This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem’s and Poincaré’s views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed to them – in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem and the epistemological status of certain principles – I show that neither Duhem’s nor Poincaré’s arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory choice, (...) differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially different. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem’s 1905 essay “Physics of a Believer” is generally read as proposing a neat separation between metaphysics and physics as two fields that have little to nothing in common: some things will be the subject of metaphysics and some of physics, but nothing will fall under the purview of both. In this article, I advance a more nuanced interpretation of Duhem’s understanding of the differences between physics and metaphysics by drawing on his notion of “common sense” and highlighting the (...) historical (particularly Aristotelian) influences at work in Duhem’s thought on this question. I argue that Duhem’s own distinction between physics and metaphysics is subtler than the received view, framing metaphysics and physics as two distinctive fields of inquiry that nonetheless both begin from sensed phenomena and common-sense principles that are eminently certain but characteristically imprecise. (shrink)