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  1. Evidence for a Weak but Reliable Processing Advantage for False Beliefs Over Similar Nonmental States in Adults.Steven Samuel, Geoff G. Cole, Madeline J. Eacott, Rebecca Edwardson & Hattie Course - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (10):e13364.
    The ability to understand the mental states of others has sometimes been attributed to a domain‐specific mechanism which privileges the processing of these states over similar but nonmental representations. If correct, then others’ beliefs should be processed more efficiently than similar information contained within nonmental states. We tested this by examining whether adults would be faster to process others’ false beliefs than equivalent “false” photos. Additionally, we tested whether they would be faster to process others’ true beliefs about something than (...)
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  • The Multiple Perspectives Theory of Mental States in Communication.Daphna Heller & Sarah Brown-Schmidt - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (7):e13322.
    Inspired by early proposals in philosophy, dominant accounts of language posit a central role for mutual knowledge, either encoded directly in common ground, or approximated through other cognitive mechanisms. Using existing empirical evidence from language and memory, we challenge this tradition, arguing that mutual knowledge captures only a subset of the mental states needed to support communication. In a novel theoretical proposal, we argue for a cognitive architecture that includes separate, distinct representations of the self and other, and a cognitive (...)
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  • Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoning.Leda Berio - 2020 - Synthese (Special Issue: THE CULTURAL EVOL):1-30.
    I argue that both language acquisition and cultural and social factors contribute to the formation of schemata that facilitate false belief reasoning. While the proposal for an active role of language acquisition in this sense has been partially advanced by several voices in the mentalizing debate, I argue that other accounts addressing this issue present some shortcomings. Specifically, I analyze the existing proposals distinguishing between “structure-oriented” views :1858–1878, 2007; de Villiers in Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford University (...)
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  • The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus.Michael Barlev, Spencer Mermelstein, Adam S. Cohen & Tamsin C. German - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (9).
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  • Is Language Required to Represent Others’ Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations.Steven Samuel, Kresimir Durdevic, Edward W. Legg, Robert Lurz & Nicola S. Clayton - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (1):e12710.
    An important part of our Theory of Mind—the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states—is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering (...)
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