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  1. (2 other versions)The Nonconceptual in Concept Acquisition.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2009 - Theoria 22 (1):93-110.
    This article takes as its starting-point that a viable account of concept acquisition must be ontogenetically sound, and analyses in detail two alternative accounts of concept acquisition, one conceptualist and the other non-conceptualist, concluding that the conceptualist account is to be preferred.
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  • Understanding visual consciousness in autism spectrum disorders.Tal Yatziv & Hilla Jacobson - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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  • Conceptual Capacities in Perception.John Mcdowell - 2006 - In G. Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Felix Meiner Verlag.
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  • In defence of non-conceptual content.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
    In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine (...)
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  • Gefühle und der begriffliche Raum des menschlichen Lebens.Christoph Demmerling - 2021 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 69 (3):347-364.
    In this paper I defend the thesis that emotions are conceptual phenomena. It is assumed that the capacity to acquire a language and thereby the capacity to possess concepts in an exacting sense fundamentally changes the human mind and, ultimately, the human being as a whole, including in relation to its physical condition. Although emotions do not presuppose language, the capacity to use and understand a language can nonetheless change their content. In recent discussions on affective intentionality, emotions are conceived (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The Nonconceptual in Concept Acquisition.Ángel García Rodríguez - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):93-110.
    The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge (...)
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  • Against Perceptual Conceptualism.Hilla Jacobson & Hilary Putnam - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):1-25.
    This paper is concerned with the question of whether mature human experience is thoroughly conceptual, or whether it involves non-conceptual elements or layers. It has two central goals. The first goal is methodological. It aims to establish that that question is, to a large extent, an empirical question. The question cannot be answered by appealing to purely a priori and transcendental considerations. The second goal is to argue, inter alia by relying on empirical findings, that the view known as ‘state-conceptualism’ (...)
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  • Capacidades conceituais na percepção.John McDowell - 2006 - Dois Pontos 3 (1).
    resumo Um empirismo conseqüente depende da atribuição de um significado racional à nossa experiência perceptiva. Sem isto, a experiência perceptiva fica segregada do universo das crenças. Por outro lado, a experiência perceptiva não pode ser tratada como se fosse uma criação nossa. Ela deve ser vista como uma contribuição vinda de fora, que chega até nós através de nossos órgãos sensíveis. Estas duas exigências podem ser cumpridas desde que concebamos a experiência como a realização de capacidades conceituais na própria consciência (...)
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