can have an, say, X-type experience without recognizing (...)
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  • On the Justification Problems: Towards a Peircean Diagnosis and Solution.Liuhua Zhang - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (3):222-238.
    Responding to the paradox of inference and the related problems in philosophy of logic, this paper argues for the necessity of distinguishing between two different objects of justification: logica utens and logica docens. Then, equipped with Peirce’s critical common-sensist conception of logica utens and his classification of sciences, I propose a diagnosis of and a solution to the problem of justification of logic. I argue that this alternative approach successfully avoids circularity in which most attempts in philosophy of logic have (...)
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  • Hume's two assumptions.Nathan Stemmer - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (2):93-104.
    SummaryOne usually speaks of Hume's problem of induction in the singular, as if Hume had called our attention to only one problem which affects the justification of inductive inferences. But Hume shows that this justification depends on two assumptions which are not logically valid. In most studies about the justification of inductive inferences, Hume's approach to base the justification on two assumptions has not been discussed. This seems to have been a mistake, however. Not only do these assumptions play different (...)
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  • Induction: The glory of science and philosophy.Uwe Saint-Mont - unknown
    The aim of this contribution is to provide a rather general answer to Hume's problem, the well-known problem of induction. To this end, it is very useful to apply his differentiation between ``relations of ideas'' and ``matters of fact'', and to reconsider earlier approaches. In so doing, we consider the problem formally, as well as empirically. Next, received attempts to solve the problem are discussed. The basic structure of inductive problems is exposed in chap. 6. Our final conclusions are to (...)
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