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  1. Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis.Lydia McGrew - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):801-828.
    Testimonial evidence that is particularly helpful to confirmation combines agreement on some content with variation of detail. I examine the phenomenon of “undesigned coincidences” from a probabilistic point of view to explain how varied reports, including those that dovetail in detail, assist confirmation of an hypothesis. The formal analysis uses recent work in probability theory surrounding the concepts of dependence, independence, and varied evidence. I also discuss the connection between these types of report connections and an hypothesis about the reliability (...)
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  • Reliability: An Introduction.Stefano Bonzio, Jürgen Landes & Barbara Osimani - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S23):5615-5624.
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  • Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.
    Varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys long-standing widespread intuitive support. Recent literature has raised serious doubts that the correlational approach of explicating the thesis can vindicate it. By contrast, the eliminative approach due to Horwich vindicates the Variety of Evidence Thesis but only within a relatively narrow domain. I investigate the prospects of extending the eliminative approach to a larger domain by considering a larger (...)
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  • The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):1-31.
    The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counter-example to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau’s measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward (...)
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  • Emergence and Evidence: A Close Look at Bunge’s Philosophy of Medicine.Rainer J. Klement & Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay - 2019 - Philosophies 4 (3):50-0.
    In his book “Medical Philosophy: Conceptual issues in Medicine”, Mario Bunge provides a unique account of medical philosophy that is deeply rooted in a realist ontology he calls “systemism”. According to systemism, the world consists of systems and their parts, and systems possess emergent properties that their parts lack. Events within systems may form causes and effects that are constantly conjoined via particular mechanisms. Bunge supports the views of the evidence-based medicine movement that randomized controlled trials provide the best evidence (...)
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  • The Multiple Dimensions of Multiple Determination.Klodian Coko - 2020 - Perspectives on Science 28 (4):505-541.
    Multiple determination is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by means of multiple, independent procedures. It is an important strategy praised by both philosophers of science and practicing scientists. Despite the heavy appeal to multiple determination, little analysis has been provided regarding the specific grounds upon which its epistemic virtues rest. This article distinguishes between the various dimensions of multiple determination and shows how they can be used to evaluate the epistemic force of the strategy in particular cases. (...)
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  • On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias.Jürgen Landes & Barbara Osimani - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (4):525-549.
    Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.
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