Integrative Bioethics engages in descriptive and normative fields, or in two cultures, as Snow puts it in The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, announcing though, in his later writings the emergence of a third culture that can mediate between the two. Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions exposes the practice of a new paradigm of the teaching of history describing in fact the relation of science and humanities in the positivist era. The long standing reasons-causes debate that (...) lay the groundwork of the implied incompatibility of the two cultures, as it reflects on the Collingwoodian anti-causalism of the philosophy of history, against Davidsonian causalism, may elucidate the problem of the ‘marriage’ of cultures. Taking a look on Collingwood’s absolute presuppositions and Carnap’s external to linguistic frameworks questions, will help us investigate the possibility of a coherent framework for integrated Bioethics. Can we frame a transdisciplinary field, where science and humanities as collaborating social practices, or as a new ‘cultural policy’, will abstain from normative violence against each other? (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute (...) a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program. (shrink)

Science is about conceptualizing the natural world in a way that can be understood by human beings while at the same time reflecting as much as possible what we can empirically infer about how the world actually is. Among the crucial tools that allow scientists to formulate hypotheses and to contribute to a progressive understanding of nature are the use of imagery and metaphors, on the one hand, and the ability to assume certain starting points on which to build new (...) avenues of inquiry on the other hand. The premise of this work is that, in the words of philosopher of science Daniel Dennett, "There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination." The purpose here is precisely to examine some of this philosophical baggage, and to see where such analysis may lead us. Obviously, it is not possible for a single project to take on science as a whole, or even an entire discipline such as physics, or ecology. Therefore, the core of this work is constituted by a series of eight case studies drawn from the field of evolutionary biology, with which I am particularly familiar as a practicing biologist. The hope is that combining expertise in both philosophy and science in one person, the resulting insights might be useful for the practicing scientist as well as because of their value as philosophical inquires. The dissertation is a combination of conceptual analysis and science criticism applied to specific questions in organismal biology, largely of an evolutionary nature, with the eight case studies grouped into three broad categories: Unexamined Baggage, Bad Habits, and Good and bad metaphors. (shrink)