Deliberation is widely viewed as being intrinsic to republican citizenship. Neo-Roman republicans such as Philip Pettit value deliberation primarily for its role in rendering coercive political authority non-arbitrary and thus non-dominating. Accordingly, a deliberative public sphere is seen as necessary to foil domination in politics. In this article, I consider a countervailing view shared by two otherwise very different theorists – Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In Bourdieu’s account of social practice, deliberation can harbour subtle forms of symbolic violence (and (...) thus of domination) in ways which neo-republican theory struggles to account for. Rousseau’s ‘communitarian’ politics of austerity is, I argue, undergirded by a similar concern that complex political discourse will represent a mystifying ‘sophistry’, encoded in differentiating signifiers, and thus become an insidious site of domination. Both perspectives, I argue, help to illuminate important blind spots in the neo-republican account of political deliberation in its relationship to domination. (shrink)

Rousseau's understanding of legislation as the expression of the general will implies a constitutional principle of legislative supremacy. In turn, this should translate to a narrow, mechanical account of adjudication, lest creative judicial interpretation subvert the primacy of legislative power. Yet in his constitutional writings, Rousseau recommends open-textured and vague legislative codes, which he openly admits will require judicial development. Thus he apparently trusts a great deal in judicial discretion. Ostensibly, then, he overlooks the problem of how legislative indeterminacy—and correspondingly, (...) judicial discretion—may undermine the authority of the general will. However, I argue that Rousseau aims to check judicial subversion of legislative supremacy simply by extending his broader social politics—and specifically, his peculiar concept of republican virtue—to the domain of law. His main concern is that the law should not develop as a mystifying expert practice; therefore, he necessarily rejects any understanding of judicial virtue as lying in principled discourse. Instead, he envisages that judicial power will be checked by a more generic sense of republican virtue. In turn this echoes his apprehension of social differentiation and social complexity as sources of domination and hierarchy. (shrink)

This essay takes as its starting point an apparent tension between theories of democratic deliberation and democratic theories of multicultural accommodation and makes the case that many multiculturalists and deliberative democrats converge on an ideal of political freedom, understood as nondomination. It argues for distinguishing two dimensions of nondomination: inter-agentive nondomination, which obtains when all participants in a power relation are free from rule by others who can set its terms, and systemic nondomination, which obtains when the terms of a (...) power relation itself are responsive to those they affect. Because inter-agentive and systemic nondomination do not covary, it is critical to distinguish between them, in order to build institutions and practices that promote both. (shrink)