Research on concepts has concentrated on the way people apply concepts online, when presented with a stimulus. Just as important, however, is the use of concepts offline, when planning what to do or thinking about what is the case. There is strong evidence that inferences driven by conceptual thought draw heavily on special-purpose resources: sensory, motoric, affective, and evaluative. At the same time, concepts afford general-purpose recombination and support domain-general reasoning processes—phenomena that have long been the focus of philosophers. There (...) is a growing consensus that a theory of concepts must encompass both kinds of process. This book shows how concepts are able to act as an interface between general-purpose reasoning and special-purpose systems. Concept-driven thinking can take advantage of the complementary costs and benefits of each. The book lays out an empirically-based account of the different ways in which thinking with concepts takes us to new conclusions and underpins planning, decision-making, and action. It also spells out three useful implications of the account. First, it allows us to reconstruct the commonplace idea that thinking draws on the meaning of a concept. Second, it offers an insight into how human cognition avoids the frame problem and the complementary, less discussed, ‘if-then problem’ for nested processing dispositions. Third, it shows that metacognition can apply to concepts and concept-driven thinking in various ways. The framework developed in the book elucidates what it is that makes concept-driven thinking an especially powerful cognitive resource. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument for the realism about mechanisms, contents, and vehicles of mental representation at both the personal and subpersonal levels, and showcases its role in instrumental rationality and proper cognitive functioning. By demonstrating how misrepresentation is necessary for learning from mistakes and explaining certain failures of action, we argue that fallible rational agents must have mental representations with causally relevant vehicles of content. Our argument contributes to ongoing discussions in philosophy of mind and cognitive science by challenging (...) anti-realist views about the nature of mental representation, and by highlighting the importance of understanding how different agents can misrepresent in pursuit of their goals. While there are potential rebuttals to our claim, our opponents must explain how agents can be rational without having mental representations. This is because mental representation is grounded in rationality. (shrink)