Switch to: References

Citations of:

Skills, spills and the nature of mindful action

Andy Clark

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):385-387 (2002)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Know-How, procedural knowledge, and choking under pressure.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):361-378.details I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Explaining social norm compliance. A plea for neural representations.Matteo Colombo - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):217-238.details How should we understand the claim that people comply with social norms because they possess the right kinds of beliefs and preferences? I answer this question by considering two approaches to what it is to believe (and prefer), namely: representationalism and dispositionalism. I argue for a variety of representationalism, viz. neural representationalism. Neural representationalism is the conjunction of two claims. First, what it is essential to have beliefs and preferences is to have certain neural representations. Second, neural representations are often (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
Coping Without Foundations: On Dreyfus’s Use of Merleau‐Ponty.J. C. Berendzen - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):629-649.details Hubert Dreyfus has recently invoked the work of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty in criticizing the ‘Myth of the Mental’. In criticizing that supposed myth, Dreyfus argues for a kind of foundationalism that takes embodied coping to be a self‐sufficient layer of human experience that supports our ‘higher’ mental activities. In turn, Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology is found, in Dreyfus’s recent writings, to corroborate this foundationalism. While Merleau‐Ponty would agree with many of Dreyfus’s points, this paper argues that he would not, in fact, agree with (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
Dissolving the Grounding Problem: How the Pen is Mightier than the Sword.Nancy Salay - 2017 - In R. Catrambone & S. Ohlsson (eds.), Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.details The computational metaphor for mind is still the central guiding idea in cognitive science despite many insightful and well-founded rejections of it. There is good reason for its staying power: when we are at our cognitive best, we reason about our world with our concepts. But the challengers are right, I argue, in insisting that no reductive account of that capacity is forthcoming. Here I describe an externalist account that grounds representations in organism-level engagement with its environment, not in its (...) neural activity. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark

1