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  1. Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories.Francesca Righetti - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    This paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand episodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification, which implies a reproduction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to (...)
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  • Introduction: Is Subjectless Consciousness Possible?Christian Coseru - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (5):6-25.
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  • Can There Be Something it is Like to Be No One?Christian Coseru - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (5):62-103.
    This paper defends the persistence of the subjective or self-intimating dimension of experience in non-ordinary and pathological states of consciousness such as non-dual awareness, full absorption, drug-induced ego dissolution, and the minimal conscious state. In considering whether non-ordinary and pathological conscious states display any subjective features, we confront a dilemma. Either they do, in which case there needs to be some way of accounting for these features in phenomenal terms, or they do not, in which case there is nothing it (...)
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  • Psychedelic phenomenology and the role of affect in psychological transformation.Christopher Kochevar - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    In this paper, I explore scientific attempts to articulate a unified theory of the serotonin system and to explain the effects of psychedelic substances. I consider how certain accounts of psychedelic action have focused primarily on cognitive states, and I propose some phenomenological insights to supplement these models and inform work on psychedelics as therapeutic agents. Specifically, I argue that considering “psychological transformation” to be a core desideratum of psychedelic therapy should lead us to investigate the role of affect in (...)
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  • Recovery without normalisation: It's not necessary to be normal, not even in psychiatry.Zsuzsanna Chappell & Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2023 - Clinical Ethics 18 (3):298-305.
    In this paper, we argue that there are reasons to believe that an implicit bias for normalcy influences what are considered medically necessary treatments in psychiatry. First, we outline two prima facie reasons to suspect that this is the case. A bias for ‘the normal’ is already documented in disability studies; it is reasonable to suspect that it affects psychiatry too, since psychiatric patients, like disabled people, are often perceived as ‘weird’ by others. Secondly, psychiatry's explicitly endorsed values of well-being (...)
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  • No need for mineness: Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder and mental state types.Franz Knappik - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-25.
    Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition in which subjects suffer from a massive alienation from themselves and the world around them. In recent years, several philosophers have proposed accounts that explain DPD in terms of an alteration in global features of normal consciousness, such as ‘mineness’. This article criticizes such accounts and develops an alternative approach, based on the observation that many mental states relate to the subject because of the kind of state they belong to. I argue that (...)
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  • How can consciousness be false? Alienation, simulation, and mental ownership.Matteo Bianchin - 2023 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (6).
    Alienation has been recently revived as a central theme in critical theory. Current debates, however, tend to focus on normative rather than on explanatory issues. In this paper, I confront the latter and advance an account of alienation that bears on the mechanisms that bring it about in order to locate alienation as a distinctive social and psychological fact. In particular, I argue that alienation can be explained as a disruption induced by social factors in the sense of mental ownership (...)
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  • A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence.Philip Gerrans - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1059-1080.
    The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function).This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self‐representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced (...)
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  • “Robbed of my life”: The Felt Loss of Familiar and Engaged Presence in Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder.Elizabeth Pienkos & Louis Sass - 2022 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 53 (1):51-81.
    Depersonalization/derealization disorder is classified as a dissociative disorder in the DSM5. It is noteworthy that the symptoms of depersonalization and derealization are commonly found in many other psychological disorders, including schizophrenia spectrum disorders, while phenomenological features of schizophrenia are commonly found in DPDR. The current study attempts to clarify these apparent similarities via highly detailed phenomenological interviews with four persons diagnosed with DPDR. The data revealed four interrelated facets: 1, Loss of resonance, 2, Detachment from experience, 3, Loss of self, (...)
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  • Whatever Next and Close to My Self—The Transparent Senses and the “Second Skin”: Implications for the Case of Depersonalization.Anna Ciaunica, Andreas Roepstorff, Aikaterini Katerina Fotopoulou & Bruna Petreca - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:613587.
    In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not (...)
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  • Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation.George Deane, Mark Miller & Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • The self and our perception of its synchrony – Beyond internal and external cognition.Andrea Scalabrini, Michelangelo De Amicis, Agostino Brugnera, Marco Cavicchioli, Yasir Çatal, Kaan Keskin, Javier Gomez Pilar, Jianfeng Zhang, Bella Osipova, Angelo Compare, Andrea Greco, Francesco Benedetti, Clara Mucci & Georg Northoff - 2023 - Consciousness and Cognition 116 (C):103600.
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  • I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder.Anna Ciaunica, Anil Seth, Jakub Limanowski, Casper Hesp & Karl J. Friston - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103320.
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  • Looking for blindness: first-hand accounts of people with BID.Alessandro Capodici, Giovanni Pennisi & Antonino Pennisi - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):947-960.
    The label Body Integrity Dysphoria (BID) refers to a heterogeneous class of conditions whose sufferers desire a particular type of physical impairment. Variants of the desire for disability share the experiential “friction” elicited by the mismatch between the physical body and the subjective body. Perceived from childhood, body integrity dysphoria intensifies progressively throughout life, often leading sufferers to simulate disability and attempt to engage in self-injury. The contemporary scientific community agrees on the assumption that BID is a complex phenomenon that (...)
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