The capacity to designate a surrogate (CDS) is not simply another kind of medical decision-making capacity (DMC). A patient with DMC can express a preference, understand information relevant to that choice, appreciate the significance of that information for their clinical condition, and reason about their choice in light of their goals and values. In contrast, a patient can possess the CDS even if they cannot appreciate their condition or reason about the relative risks and benefits of their options. Patients who (...) lack DMC for many or most kinds of medical choices may nonetheless possess the CDS, particularly since the complex means-ends reasoning required by DMC is one of the first capacities to be lost in progressive cognitive diseases (eg, Alzheimer’s disease). That is, patients with significant cognitive decline or mental illness may still understand what a surrogate does, express a preference about a potential surrogate, and be able to provide some kind of justification for that selection. Moreover, there are many legitimate and relevant rationales for surrogate selection that are inconsistent with the reasoning criterion of DMC. Unfortunately, many patients are prevented from designating a surrogate if they are judged to lack DMC. When such patients possess the CDS, this practice is ethically wrong, legally dubious and imposes avoidable burdens on healthcare institutions. (shrink)

As the prevalence of dementia increases across the Western world, there is a growing interest in advance care planning, by which patients may make decisions on behalf of their future selves. Under which ethical principles is this practice justified? I assess the justification for advance care planning put forward by the philosopher Ronald Dworkin, which he rationalises through an integrity-based conception of autonomy. I suggest his judgement is misguided by arguing in favour of two claims. First, that patients with dementia (...) qualify for some right to contemporary autonomy conceptualised under the ‘sense of liberty’ it provides. Second, that respecting precedent autonomy, such as an advance care plan, is not essential to Dworkin’s integrity-based account of autonomy. Together, my claims problematise the practice of using advance decisions in the context of dementia. (shrink)

While principle-based ethics is well known and widely accepted in psychiatry, much less is known about how decisions are made in clinical practice, which case scenarios exist, and which challenges exist for decision-making. Protocols of the central ethics committee responsible for four psychiatric hospitals over 7 years (N=17) were analysed. While four cases concerned suicide risk in the case of intended hospital discharge, the vast majority (N=13) concerned questions of whether the responsible physician should or should not initiate the use (...) of coercion in patients lacking mental capacity. The committee’s recommendations were non-uniform. Forced feeding and electroconvulsive therapy were endorsed in each one case. In two cases of intermittent loss of capacity due to heavy drinking or intermittent severe suicidal ideation, a self-binding contract was recommended and the use of coercion was considered as justified for a very limited period. In all other cases, most of which involved involuntary treatment, the use of coercion was not endorsed. Without exception, the recommendations were accepted with relief by the physicians and their treatment teams, who feared liability in the event of harm to the patient. Eventually, a model of a decision algorithm was derived from the ethical arguments in the protocols. (shrink)

The incorporation of neural-based technologies into psychiatry offers novel means to use neural data in patient assessment and clinical diagnosis. However, an over-optimistic technologisation of neuroscientifically-informed psychiatry risks the conflation of technological and psychological norms. Neurotechnologies promise fast, efficient, broad psychiatric insights not readily available through conventional observation of patients. Recording and processing brain signals provides information from ‘beneath the skull’ that can be interpreted as an account of neural processing and that can provide a basis to evaluate general behaviour (...) and functioning. But it ought not to be forgotten that the use of such technologies is part of a human practice of neuroscience informed psychiatry. This paper notes some challenges in the integration of neural technologies into psychiatry and suggests vigilance particularly in respect to normative challenges. In this way, psychiatry can avoid a drift toward reductive technological approaches, while nonetheless benefitting from promising advances in neuroscience and technology. (shrink)

Die Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen (PV) wird kontrovers diskutiert. Dabei ist nicht bekannt, wie verbindlich PV von denen gewollt sind, die sie verfassen. Mit Hilfe eines anonymen Fragebogens wurden Verfasser von PV in bayerischen Palliativeinrichtungen und Beratungsstellen hierzu befragt. Von den 402 Befragten gaben 69,1% an, dass ihre PV auch für Bevollmächtigte und Betreuer strikt verbindlich sein soll. Demgegenüber räumten 23,9% ihrem Stellvertreter ein, von der PV abzuweichen. Die lebensbedrohlich Erkrankten unter den Befragten legten nicht weniger, sondern signifikant mehr Wert auf (...) hohe Verbindlichkeit. Für den Fall, dass die PV nicht anwendbar sein sollte, wünschen deren Verfasser eine Entscheidung durch ihren Vertreter. Abgelehnt wird die richterliche Entscheidung bei Dissens. (shrink)

Live broadcasts of surgical procedures are most common at professional conferences, but they are not uncommon in the wider public arena, with operations having recently been transmitted in realtime on public television in the UK. This phenomenon raises ethical concerns familiar from the professional context, along with some distinct considerations which merit further attention. In this article I aim to examine the issues in terms of patient autonomy, patient welfare and the public interest. Prompted by the interest recently expressed by (...) the Royal College of Surgeons of England, under each topic I pose a series of questions, before closing with a call for enhanced ethical oversight, such as might be afforded by a clinical ethics committee. (shrink)

What characteristics or attributes of a healthcare decision qualify it as acceptable to those who are empowered to judge it as adequate and hence suitable to either proceed (or not) with a recommen...