- Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
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Representing knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.details
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Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope: An Introduction (The Moral Psychology of the Emotions). Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 135-151.details
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Deceiving without answering.Peter van Elswyk - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1157-1173.details
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Interrogatives, inquiries, and exam questions.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Norms of Speech Acts.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2022 - Studia Semiotyczne 36 (11):45-56.details
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Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Questioning and addressee knowledge.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-23.details
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Lying versus misleading, with language and pictures: the adverbial account.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (3):509-532.details
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Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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Bullshit, trust, and evidence.Adrian Briciu - 2021 - Intercultural Pragmatics 18 (5):633-656.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Metalinguistic apophaticism.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.details
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Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
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Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):328-352.details
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True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.details
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Science, assertion, and the common ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.details
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Counterevidentials.Laura Caponetto & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Lying, hedging, and the norms of assertion.Noah Betz-Richman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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The signaling function of sharing fake stories.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Mind and Language (1):64-80.details
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On Predicting.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
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